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“Nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our research methods 
than our view of the nature of human beings whose behaviors we are studying. . . It makes a 
difference to research, but it also makes a difference for the proper design of . . . institutions”        
        Herbert Simon 
 
“We are much better at learning from others than animals are, and equally important, we are 
motivated to learn from others even when we do not understand why our models are doing what 
they are doing. This psychology allows human populations to accumulate pools of adaptive 
information that greatly exceed the inventive capacities of individuals. Cumulative cultural 
evolution is crucial for human adaptation.” 
        Robert Boyd 
 
“Cooperation can be seen as the master architect of evolution, as the third fundamental principle 
of evolution beside mutation and selection.” 
        Martin Nowak 
 
“It must not be forgotten that although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no 
advantage to each individual man and his children over the other men of the same tribe, yet that 
an increase in the number of well-endowed men and an advancement in the standard of morality 
will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe over another … At all times throughout the 
world tribes have supplanted other tribes; and as morality is one important element in their success, 
the standard of morality and the number of well-endowed men will thus everywhere tend to rise 
and increase” 
        Charles Darwin 
 
  
I 
 
Declaration of Originality 
 
This dissertation is the result of my own work and includes nothing which is the outcome of work 
done in collaboration except as declared in the Abstract. At least two thirds of the original 
contribution of each of the co-authored papers is my own work. The dissertation has not previously 
been submitted to any university for any degree or other qualification and does not exceed the 
maximum length stipulated by Cambridge Judge Business School. All sources of information are 
acknowledged and referenced in the text and bibliography.  
  
II 
 
Acknowledgements 
First, I would like to thank Professor Christoph Loch for being a wonderful supervisor and 
supporter of my work and research. In the midst of his busy schedule, he constantly devoted quality 
time to meet and talk about my different research projects. He encouraged me and provided the 
necessary freedom to pursue the topics I deeply cared about. I have learned a lot from Christoph, 
not only from his breadth and depth of knowledge, but also from his character. I am privileged to 
have been his student.   
I would also like to thank Professor Stelios Kavadias for all his support and guidance. Our 
many conversations have been very valuable for my development as a scholar. To the faculty and 
staff at the Cambridge Judge Business School – the support I have received from you has been 
wonderful. As a PhD student, everything has been in place so that I can focus entirely on our 
coursework and research. In particular, I would like to thank Professor Jennifer Howard-Grenville, 
Professor Stefan Scholtes, and Ms. Joanna Blakeman for a great job running the PhD program. I 
also thank the OTM faculty, Dr. Vincent Mak, Dr. Paul Kattuman, Dr. Dominique Lauga, Dr. 
Andreas Richter, Professor Yasemin Kor, Professor Sucheta Nadkarni, and Professor David De 
Cremer for having supported me, each one in its own unique way. To all of the members of Clare 
Hall College, particularly all the staff – you made Cambridge my family’s home and I will forever 
be in your debt. To Brian Silverman of the Rotman School of Management – thanks for providing 
valuable feedback on this dissertation. In addition, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to 
the Cambridge Trust and CONICYT. This research would not have been possible without their 
generous financial support.  
This journey would have not been possible without the support of my family. To my wife 
Camila – I will be forever grateful for your selfless support in the pursuit of my dream of becoming 
an Academic. Moving abroad is challenging, and I deeply value all the sacrifices that you have 
made these years. These years have laid a solid foundation for our family’s future. To our children, 
Diego and Rocio, the joy you bring to our life is unmeasurable. Any simple gesture –a look, a 
laugh, a call– provided all the energy I needed. To my parents, whose unconditional love and 
support have been an irreplaceable foundation in my life. You made this journey easier in so many 
ways. To my siblings, who have enthusiastically followed our progress abroad, particularly Jorge, 
  
III 
 
whose many visits brought joy to his godson. To my parents-in-law for their support, especially 
for constantly connecting with Camila and Diego, and visiting us at the time of Rocio’s birth.  
I would also like to thank the Economics and Management Department at the Pontifical 
Catholic University of Chile (PUC), which supported the continuation of pre-PhD research 
projects while in Cambridge and during my visits to Chile. Special thanks to my long time mentor 
and collaborator, Jorge Tarzijan. Without your generous support and guidance, my transition 
towards academia would have been much harder. Our collaboration certainly counts as a “PhD in 
the shadows”; it prepared me incredibly well for a PhD and a career in academia. Marcos Singer 
was also extremely generous, supportive and resourceful in facilitating that transition stage of my 
career. 
Last, but not least, I would like to thank my fellow PhD students. Thanks Antoine and KC for 
many conversations around our research, our projects, our challenges and successes. I deeply 
cherish our friendship. To Corinna, for being a caring and sharing peer, particularly at the job-
market stage. To Armando, Katie, Systke, Geoffroy, Isabel, Jan, Shi, Niklas, Jan, Stavros, and 
Charlie for being great fellow travellers in this journey. Best of luck to you all in continuing the 
knowledge expansion adventure!  
  
IV 
 
Preface 
As a researcher, I am deeply interested in organizations, broadly understood as the relatively stable 
collection of individuals that share a common goal. I focus my attention on the business firm, 
including its variants and subdivisions. My aim is to understand two issues about organizations. 
First, what is their nature, that is, what essential forces explain their origins as well as their 
functions for agents and economies at large. Second, how can we better understand and design 
their structures –both formal and informal– in order to improve their performance.  
Let me describe how this research identity unfolded over time (and how this PhD dissertation fits 
in). 
My interest for academic research began with my undergraduate thesis to obtain a Bachelor of 
Science in Management. At that time, given that in microeconomics courses I was told that 
competition would wipe abnormal rents out, and that reality wasn’t exactly matching the theory, I 
became puzzled by the drivers of firm performance. After wasting several months in order to 
realize that a quest for generic drivers of high performance –that is, invest in or execute ‘A’ and 
performance will ensue – was akin to the search of a philosophers’ stone in medieval alchemy, I 
discovered and settled on the topic of firm performance variance decomposition and persistence 
analysis. That is, I discarded a search for general drivers, to focus on their “locus” and 
“sustainability”. In that thesis, we decomposed the return over assets of Chilean listed companies 
into several components, studied their persistence and compared them to the US1.  A peer-reviewed 
publication came out of this effort (Tarzijan, Brahm and Daiber, 2008), which immediately planted 
a seed: I realized early on that I could contribute to scientific knowledge and, best of all, that I 
could share it with the world.  
Blossoming would wait. After graduation, I embarked in (senior) managerial positions for a span 
of five years. Over time, however, I kept struggling with trying to understand the object that I was 
trying to manage: what is a firm? why not only markets? It happened that my Bachelor of Science 
                                                 
 
1 We showed that, consistent with research in the United States (US), “firm effects” was the largest component of the 
variance in ROA, but that “corporate” and “industry effects” carried a higher relative weight in Chile; regarding 
persistence, we found that in Chile it was explained more evenly by the business-, industry- and corporate- effects in 
comparison to the US. 
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was heavy on economics, so I become somewhat knowledgeable on the nature of markets. 
However, as a manager a few years later, I realized that I had a poor understanding of what actually 
a firm is. The question of the nature of the firm nicely complemented my previous interests on the 
roots of firm performance. My curiosity about academia grew. 
Circumstances led to the opportunity of completing a Master of Science in Management, and after 
that, a dual career as a consultant and as an associate researcher at PUC. I gave the seed a good 
chance. Of course, the theory of the firm became the topic of the MSc’s dissertation. To ground 
this topic, I adopted the typical approach in the literature, which is to study the boundary between 
the market and the firm, that is, the make-or-buy problem. By understanding the frontier, so the 
argument goes, we would understand the nature of firms. I did this using a fine-grained dataset of 
construction projects. Crucially, several academic publications emanated from the dissertation2. I 
loved the process of going from dissertation to papers: refining the arguments, engaging with 
reviewers, presenting you work at seminar and conferences were all quite fun. Moreover, it was 
not all that difficult. They say you know you have a talent for something when you do it with 
relative ease, and you enjoy it! I was on track; the seed had become a plant.   
Over those four years as a research associate, I naturally expanded out from the theory of the firm, 
by discovering and studying a broader field, organizational economics. This field combines 
contract theory, transaction cost economics and property rights theory in order to understand how 
organizations, typically the business firm, are formally structured (and how this affects 
performance). Formal structure is a broad term that includes a myriad of (largely observable and 
enforceable) choices: the extent of delegation vis a vis centralization, the use of incentives and 
monitoring, make-or-buy choices, corporate diversification, contracting with external parties, 
among many others. I engaged with this literature executing several projects3.  
                                                 
 
2 In Brahm and Tarzijan (2014) we show that pre-existing capabilities not only increase vertical integration, they also 
mitigate the positive impact of transaction hazards on integration. In Brahm and Tarzijan (2013, 2012) we show that 
different integration choices are complementary to each other. 
3 In a project that ended published in Brahm and Poblete (2017), we studied the dynamics of incentive schemes by 
way of a field experiment in a Chilean salesforce. In Brahm and Tarzijan (2016) we show how vertical integration of 
activity ‘A’ promotes centralization in the interacting activity ‘B’. In Brahm, Tarzijan, and Singer (2017) we analyse 
how increases in product diversification reduce the efficiency of operational routines. 
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However, two nuisances kept surfacing. First, by drawing from organizational economics, I used 
self-interested maximization as the main behavioural assumption in my research. And, of course, 
by simple introspection we know that this is only half of the action, and within organizations, most 
likely less. Trust, cooperation and altruism, and the idea of social norms as the guide for action 
(instead of calculativeness), are surely a large part of what constitutes organizations and what 
makes them perform.  
The second nuisance was that, largely by engaging with real world organizations as a consultant, 
I noticed that the “informal organization” of companies carries a disproportionate weight in 
explaining firm behaviour and performance. In addition, this aspect was absent from the main 
extant theories of the firm (Baker et al, 2002 is a notable exception). Informal organization can be 
(broadly) referred to as “firm culture”, that difficult-to-define concept encompassing, social norms, 
tacit knowledge, routines, values and relationships (in the lingo of contract theory, informal 
organization encompasses all that is difficult to observe/enforce and therefore, displays limited 
contractibility). Although I had already contributed to informal organization research (mostly by 
studying its interaction with formal organization)4, it felt that I had only scratched the surface of 
the informal aspects of organizing.  
By now, as you might imagine, I was well on my way to a PhD, having decided to pursue it at 
CJBS. Quite naturally, during my PhD I decided to dive into informal organization and culture, 
both to understand organization and performance better and to probe into the nature of firms. I 
consider this a “big” topic that, at the same time it naturally flows out of my previous interests, it 
is novel and rich enough to provide the steam for a PhD and for the next decade of research.  
A “big” topic requires focus. At the start of the PhD I scanned different theoretical approaches that 
would suit my topic and complement my quantitative research style. I quickly settled on two 
related evolutionary approaches, rooted in basic disciplines: “Cultural Evolution”, developed by 
evolutionary anthropologists Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson (and their collaborators) (Boyd and 
                                                 
 
4 In Brahm and Tarzijan (2016b) we show that relational contracts stemming from expected future interaction decrease 
vertical integration, especially if prior interactions and asset specificity are present. We also demonstrate that prior 
interactions increase the use of fixed-price contracts in mega-projects (Brahm and Tarzijan, 2015). In Brahm and 
Singer (2013) we show that the most effective safety training methods are those whose structure promote worker 
engagement. 
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Richerson, 1985 and 2005; Henrich, 2004 and 2015), and “Evolution of Cooperation”, championed 
by mathematical biologist, Martin Nowak (and his collaborators) (Nowak, 2006; Rand and Nowak, 
2013). The former is the foundation for the second section of this dissertation; the later for the 
third section. Below I introduce each section in the abstract section, and then, in the introduction, 
I connect these approaches with the sections. 
The scholarly journey so far has been extremely rewarding. I am very lucky to be well embarked 
on a career of knowledge discovery and dissemination. I am hopeful, as well as confident, that I 
will be able to gradually grow a tree that casts a long shadow. 
References 
Baker, G., Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K.J., 2002. Relational Contracts and the Theory of the 
Firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1), pp.39-84. 
Boyd, R., Richerson, P.J. 1985.  Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Boyd, R., Richerson, P.J. 2005. The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Brahm, F., Poblete, J. 2017. Incentives and ratcheting in a multiproduct firm: A field 
experiment. Management Science, forthcoming. 
Brahm, F., Singer, M. 2013. Is more engaging safety training always better? Evidence from 
Chilean panel data”. Journal of Safety Research, (47): 85-92. 
Brahm, F., Singer. M 2017. Do individuals and teams respond differently to co-
located competitors under different contract choices? Evidence from supermarkets, 
working paper.  
Brahm, F., Tarziján, J. 2012. The impact of complexity and managerial diseconomies on 
hierarchical Governance, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 84(2): 586-
599. 
Brahm, F., Tarziján, J. 2013. Boundary choice interdependency: Evidence from construction 
firms. Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol 22(5): 1229-1271. 
Brahm, F., Tarziján, J. 2014. Transactional hazards, capabilities, and institutional change: 
Integrating the theories of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 35(2): 224-245. 
Brahm, F.,Tarziján, J. 2015. "Does Complexity and Prior Interactions Affect Project Procurement? 
Evidence from Mining Mega-Projects". International Journal of Project 
Management, Vol 33, Nº 8, p. 1851-1862 
Brahm, F., Tarziján, J. 2016a. Toward an integrated theory of the firm: The interplay between 
internal organization and vertical integration. Strategic Management Journal. 37(12): 
2481-2502. 
  
VIII 
 
Brahm, F., Tarziján, J. 2016b. Relational Contracts and Collaboration in the Supply Chain: Impact 
of Expected Future Business Volume on the Make-or-Buy Decision. Journal of Supply 
Chain Management, Vol 52, Nº 3 
Brahm, F., Tarziján, J., Singer. M 2017. The impact of frictions in routine execution on economies 
of scope. Strategic Management Journal, forthcoming. 
Henrich, J. 2004. Cultural group selection, co-evolutionary processes and large-scale 
cooperation. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 53(1): 3-35. 
Henrich, J. 2015. The Secrets of our Success. Princeton University Press. 
Nowak, M. A. 2006. Five rules for the evolution of cooperation. Science,314(5805): 1560-1563. 
Rand, D. G., Nowak, M. A. 2013. "Human Cooperation." Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (8): 
413-425. 
  
  
IX 
 
Abstract 
 
The second section, titled “The Evolution of Productive Organizations”, attempts to break new 
ground in our explanations of the nature of guilds, partnerships and other pre-modern firm-like 
organizations (executed in collaboration with Joaquin Poblete5). I use the theory of Cultural 
Evolution to develop a foundation for the evolutionary origins of firms. In extant theory, a 
historically rooted explanation for the evolution of firms is largely absent. I argue that Cultural 
Evolution theory can address this challenge, putting knowledge, learning, and cooperation at 
centre-stage. This theory, developed in Evolutionary Anthropology, studies culture as an 
evolutionary system. It specifies micro-foundational mechanisms for inheritance, selection and 
variation. Culture is defined as information that is acquired from other individuals via social 
learning mechanisms, such as imitation and teaching. Information includes beliefs, norms, 
knowledge, skills and artefacts/technology.  
In this second section, we develop a cultural evolution model that illuminates the evolution of pre-
modern productive organizations, such as, partnerships and guilds. Specifically, we introduce 
productive organizations in a workhorse cultural evolution model, widely used to explore the 
conditions that make social learning fitness enhancing. If organizations are exclusive and facilitate 
social learning, they stop the negative externality generated by the replication of social learners. 
The basic insight provided by the model is that productive organizations evolved because they 
favoured the conditions that sustain the process of cumulative culture. Productive organizations 
make social learning –and therefore culture– useful to society, playing an important role on the 
adaptive success of the human species.  
Our model has predictions regarding the benefits of organizations for society that are at odds with 
standard models of firms in economics and management based on transaction costs.  For example, 
while in transaction costs theories the firm-like organizations is more valuable when uncertainty 
                                                 
 
5 Joaquín Poblete contributed by translating our many conversations into a theoretical model. Proofs of propositions 
were executed by Joaquín. The solution of the model, as well as the simulations, were executed by myself. Most of 
the writing in the introduction, plus half of the model and extensions sections, was executed by myself. The empirical 
section of the section is my exclusive contribution. 
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is high, in our model the firm-like organization is more valuable when it is low. These differences 
allow for empirical comparison of the theories.  
We test our theory using data from the Ethnographic Atlas and the Standard Cross Cultural Sample. 
We measure the presence of technologies in pre-modern societies (e.g., weaving, metalworking, 
pottery) and whether they were used throughout the society or mainly by a small group of people, 
that is, within a productive organization. Across several tests and robustness checks, we find 
consistent evidence for the propositions and comparative statics of our model. 
The third section, titled “The evolution and Impact of Cooperation in Large Groups: Evidence 
from Administrative Data and a Field Experiment” (executed in collaboration with Christoph Loch 
and Cristina Riquelme6), I zoom in on the informal structure of firms (or “culture”) by studying 
the drivers of cooperation in large groups. As groups grow large, it is increasingly hard for workers 
to accept to pay a cost in order to provide a benefit to colleagues or the group at large. There is a 
vast theoretical literature in the fields of evolutionary biology and evolutionary anthropology 
regarding the conditions and mechanisms that favour the evolution of cooperation in large 
populations (i.e., increase in frequency). For cooperation to evolve, a mechanism is required that 
allows favouring cooperators over defectors. This mechanism is an interaction structure that 
specifies who interacts with whom in the population (i.e., random v/s structured v/s flexible) and 
how the agents interact in order to receive payoffs (e.g., what is known by whom, degree of 
repetition, order of play, details of payoff functions, enforcement technology). On the former 
element of ‘how’, the main mechanisms are spatial/network selection and group selection; on the 
latter, direct reciprocity and indirect reciprocity. 
Using this theory, we collaborate with three organizations to study a workplace safety practice that 
is based on voluntary cooperation by workers. In this practice, an initial core of cooperators strives 
to expand cooperation within the implemented site (e.g., plant or store). The methodology 
leverages cooperation: training and counselling is costly to observers while the benefits of 
                                                 
 
6 Christoph Loch contributed by guiding the research effort, particularly in the treatment design stage. He also 
contributed in thoroughly editing the text. Cristina contributed with the execution of the experiments on the ground, 
particularly in the execution of the randomization, the entry survey, the exit interviews, the monitoring of treatment 
progress, the measurement of treatment take-up, and the compilation and preliminary analysis of accident data. All 
these activities were performed under my guidance. 
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improved safety flow mostly to the observed workers. Moreover, the strive for expansion provides 
a unique setting to study the evolution of cooperation (i.e., its increase in frequency). Using a 
detailed administrative dataset, we first show that the methodology reduces accidents and improves 
culture, documenting the power of cooperation. However, the dataset also demonstrates that, in 
line with theories of cooperation breakdown in large groups, this positive impact decreases very 
quickly as the number of observers expands.  
Then, we examine the idea of interaction structures, by analysing the impact of direct reciprocity 
in two ways. First, using the administrative dataset, we document traces of the positive impact of 
direct reciprocity in the adoption and impact of the practice. Second, we executed a field 
experiment in four sites where we intervened the established safety methodology with a baseline 
“direct reciprocity” treatment, plus two additional interaction treatments, aimed at solving the 
breakdown problem. We show that: i) the effort of the additional observers is restored when the 
expansion of observers is structured around small groups (1st treatment – “Direct Reciprocity”), ii) 
lifting the anonymity of the observed workers is detrimental to observers’ effort, eliminating the 
benefits of direct reciprocity (2nd treatment – “Identity”), and iii) public display of  effort is mute 
(3rd treatment – “Indirect Reciprocity”), but interacts with the ‘private enforcement’ –measured 
with administrative data– in subtle ways. Further, we find that these treatment effects on effort 
translate into the speed of diffusion (i.e., the likelihood of becoming observer) and into safety 
outcomes (i.e., safe behaviour and accidents of the workforce): both increase with treatment 1 but 
decrease with treatment 2.  
Overall, the third section provides unique field evidence of cooperation breakdown when groups 
grow large, as well as of “structured growth” (sustained by direct reciprocity) as a crucial 
mechanism that allows for its recovery and evolution. 
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1. Introduction 
The human species is unique. We have conquered every habitat on earth --from dry deserts, 
to the cold at the poles, and everything in between. We cooperate with unrelated individuals across 
time and space at rates unmatched in nature, even by eusocial species (which mostly cooperate 
locally among related individuals). What explains these two outstanding feats? The answer to this 
question will allow me to place both studies of this dissertation in context.  
The field of Cultural Evolution provides a cogent answer based on a few very simple but precise 
(micro-founded) theoretical models, and a burgeoning empirical agenda (Boyd and Richerson, 
1985 and 2005; Richerson et al, 2013; Boyd; 2018; Boyd and McElreath, 2007; Henrich, 2015; 
Laland, 2017). The unique (compared to the animal kingdom) capacity of human beings to learn 
from one another –labelled “social or cultural learning”– allows innovations to accumulate 
gradually over time. This happens even if social learners do not understand why a trait or behaviour 
might be superior or why a model is performing it: natural selection, but more importantly, social 
learning biased towards the majority, the skilful, or the successful can do the trick. This process of 
cultural adaptation operates fast: it has been estimated to be at least 50 times quicker than genetic 
adaptation (Boyd, 2018).7  
The nature of biases in social learning generates stable heterogeneity between groups, that is, 
groups come to develop behavioural and technological traditions (e.g., norms and tools) that are 
sturdy and often different due to drift. In contrast to genetic evolution, where little migration 
dissolves genetic differences, this stable heterogeneity allows group selection (or multilevel 
selection) to be a powerful evolutionary force (Wilson, 2015; Turchin, 2015): more capable groups 
outcompete and replace others. “Capable” here refers to groups that have a deeper cultural and 
knowledge baggage, and, as the Darwin quote on the opening pages indicates, that cooperate 
successfully.  
                                                 
 
7 Explaining the evolution of social learning itself –the basic primitive in the theory– is however much tougher because 
it is frequency dependent. A few theoretical explanations have been proposed (see Boyd and Richerson, 2005, Boyd, 
2018 or Laland, 2017). 
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In Figure I we classify the evolutionary process of cultural evolution in a two-by two matrix. In 
the horizontal dimension, we divide the elements that evolve in culture into cooperation and other 
cultural traits (especially knowledge-based “technologies”, or ways of doing things). The vertical 
dimension distinguishes two scales (in size and time) of cultural evolution, Micro- and Macro-
evolution. We analyse first the horizontal dimension. 
Figure I. Matrix of “what evolves when” 
  Aspect that evolves: 
  Knowledge / 
Technology / Norms / 
Institutions 
Cooperation 
Timescale and 
extent of 
evolution: 
Micro-evolution 
I 
 
 
III 
SECTION 3: “The 
evolution and impact 
of large scale 
cooperation” 
 
Macro-evolution 
II 
SECTION 2: “The 
evolution of 
productive 
organizations” 
 
IV 
 
Cooperation –individuals bearing a cost to provide a benefit to a third party or the group at large– 
is a fundamental explanandum in cultural evolution. Natural or cultural selection favours 
individual fitness/utility, and therefore it should get rid of cooperation. However, cooperation is 
ubiquitous. A substantial contribution to understanding the puzzle of the evolution of cooperation 
comes from mathematical biology, specifically from the contribution made by Martin Nowak and 
his collaborators in the last two decades (Nowak, 2011; Rand and Nowak, 2013)8. The approach 
by Nowak et al is broad, generating insight valid for non-volitional entities (cells, animals) as well 
as for humans. As discussed in section 3, the crucial concept is that of “interaction structures”, a 
short hand for the details of ‘who interacts with whom and how’ in a population. These structures 
                                                 
 
8 The contributions by W. D. Hamilton and Robert Axelrod were fundamental in launching this research stream 
(Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981).  
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are mechanisms that favour co-operators against defectors. These are ‘direct reciprocity’, ‘indirect 
reciprocity’, ‘spatial/network selection’ and ‘kin-selection’. Contributions by scholars more 
directly identified with Cultural Evolution focus mostly on the mechanisms of ‘group selection’: 
cooperative groups would survive and expand (Turchin, 2015; Henrich, 2005; Bowles, 2009)9. 
The second aspect that evolves includes, (very) broadly speaking, all the remaining cultural traits 
other than cooperation. A broad brush would classify these as knowledge and technology on one 
side (e.g., tools, blueprints, productive routines) and norms and institutions on the other (e.g., “eye 
for an eye”, encoded law, centralized state). The standard biased social learning story is the main 
mechanism driving the evolution of knowledge, technology and norms of behaviour (Henrich, 
2015). Here information and traits are assumed to be transmitted across individuals. In contrast, 
given their group-level nature, group selection is the main mechanism argued for the evolution of 
institutions such as religions or centralized states (Turchin, 2015). 
In sum, social learning generates cumulative knowledge and culture, while interaction structures 
allow for cooperation to spread; group selection sits on top, further propelling both.  
The story is also self-referent, becoming more subtle (and more insightful!). Given the adaptive 
value of cooperation and cumulative culture, natural selection pressures will generate the evolution 
--that is, the increase in frequency-- of biological or cultural adaptations that favour the operation 
of social learning or the interaction structures. An example in biology is the capacity of human 
language which probably evolved because it boosted the mechanism of indirect reciprocity 
(Nowak, 2011) or the capacity for social learning, particularly teaching (Laland, 2017) (the same 
could be said about writing, a cultural trait). Example in culture are political complexity and big-
god religions, which may have evolved because they fostered large scale cooperation, which in 
turn provided advantages to tribes and nations in the group-selection process (Norenzayan et al, 
2016; Turchin, 2015).  
The second dimension of Figure I displays the timescale and the extent of evolution. 
Microevolution studies whether a trait can evolve, and how it does, in a population of agents. It 
                                                 
 
9 There is a big focus on punishment, both peer-to-peer or centralized, as a key mechanism propelling cooperation. 
However, as nicely noted by Nowak, punishment is a cooperative trait that requires an evolutionary explanation in the 
first place. 
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uses evolutionary game theory where strategies and payoff are specified, and replication dynamics 
are assumed – that is, in every period a small proportion of agents copies the strategy that is more 
advantageous. These models are used to study the whether traits can invade, under which 
circumstances they do so, and study the properties of the evolutionary equilibrium, such as the 
long-run percentage of different strategies in the population (McElreath and Boyd, 2007). As such, 
these models are well suited to study what happens within a single population, exploring how 
strategies evolve. Therefore, they can, and usually are used to, explore shorter time periods to 
explain local change. The models by Boyd and Richerson or Nowak largely qualify here. Some 
empirical examples are the studies by Alex Mesoudi where he analyses how different bows and 
arrows evolve within in the lab (so to inform and explain the recorded archaeological record in 
North America) (Mesoudi, 2011); the social norms shifts studied by Peyton Young, such as 
contracting norms in farming (Young and Burke, 2001); and the lab experiments around 
cooperation surveyed by Rand and Nowak (2013). This is where the third section of this 
dissertation operates (quadrant III of Figure I): we study how interaction structures – following 
the propositions of extant micro-evolutionary models – can favour the evolution of cooperation 
over the span of one to three years in a specific population (in our case, the sites that implement 
the safety technology).  
We argue in section 3 that this micro-founded, but nonetheless population level approach, is 
exactly what is needed for studying cooperation in firms. Cooperation in large groups is a root 
cause of firm performance, as attested by the ever-present calls for collaboration and team spirit 
in values statements of companies. Micro-evolutionary models can unveil the mechanics of 
cooperation and of other cultural traits that manifest themselves at the group level. In comparison 
to cultural microevolution models, current approaches in management and economics deal poorly 
with these. In organization theory, cultural traits such as cooperation are simply described and 
categorized without addressing the underlying mechanics (e.g., Giorgi et al, 2015). In economics, 
modelling approaches using rational maximization tend to focus on dyadic relations, such as 
models of relational contracting (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012), and therefore, they eschew the 
large group interactions –or simply extend the conclusion of a dyadic model to the group level. 
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(This is probably done because, if N rational agents are assumed, models might become 
intractable; however, promising strides are being made in network economics)10. 
In contrast, macroevolution11 studies differences across populations over a much longer time span, 
such as ethnic groups, nations, states or countries (Gray and Watts, 2017). What is typically 
compared are traits that have largely invaded a population and have become established (fixed) in 
it12. A typical approach is to study how traits have co-evolved across the different branches of the 
evolutionary tree of populations across the globe. For example, Watts et al (2016) show, by way 
of a phylogenetic comparison of Austronesian societies, that ritual human sacrifice promoted and 
sustained the evolution of stratified societies. With the advent of long run longitudinal datasets 
covering regions, group selection hypotheses have started to be rigorously tested and confirmed 
(Turchin et al, 2013)13.   
However, macroevolution runs the risks of offering unfounded “functional explanations”, that is, 
arguing that a trait ‘X’ exist in a population because it provides some benefits to the population, 
with too slim a description of the bi-directional connections with benefits or the micro-mechanisms 
that generated them (Elster, 1983)14. To avoid this, macroevolutionary explanations require to be 
complemented by micro-evolutionary models. These models provide a way to show the mechanics 
of the benefits generation process, and then test all the predictions and comparative statics that 
they generate. This is what section 2 accomplishes: we provide a long run macro-evolutionary 
explanation for a cultural “technology” that has invaded human societies –productive 
                                                 
 
10 The “easy” case of market-mediated cooperation is an exception rather than the rule: it focuses on the case where 
individuals do not have externalities (i.e., they don’t play a game) and thus individual maximization generates 
maximum collective welfare (Frank, 2012). 
11 A mapping can be done between the Macro- and Micro-evolution and the concepts of ultimate and proximate 
causation and the derived “four questions of Tinbergen” regarding ontogeny, control, function and phylogenies 
(Bateson and Laland, 2013). However, a full description of this mapping is beyond the scope of this introduction. Its 
absence is not detrimental to the contextualization and framing of the sections of this dissertation. 
12 If all populations have the trait, then the analysis becomes extremely difficult. This is the case of human language, 
where all known populations display it. Comparison with primates can shed some but not definitive light on the issue 
(Laland, 2017). 
13 The Seshat database is promising. An example is Turchin et al (2017) that shows that several traits of cultural 
complexity (e.g., social scale, economy, features of governance, and information systems) display strong evolutionary 
relationships with each other in a complementary way, and thus, can be summarized in one principal component. This 
suggest the presence of an underlying general principle in historical evolution of cultural complexity (instead of many 
“equally valuable” configurations). 
14 Of course, this does not considers intentional/purposeful explanations –which indeed can generate traits simply by 
invoking to the intended / expected benefits of agents. This is the explanatory currency in most of economics. 
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organizations such as guilds, roman societae, and partnerships– by arguing from a micro-
evolutionary model; this allow us to empirically test not only the benefits of the mere presence of 
productive organizations, but also the myriad of comparative statics that emanate from the model.  
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2. The Evolution of Productive Organizations 
Abstract 
We develop a cultural evolution model that illuminates the evolution of pre-modern productive 
organizations, such as, partnerships, roman societae and guilds. The basic insight provided by the 
model is that productive organizations evolved because they favoured the difficult-to-propel process 
of cumulative culture by virtue of being exclusive and facilitating social learning. Productive 
organizations make social learning and culture useful to society, playing a fundamental role on the 
adaptive success of the human species. The model also illuminates issues regarding adaptation and 
rigidity, the locus of innovation, secrecy and the origins of specialization. We test the model using 
a sample of pre-modern societies drawn from the Ethnographic Atlas. The empirical analysis 
provides supportive evidence for our predictions. 
KEYWORDS: Organizations, Theory of the Firm, Knowledge, Social Learning, Cultural 
Evolution, Specialization. 
2.1. Introduction 
Organizations, defined as a stable collection of individuals with a common goal, have played a 
crucial role throughout human history. Hunting bands, armies, academies and churches are some 
examples. One of such organizations is the "productive organization" (PO) whose goal is to produce 
goods and services that satisfy the material needs of human populations (e.g., food, shelter, tools). 
Whether it is the societas in roman times (Hansmann et al., 2006), the guilds in medieval times 
(Ogilvie, 2014), or the partnerships in early renaissance (Padgett et al., 2006), goods and services of 
POs have consistently sustained towns, cities and states. In the last century and a half, the influence 
of modern firms such as large corporations cannot be overstated: their scale and reach dominates 
modern economic life (Chandler, 1990)15. 
                                                 
 
15 Although the theory we develop in this paper lends itself to a broad application, organizations are varied. We 
focus on POs as we judge to be it the most direct and informative application of our model. 
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Organizations are varied, so let us contextualize POs at the outset. There is a vast literature in sociology 
describing and cataloguing organizations (Blau and Scott, 1963; Scott, 2003). First, organizations 
exclude social aggregates --collection of people in the same place (e.g., public in stadium)-- and 
networks --fluid collection of connected individuals sharing an interest (e.g., collectors). Organizations 
are groups --a stable and interacting collection of individuals. But not all groups are organizations. 
“Primary groups" such as family, household, and friends do not have a specific goal; instead they serve 
an intimate and emotional supporting role. Organizations, in contrast, are a “secondary group" that 
exhibit a common and specific goal, often practical or utilitarian. Most organizations also display a 
high degree of formalization (e.g., roles, rules governing behavior, clear boundaries). POs are located 
here: they are a large subset of these formal organizations16. POs differentiate from another important 
type of formal organization, the “voluntary organizations", where members can freely join or leave 
(e.g., some charitable organizations, clubs, churches); POs, as we define them, have instead the crucial 
distinction of restricted access. Although the most common type of POs are for profit companies 
producing goods and services, our definition does not preclude other POs providing more specific 
services such as defence (e.g., police, army), healthcare and education (e.g., schools, universities). 
However, we restrict our attention to companies, especially its pre-modern predecessors such as guilds 
and partnerships, to focus the discussion. This allows contrasting with theories in economics, and it 
avoids dealing with the nuances that arise when discussing some specific services such as defence or 
education. 
Extensive research in economics and business provides explanations for the existence of POs, 
focusing on incentives and governance. Under the umbrella of the "theory of the firm", several 
theories propose, in a nutshell, that firms are a way to avoid the potential hazards involved in the 
market exchange of goods, labor and assets (Coase, 1937). Under conditions of uncertainty and 
specificity, transactions among self-motivated agents become costly, favouring the use of a 
hierarchical organization to govern them. Different theories emphasize different costs of market 
exchange, and thus different rationales for firms. For example, firms allow for ex-ante investment 
incentives when parties could behave opportunistically (Hart and Moore, 1990); firms allow for the use 
                                                 
 
16 In contrast, “informal organization" refers to the tacit consensus and norms that guide the goal-directed behavior of the 
group. All “formal organizations" contain informal organization within them; in contrast, informal organizations can exist 
with minimal, or even none, formalization (however, this is rarer). 
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of authority and fiat when transaction complexity requires constant coordination (Williamson, 1991); 
firms solve moral hazard problems that stem from diversity of tasks in a transaction (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom, 1991), among others. Empirical evidence is supportive of these governance functions of 
firms (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). 
Recent research indicates, however, that the nature of productive organizations is not only about 
protection from hazards in exchange or investment, but also about being carriers and 
transmitters of culture, knowledge and intangible capital. Plenty of evidence is consistent with this 
view. Recent evidence on a comprehensive sample of US firms shows that vertically integrated 
companies display a surprisingly small flow of physical goods and a significant flow of knowledge 
and intangible capital (Atalay et al., 2014); the literature on organizational learning shows that 
knowledge diffusion is enhanced within firms (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011); the existence of 
persistent performance differentials across firms has been related to firm specific know-how based on 
relationships and culture (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012); the central function of guilds in medieval 
Europe was the efficient transmission of skills and tacit knowledge (De La Croix et al., 2017); 
modern partnerships (e.g., a law firm) essentially provides know-how to its members through 
effective training and mentoring (Morrison and Wilhelm, 2008). Common to these examples is the 
idea of knowledge and information transmitted among individuals via social learning (e.g., 
copying, teaching, apprenticeship). Thus, a first challenge is to incorporate social learning -the 
basic building block of culture- into the theory of productive organizations. 
A second challenge to mainstream theories of POs is that their evolutionary origin is not addressed 
and, consequently, we lack an understanding of their historical role in the development of our 
civilization. Current theories of POs focus on modern firms such as corporations, without 
addressing their relationship with their historical "predecessors" (e.g., partnerships, guilds, roman 
societas). In current theories, POs are a de novo phenomenon, without explaining how they went 
from non-existence to current universality. In other words, we lack an understanding of the 
evolutionary and historically grounded mechanisms that made the POs to be selected, to gradually 
increase in frequency and to come to dominate the modern economic landscape17. Clarifying the 
                                                 
 
17 As the following quote attest, this is also true for evolutionary theories of POs: "One kind of glaring omission in 
our 1982 book was the failure to think about evolution, and industry evolution in particular, in a historical context. 
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historical role and evolutionary roots of POs is necessary to fully understand their nature and their 
contribution to our species success. 
In this article, we develop and test a theory of the origin of POs that tackles these challenges. First, 
our theory puts social learning at the centre of the role played by POs. Using a cultural evolution 
model (Boyd and Richerson, 1995), we show that POs can improve the conditions that are necessary 
for knowledge, technologies and other cultural traits to accumulate over time, a key driver of cultural 
complexity and the adaptive success of our species. In particular, POs need to restrict access and 
facilitate social learning in order to favour cultural ratcheting. This produces an account of POs based 
on knowledge and culture that does not require incentive and governance considerations. Further, by 
focusing on knowledge and cultural accumulation we go beyond extant theories that consider 
knowledge but that focus on the optimal organization of knowledge activities (e.g., hierarchies as a 
natural response to problems of varying complexity and agents of varying capacity; see Garicano, 
2000). 
Second, our theory provides a logic for the rise and invasion of POs. In our evolutionary past, the 
first exclusive and social-learning-enhancing POs favoured the conditions for cumulative culture, 
and consequently, several mechanisms -natural selection, biased social learning, and group 
selection- would have operated in selecting the POs, which then gradually invaded the landscape. 
This provides an additional layer to our understanding of POs. In current incentive-based theories 
the set of exchanges or investments requiring governance originate from an already-in-place and 
exogenous pool of knowledge and technologies. Instead, in our theory POs arose and expanded because 
they favoured the expansion of this pool. Given that knowledge and cultural accumulation is at the 
base of our species' success, it is natural to look there for the origins of POs.  
The theory of the origin of POs applies straightforwardly to pre-modern POs such as guilds and 
long-standing POs such as partnerships. Consistently, we test our theory in the context of pre-modern 
societies using the Ethnographic Atlas. To the extent that modern firms (e.g., corporations, limited 
                                                 
 
This is a real head-thumper kind of realization after the fact." (stated by Sidney Winter in Murmann et al, 2003, p. 
28) 
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liability companies) descend from these earlier organizations, our theory also provides insights into 
to the nature of modern firms18. 
2.1.1. Our argument and findings 
Our model is based on standard theories on cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Boyd 
and Richerson, 2005; Henrich, 2015). These ideas, developed in Evolutionary Anthropology, 
study culture as an evolutionary system (which can also feed back into genetic evolution, hence 
its tag of "dual-inheritance theory"). The theory specifies micro-founded mechanisms for the 
inheritance, selection and variation of cultural traits. Culture is defined as information that is 
acquired from other individuals via social learning mechanisms, such as imitation and teaching 
from parents (vertical transmission) or non-related peers (horizontal and oblique transmission). 
Information includes beliefs, norms, knowledge, skills, artefacts and technology. A central insight of 
this theory is that social learning –a fundamental behavioural trait of the theory– is able to generate 
cumulative culture. By way of diffusing innovations in a population, social learning can make 
small innovations to accumulate over time in a society. This has allowed the human species to 
adapt and conquer, in a very short span of evolutionary time, every environment in the globe. 
                                                 
 
18 Based on the accounts of Dari-Mattiacci et al (2017), Guinnane et al (2007) and De la Croix et al (2018), among 
many others, it is possible to establish guilds, and particularly partnerships, as ancestors of modern firms. Modern 
firms such as corporations and private limited liabilities companies display incorporation, limited liability, asset 
shielding, capital lock-in and tradeable shares (either privately or publicly, in stock markets). Guilds were incorporated 
entities that produced the bulk of goods and services consumed in pre-modern economies; modern companies fulfil 
that role nowadays. The partnership ancestry of modern firms is much clearer. The limitations of partnerships to lock-
in capital in the wake of long distance maritime trade in early 17th century, drove the partnerships’ owners to push for 
the creation of two historical corporations whose charter included asset lock-in, the Dutch India Company and its 
British counterpart, the East India Company (Dari-Mattiacci et al, 2017). Over time, these corporations slowly added 
the other complementary features of modern firms such as tradeable shares and limited liability. Corporations had to 
wait for early- and mid-1800 to be fully established themselves through legislation as a “free access” organizational 
form, without the need for case-by-case charters. However, their incidence remained low as they were costly in terms 
of capital and informational requirements; partnerships remained the dominant organizational form for small and 
medium sized business and new ventures. In the late 19th century and early the 20th century, a new type of modern 
firm arose, the Private Limited Liability Companies (PLLC). The PLLC combined the best of corporations, such as 
limited liability and asset lock-in, with the best of partnership, flexibility and low cost. Once established, the PLLC 
quickly replaced the partnerships as the preferred organizational form for new firms, with a share of 60% to 80% in 
Europe (Guinnane et al, 2007). In the US, PLLC was introduced in 1980s. Interestingly, over time partnerships had 
already evolved to partially mimic the PLLC and continued to do so. For example, LLPs (Limited Liability 
Partnership) include limited liability for the “general” partner, typically the one providing capital. Again, as in other 
countries, the PLLC has been successful in outplacing the partnership as the preferred organizational vehicle.  
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Oftentimes, this cultural selection process occurs independent of people's awareness or immediate 
understanding (Henrich, 2015).  
However, social learning is not automatically conducive to adaptive cumulative culture (i.e., a 
culture that increases fitness). An important class of cultural evolution models show that, although 
social learning is favoured by selection, it does not directly lead to an increase in Fitness (Rogers, 
1988; Boyd and Richerson, 1995). The problem is that, under changing environmental conditions 
(which call for novel technologies or cultural traits after a change), if part of the society invest in 
understanding the current state of nature and developing the required technology (i.e., individual 
learning) and others simply copy someone else in the society at a lower cost (i.e., social learners), 
then social learners enjoy higher fitness and, over time, expand until their Fitness equalizes to that 
o§ individual learners. The outcome is a society with culture (i.e., social learning diffuses the 
technology and the cultural traits) but whose fitness hasn’t increased (as compared to the starting 
condition of only individual learners). Simply put, social learning generates culture, but it is non-
adaptive. This result, known as Roger’s paradox, has generated an important literature exploring 
the conditions that makes social learning a source of adaptive cumulative culture (Laland, 2017; 
Boyd and Richerson, 1995; Boyd et al., 2013). Some of these conditions are payoff biased social 
learning, selective learning (e.g., using social or individual learning depending on the 
circumstances), and traits/technologies that are not independent across environmental states (see 
Boyd et al., 2013 for more details). 
In this paper, we show that POs allows societies to overcome Roger’s paradox and thus facilitate 
adaptive cultural accumulation. The exclusiveness of POs allows society to benefit from the 
improvements in social learning that happen within the POs. We contend that this benefit is the 
key to understanding the origins and subsequent increase in frequency of POs. Once a “right" PO 
arises (exclusive and better at social learning), then cultural group selection will exploit its capacity 
to generate adaptive culture, leading to an increase in its frequency over time. There are several 
group selection processes at play: first, POs will be imitated by other groups or societies; second, 
the group or society with POs will attract migration from worse-o§ better societies; third, the group 
or society with POs produce more offspring and therefore will expand geographically more 
rapidly; fourth, POs help in generating technological and numerical advantage in armed conflicts 
with other societies. Note that these selection processes have been shown to select and diffuse 
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other group-level or society-level traits, such as routines, religion, or political institutions (Henrich, 
2015; Turchin, 2016). 
To be clear, we do not model the long-run cultural selection processes. We do not model different 
groups or societies with different institutions, for example with POs of different types, competing 
against one another over time. In this paper we determine the conditions of POs that make social 
learning useful as a source of adaptive cultural accumulation. Then we rely on the four mechanisms 
of the cultural selection processes described above to do the “long-run lifting". This type of 
explanation is standard in evolution. In biology, an evolutionary explanation consists of clarifying 
how the trait favours reproduction and survival (e.g., colour of flowers attract bees which then help 
polonization), and then simply pointing that natural selection will gradually select that trait in the 
organism’s population (e.g., flowers with no colours will be selected out)19. Similarly, given that 
it is well documented that adaptive cumulative culture and group selection are the crucial processes 
that generated the success and expansion of the human species (Boyd, 2017; Henrich, 2015; 
Turchin, 2016; Laland, 2017), it only su¢ ces to demonstrate that the trait being explored favours 
the conditions for these processes to operate (or alternatively, that the trait will be harnessed by 
these processes) in order to claim that the trait is going to invade the social landscape. In our case, 
we show that POs directly support adaptive cumulative culture, which in turn, supports group 
selection. 
The modelling approach is as follow. We use is a workhorse cultural evolution model, widely used to 
explore the conditions that make social learning adaptive (Rogers, 1988, Boyd and Richerson, 1995). 
On every period, a population of agents adopts an activity (or technology) that confers benefits but 
whose value is lost if the environment changes. These agents can have one of two strategies: individual 
learning, where agents always adapt their activity to the environment of the current period with a cost 
𝐶, or social learning, where the agent bear cost 𝑐 (lower than 𝐶) in order to copy a random agent 
from the previous period. Consistent with prior literature, we show that, although favoured by 
                                                 
 
19 Paleontology and phylogenetic trees complement this by building the “tree of life", that is, the documentation of the 
branching of the different species over time, including their timing, sequence and differential traits. In cultural 
evolution, the equivalent is: i) the tracing the evolution of artifacts (or institutions such as kinship structures) across 
time and place by archeologists, anthropologists and historians, and ii) the study of the branching of the different 
languages in the human species by linguists. 
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selection, social learning does not enhance the fitness of the population because social learning 
expands until its benefit is the same as that of individual learning. As social learners expand, they 
place a negative externality on the rest of social learners (i.e., social learners become increasingly 
liable to a change in environment). However, we prove that by placing a portion of the population 
into a small group that has a lower cost of social learning equal to c- and whose access is restricted 
-that is, a PO is introduced-, the fitness of this group, and therefore of the average fitness of the 
population, increases. As a corollary, POs end up populated exclusively by social learners and thus, 
POs adapt slowly to environmental changes (an interior equilibrium is reached outside of the firm). 
We explore several comparative statics in order to explore conditions that make POs more or less 
beneficial. Among these, we find that "secrecy" –the fact the social learners located outside the PO 
learn imperfectly from the agents within the PO– decreases the fitness of POs. 
Intuitively, POs make social learning adaptive by using two mechanisms. First, POs improve the 
efficiency and the fidelity of knowledge transmission (𝑐 ̃ < 𝑐)  , a crucial driver of cumulative culture 
(Lewis and Laland, 2012).  Knowledge transmission is a cooperative act (Laland, 2017; Fogarty et 
al., 2011) and POs naturally generate conditions that favour cooperation among their members. This 
comes from many sources, such as population structure and assortment of cooperative types (Nowak, 
2016; Rand and Nowak, 2013) or triggering deep seated tribal instincts (Bowles, 2009). The second 
mechanism is that POs, by way of being exclusive, put a halt to the expansion of social learners, 
limiting the negative externality they generate. This restriction of access enables that any 
improvements in the cost of social learning within POs can be adaptive and useful for society. Thus, 
instead of preventing hazards when agents interacts (as in current theories of POs), POs mitigate the 
negative externality that the expansion of social learners generates. 
An important contribution of our theory is that it provides a novel solution to Roger's 
paradox. Current models suggest that in order to increase fitness, social learning has to allow individual 
learning to perform better (Boyd and Richerson, 1995). We are the first to show that social learning 
can be beneficial to society without resorting to a positive impact on individual learning. Within 
exclusive POs, improvements in social learning are sufficient. Equally important, our theory also 
provides an explanation for the origin of specialization within POs, a condition that has been 
prevalent in these organizations. Contrary to extant explanations based on comparative advantages 
and economies of scale, we show that even in societies in which trade is absent, specialization 
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within POs -that is, social learners of a PO share the same activity- will be beneficial to the 
society. In a world with multiple productive activities, specialization within POs maximizes the 
social learning advantage of POs, which in turn maximizes the fitness benefits that POs bring to 
society. 
We test our theory using data from the Ethnographic Atlas and the Standard Cross Cultural 
Sample, as provided by the D-PLACE dataset (Kirby et al., 2016). We measure the presence of 
technologies in pre-modern societies (e.g., weaving, metal working, pottery) and whether they were 
executed throughout the society or mainly by a small group of people, that is, within a PO. Using 
several measures of population and cultural complexity as our dependent variable, we find consistent 
evidence for the main propositions and comparative statics of our model. The results are robust to 
alternative explanations and endogeneity corrections, and we successfully test a secondary prediction 
of the model following Giuliano and Nunn (2017).  We see this empirical exercise as a first attempt 
to bring the theory to data. It grounds the theoretical arguments and provides compelling 
correlations in line with the predictions. 
2.1.2. Other related literature 
Our paper is related to other strands in the literature on the nature of firms. Knowledge based accounts 
of POs have been put forward in the economics and management literature. These theories point at the 
importance of knowledge as a basis for POs focusing mostly on the integration of different bits of 
specialized knowledge in order to apply  it to current productive challenges (Grant, 1996) or in order 
to solve novel problems (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004). Also, they explore the benefit that hierarchies 
provide in matching problems of varied difficulty to agents with different levels of skills (Garicano, 
2000), the substitution of knowledge transfer by authority and directives (Demsetz, 1988) or the 
organization of the firm aims to reduce asymmetric information between the firm and it's clients 
(Levin and Tadelis, 2015, Poblete, 2015) (for a discussion see Spulber, 2009) . We focus on a more 
basic and general issue -the transmission of knowledge among individuals. In this sense we are closer 
to work on organizational learning (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011), knowledge replication 
(Winter and Szulanski, 2001), idiosyncratic culture as the root of performance in POs (Gibbons and 
Henderson, 2012), and knowledge transmission costs as the source of boundaries in knowledge 
intensive firms (Espinosa, 2017). Our theory is also explicitly dynamic, formally modelling the 
transmission of knowledge and its evolutionary process. 
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An evolutionary take on POs is also part of extant research in economics, sociology and 
management (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Aldrich (1999); Hannan and Freeman, 1997; Levinthal, 
1997). Although these theories successfully inform questions of change and adaptation, they do not 
address the question of what are the evolutionary and historical origins of POs. Why is it that POs 
have gone from nonexistence to domination of the modern economic landscape is not explained. By 
studying how POs impact the process of cultural evolution, we provide a first step into this direction. 
Our paper also relates to the literature in economics that explores the long term and historical 
determinants of economic development (Nunn, 2009; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). Within this 
body of work we relate more directly to research that studies the origin and evolution of 
institutions (North, 1991), particularly the branches that high- light the role played by culture 
(Alesina and Giuliano, 2015; Nunn, 2012; Mokyr, 2016; Tabellini, 2008) and that use a cultural 
transmission (Bisin and Verdier, 2011) or a cultural evolution approach (Giuliano and Nunn, 
2017; Giuliano, 2016; Enke, 2017). Our unique contribution lies in providing a model for the 
evolution of organizations, complementing the prevailing focus on institutions (e.g., state 
centralization). Our theoretical arguments on the origins of POs also complements the economic 
history literature that is tracing empirically the origin of guilds, corporations, and private limited 
liabilities companies (Dari et al., 2017; De La Croix et al., 2017; Lamoreaux, 1998; Guinnane et al, 
2007; Hansmann et al., 2006). We believe that our theory (and its further developments) can 
inform the historical data.  
Our theory also weighs in the long standing debate on the role and function of guilds. While one 
camp stresses the rent-seeking costs of Guilds based on their monopoly power (Ogilvie, 2014 
and 2019), our theory supports the camp that stresses its benefits (Greif et al, 1994; Epstein, 1998 
and 2008; Epstein and Praak, 2008; De La Croix et al., 2017), particularly those related to diffusion 
of knowledge. Guilds are beneficial because they can diffuse knowledge conditional on an 
exogenous stream of innovation. Our argument indicates that this is flawed in evolutionary terms; 
in the very long run different strategies –that is, social-learning/imitation and individual-
learning/innovation– are endogenous. In that scenario, cheaper (or costlier) social learning (vis a 
vis individual learning) simply means that society gets more (less) of it, without necessarily 
benefiting from it. 
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Finally, our paper also related to the study of culture by organizational scholars (Schein, 2010; 
Giorgi et al, 2015; Weber and Dacin, 2011; Meek, 1988; O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996). In 
general, this literature studies the nature of organizational cultures: how to define culture, what 
are its constitutive elements, how it can be molded over time, how organizational members are 
influenced by culture as well as exert an influence on it, its relation to organizational structure 
and practices, among others. However, this literature has different strands; our paper is much 
closely related to the “structural-functional” perspective on culture (e.g., Schein, 2010; O’Reilly 
and Chatmant, 1996) with whom it shares the provision of a function for culture (a connection 
with performance) and a broader definition of culture. In contrast, the “symbolic” perspective 
defines culture as the repertoire of language, codes, metaphors, and other symbolic elements, 
without specifying a function that connects it with group performance (Weber and Dacin, 2011; 
Meek, 1988). Culture differentiates from these two perspectives by having a broader definition 
of culture (“anything that is transmitted via social learning”), by specifying endogenous origins 
for culture (via social learning; the other perspectives have exogenous origins such as founders 
or the external environment); and by specifying in a clear and precise way the connection of 
culture with fitness and collective payoffs. 
2.2. Model and Predictions 
We build on a workhorse model in the cultural evolution literature (Rogers, 1988; Boyd and Richerson, 
1995). A mathematical proof of all the results is presented in the appendix. Models in this tradition use 
evolutionary game theory. The basic buildings blocks of this modelling approach are the following 
(see McElreath and Boyd, 2007 for an introduction): i) there is a large population of agents, ii) each 
agent has a strategy that is fixed (i.e., players are “dumb” and don’t display strategic behaviour) 
(instead of strategy, the word “cultural trait” or “cultural variant” is frequently used), iii) there is a 
fitness function that relates the strategy to fitness and that depends on the relative frequency of 
strategies in the population and environment parameters (such as uncertainty), iv) fitness is an abstract 
measure of adaptation to the environment (fitness in cultural evolution is frequently labelled payoffs), 
v) after each period a small proportion of agents copies the strategy with highest fitness (in the case the 
periods occur within a generation, for example 5 years); this is known as “replicator dynamics” and 
allows the share of strategies in the population to change over time (in the case of biological evolution, 
fitness is equal to offspring and replicator dynamics is simply the expression that relates differential 
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fitness of different genotypes –the analog of strategies– to the change in their proportions in the 
population) (cultural evolution can also occur across generations with parents inheriting their strategies 
or traits to their children), vi) the solution concept that is utilized to solve the game is “evolutionary 
stable strategies”; this is the idea that there is one or more equilibriums in term of shares of strategies 
that, if disturbed, for example by the entry of a small share of one of the strategies, the system will 
return to the equilibrium (this equilibrium is the same as Nash equilibrium if rationality and foresight 
is assumed instead), vii) in the case of more than one equilibrium, there are threshold points that 
separate the different the basins of attractions of each equilibrium; these basins of attraction can be of 
different sizes (when an evolutionary game is stochastic, these basins are important).  
On every period, a continuum of long-lived agents adopt a technology that confers fitness, but whose 
value is subject to changes in the environment. There are N environmental states. In each period, 
there is a probability that the state may change with probability p. For every state, there is a unique 
technology that provides fitness. By a normalization, we can assume without loss of generality that 
the fitness of a technology is 0 unless it is tuned to match the state. Agents adopt a technology by using 
one of two behavioural strategies. An Individual Learner studies and understands her environment and 
is able to develop each period a new technology tuned to the current state. This strategy has a cost C, 
which is bounded between 0 and 1. The second alternative is to learn socially. A Social Learner looks 
at what some other randomly chosen member of the population did on the previous period, and simply 
copies its technology incurring in a cost  𝑐 < 𝐶. This strategy is less costly because the agent does not 
need to understand the underlying state, but simply copy what others do. In order for social learning 
to survive we assume (𝐶 − 𝑐) > 𝑝.20 
Let 𝑟𝐼 be the share of individual learners and rS the share of social learners in the population 
and let q be the percentage of people with a tuned technology in the population. For any given pair 
of shares 𝑟𝐼 and  𝑟𝑆 the expected ratio of tuned agents is given by 𝑞
𝑒(𝑟𝐼 , 𝑟𝑆) =
𝑟𝐼
1−(1−𝑝)𝑟𝑆
.21 The 
                                                 
 
20 Given that we model traits that can be transmitted among individuals, our theory is better suited for POs that 
display this behaviour, such as guilds and partnerships. Modern corporations add to the mix the integration of 
different knowledge sets, which we do not formally model. 
21 This is achieved by noting that the percentage q is governed by the differences equation 𝑞(𝑡) = 𝑟𝐼 + 𝑞(𝑡 + 1) ∙
(1 − 𝑝) ∙ 𝑟𝑆. The expected value is calculated by computing the steady state. 
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fitness of an individual learner is 𝑓𝐼 = (1 − 𝐶) > 0, because she is always tuned to the state 
bearing the cost C. The fitness of a social learner is  𝑓𝑆 = (1 − 𝑝)𝑞
𝑒 − 𝑐. Social learners, given 
that they copy their behaviour from others, sacrifice tuning if the state of the world changes or if 
inadvertently they copy from an untuned member. The fitness of social learners is increasing in the 
share of individual learners, because individual learners increases the chances of copying from tuned 
individuals. 
We assume every period a small proportion of agents adopt the strategy of other agents with higher 
fitness levels. This type of evolution dynamics is known as quasi birth and death process and converges 
to evolutionary stable strategies (ESS).22 Formally, a population with shares (𝑟𝐼 , 𝑟𝑆) plays an ESS 
if a small group of invaders using any alternative strategy achieves a strictly lower average 
fitness. Consistent with prior literature, we find that there exists a unique equilibrium where 
both strategies are present with shares that depend on C, c, and p,23 and the fitness of both types is            
1 - C. (See the appendix for a formal proof.) Intuitively, in equilibrium there cannot be only 
individual learners because in that case the ratio of tuned population  𝑞𝑒 approaches one and the 
fitness of social learners would be higher than that of individual learners. In the same way, there 
cannot exist only social learners because then the ratio of tuned population  𝑞𝑒 approaches zero, 
and the fitness of individual learners becomes larger than that of social learners. 
Observe that because both behavioural types in equilibrium achieve the same fitness 1 - C, this 
implies that society as a whole does not benefit from the existence of social learning, because the 
same average level of fitness can be achieved with individual learning only. The fact that social 
learning gets selected but does not affect the fit- ness of the population is known as Roger's paradox 
(Rogers, 1988). This result has demonstrated to be robust to different specifications and assumptions, 
leading Boyd and Richerson to state that "to improve the average fitness of the population, imitation 
must make individual learning cheaper or more accurate" (Boyd and Richerson, 2005; p. 39). In what 
                                                 
 
22 We could also assume that agents are short lived and their reproduction rate depends on their fitness level. In 
either case, the equilibrium concept is ESS and our results are the same. 
23 The share of individual learners is given by 𝑟𝐼 =
𝑝 ∙[1−{𝐶−𝑐)]
(1−𝑝)∙(𝐶−𝑐)
.  Thus, individual learning increases with uncertainty 
and decreases with the cost advantage of social learning. 
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follows, we show that adding a PO in the society solves this paradox in a way that, we argue, is 
fundamentally different from other solutions proposed in the literature, because it does not require 
improving the fitness of individual learning. 
2.2.1. Productive organizations 
We now introduce productive organizations in the model. Two characteristics describe a 
productive organization (PO). First, access to the PO is limited. A 𝜆 fraction of agents is located 
inside the organization and this fraction is fixed. This means that even though additional members 
might want to be a part of the PO, membership is limited by the value of 𝜆. This does not mean 
that 𝜆 cannot shift or evolve; we address this issue in detail in the section 3.3.  
This characteristic mirrors the condition that POs have had across history: roman societas, 
medieval guilds, renaissance partnerships and modern corporations, all limit the access of the 
population to become a member. Exclusiveness appears to be present from the first records of POs. 
For example, Apel (2008) describes the production daggers in Scandinavian society in the late 
Neolithic and explains that “the production is consciously organized to keep the recipes of the 
technology exclusive to certain segments of the society". More general reviews confirm that 
exclusivity is a salient characteristic of the first non-kin goal-oriented organizations (sodalities). 
For example, in the revision by Anderson (1971) of Lowie (1948), he states that in his description 
of early sodalities, “he could find no common characteristics beyond the fact that they all excluded 
non-members." 
Second, agents that belong to the same PO, can learn from each other at a lower cost. When a 
social learner adopts its technology from another member of the PO it has a cost 𝑐 ̃ < 𝑐 (if she 
copies outside, she bears a cost c). This entails that for a specific information to be transmitted, 
lower effort would be required; or alternatively, for a given amount of effort the fidelity of the 
information transmission is higher. Theoretically, this assumption for POs is sustained in the fact 
that population structure favours cooperative behaviour through assortment of cooperatives types 
or higher frequency of interactions (Nowak, 2016; Rand and Nowak, 2013). This, in turn, favours 
the emergence of teaching or mentoring which in essence is a cooperative act (Laland, 2017; 
Fogarty et al., 2011; Dean et al., 2012). For example, when social learners imitate technologies 
inside the organization, they can be favoured by the active transmission from the subject they are 
attending to and who might otherwise be passive. More generally, this assumption can also be 
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sustained by pointing at the deep-seated tribal tendencies of humans beings which make them 
prone to identify with their group and to trust and help fellow members (Bowles, 2009). 
Empirical evidence supports cheaper social learning within POs. There is considerable evidence in 
the management and economics literature showing that learning from others is more efficacious 
when learning from other co-workers  of the organization, as opposed from the outside (Argote and 
Miron-Spektor, 2011). Research on guilds and partnerships documents their role in improving 
knowledge transmission between its members (De La Croix et al., 2017; Morrison and Wilhelm, 
2008). In archaeology, Coto-Sarmiento et al (2018) provides compelling evidence from three 
centuries of amphorae production in workshops in the Roman Empire. Their analysis suggests that 
the variability of amphorae between workshops is mostly consistent with a process of high-fidelity 
social learning within workshops (i.e., master to disciples) instead of horizontal transmission or 
mobility between workshops. 
As before, let 𝑟𝐼 be the share of individual learners outside the firm and 𝑟?̃? be the share of 
individual learners inside the PO. In the same fashion define 𝑟𝐼, 𝑟?̃? , 𝑞, 𝑞 ̃, 𝑞
𝑒 and ?̃?𝑒. The fitness 
of an individual learner is the same outside or inside the PO, 𝑓?̃? = 𝑓𝐼 = (1 − 𝐶) > 0. The fitness 
of a social learner outside the PO is,   
𝑓𝑆 = (1 − 𝑝)[(1 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑞
𝑒 + 𝜆 ∙  ?̃?𝑒] − 𝑐                                    (1) 
while the social learner inside the PO enjoys a fitness of, 
𝑓?̃? = (1 − 𝑝)[(1 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑞
𝑒 + 𝜆 ∙  ?̃?𝑒] − [(1 − 𝜆)𝑐 + 𝜆𝑐 ̃] =  𝑓𝑆 + 𝜆(𝑐 − 𝑐 ̃)       (2)                              
In equilibrium (or equivalently, in the long run due to evolution) the expected fitness of both 
behavioural strategies outside the firm equals. Provided there exist at least one social learner 
outside the PO (something that happens if the PO is not too big), there exists a unique equilibrium 
in which the average fitness of society is larger than that of individual learners. The result is stated 
formally in the next proposition. 
Proposition 1: If 𝜆 is sufficiently small the existence of the PO increases average fitness in the 
population. 
To understand the intuition behind this proposition it is useful to compare the model with POs to 
the basic model of the previous section. In the basic model, social learners reproduce and grow, 
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lowering the average fitness of the population q until the fitness decreases to the level of individual 
learners 1 − 𝐶. With the introduction of a PO of limited size, this negative externality is put to a 
halt before all the benefits are diluted away, thus allowing society to benefit from social learning 
(figure 1A). A corollary of this result is that, inside the PO there are only social learners, as any 
equilibrium with individual learners inside the PO would be invaded by social learners (figure 1D). 
The PO has several other interesting effects. First notice that as the PO is populated only by social 
learners, they bear a relatively larger risk of environmental change and thus the share of fitted 
population inside the firm  𝑞 ̃ is lower than the share of fitted population outside the firm 𝑞. This 
makes POs slower to adapt, and the mere existence of PO's decrease the average level of tuning in 
the population (𝜆 ∙  ?̃?𝑒 + (1 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑞𝑒). 
To understand how PO's affects the ESS in the population, observe that as the PO change size (𝜆), 
two effects take place. On the one hand, social learners inside become relatively fitter, as the 
difference between inside and outside social learners is given by 𝜆(𝑐 − 𝑐 ̃) (see equation 2). On 
the other hand, the PO reduces average tuning in society (𝜆 ∙  ?̃?𝑒 + (1 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑞𝑒) reducing the 
fitness of all social learners (both inside and outside). Eventually the second effect dominates 
making the benefit of POs to reduce with size (figure 1B). 
Another mechanism at play is that the PO increases the share of individual learning outside the PO 
(figure 1C). The PO makes the social learners outside worse off because they now are "forced" to 
copy members of the PO whom, like themselves, are liable to environmental change. This 
generates an increase in the number of individual learners outside, benefiting the PO. As 𝜆 grows, 
social learners inside the PO gradually substitute social learners outside. 
These results suggest that early POs -hunting bands, roman societas, medieval guilds, and 
renaissance partnerships- probably had a key historical role in promoting hard- to-propel 
cumulative culture by way of making social learning cheaper and exclusive. Evolutionary benefits 
of organizations are typically justified by multilevel selection (Turchin, 2016), where stable 
organizational heterogeneity plus competition leads to cultural progress. Our model points to a 
more basic advantage: through cooperation, identity and trust, exclusive POs facilitate social 
learning making culture useful for society. This account provides a clear evolutionary origin to 
PO's, one that puts knowledge and cooperation at centre stage. This contrasts to extant theories of 
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PO's, most of which are a-historical and focus on incentives and effort, assuming that a cultural 
tradition or pool of knowledge is already in place. 
Our results also point at the issue of the locus of innovation. In our model, innovation occurs 
outside the PO. POs may still generate innovations that decrease the cost of social learning (e.g., 
unique language, enforcement devices, adjusting the technology for improved replicability), but 
they do not generate the radical innovations needed to track the state of nature. Over history, radical 
innovations have tended to happen outside POs, for example, in academia or by inventors and 
entrepreneurs (which then might set up a PO to exploit the innovation).  
Finally, proposition 1 is robust to PO-biased social learning, that is, social learning inside (outside) 
the PO is preferentially executed inside (outside) the PO (i.e., the likelihood of social learning 
inside the firm is larger for members than for non-members of the organization). 
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Figure 1. Equilibrium values of the model for different values of lamda. We use C = 0.6, c = 
0.45, 𝑐 ̃= 0.3, and p = 0.1. (A) Fitness inside and outside organization we multiply fitness by 2.5 to obtain fitness 
equal or superior to 1). (B) Percentage of the population that has a technology tuned to the state. (C) Share of 
social and individual learners outside the organization. (D) Share of social and individual learners inside the 
organization. 
 
2.2.2. Comparative statics 
The model presents several interesting comparative statics which are depicted in figure 2. 
Confirming the intuition that the fitness of the PO comes from their ability to facilitate social 
learning, we found that the fitness of the PO depends negatively on the cost of social learning inside 
the organization c (figure 2B). Empirically, this means that improvements in the ability of executing 
social learning inside organizations will impact positively their fitness. There is a large literature 
in organizational learning that provides evidence for this (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011). Less 
intuitively, we find that changes in the cost of social learning outside the PO (parameter c) doesn't 
translate to a monotonic change in the PO's fitness; instead, a decrease in c decreases the fitness of a 
small PO, but increases the fitness of the PO if it is sufficiently large (figure 2A). 
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Another interesting prediction is that increases in uncertainty generate a decrease in the fitness of POs 
(figure 2C). Given that POs are populated entirely by social learning, it is easy to see that as the 
parameter p increases, then the PO will be increasingly liable to a change in the environment, 
reducing its expected fitness. 
This result is opposite to what is predicted by theories of PO based on transactional cost economics 
(TCE), where the value created by the firm is increasing in the uncertainty of the environment 
(Williamson, 1991; Tadelis and Williamson, 2013). Given this disagreement, it is interesting to 
assess available evidence. Despite well documented cases where uncertainty favours the use of 
hierarchies (Forbes and Lederman, 2009), two meta-analyses of TCE show that uncertainty is slightly 
related with a decrease in the use of hierarchies in favour the use of markets and hybrids, a sign of 
lower fitness of POs under higher uncertainty (Geyskens et al., 2006; Crook et al., 2013). The 
literature on industry and product life-cycles provides consistent evidence as well: the size of firms 
is smaller at earlier stages of the cycle, when uncertainty is higher and product or technological 
standards are not yet defined (Klepper, 1996). We expand on the comparison with TCE on the 
empirical section below. 
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Figure 2. Comparative statics. For the baseline case we set We use C = 0.6, c = 0.45, 𝑐 ̃= 0.3, and p = 
0.1 (as in figure 1, fitness is multiplied by 2.5).  (A) We  set c = 0.4.  (B) We  set  𝑐 ̃ = 0.35. (C) We set p = 
0.12. (D) In the red line, we make the PO secretive, that is, social learners outside cannot imitate members 
of the PO. In addition, in the green line we reduce the value of social learning outside of the PO to c = 0.4. 
 
2.3. Extensions 
In this section we discuss four extensions to our basic setup. First we study the impact of secrecy in 
the fitness of POs. Historically many productive organizations have been reluctant to share their 
knowledge with people outside the organization, for example, guilds were protective of their 
knowledge and techniques (Ogilvie, 2014). We show that secrecy is detrimental to the fitness of 
POs, but for a different reason that those highlighted in the literature on guilds (Ogilvie, 2014). 
Second, we extend our basic model by allowing for several competing technologies. We show that 
in the presence of multiple technologies, the PO specialize so that on equilibrium all members of 
the PO adopt the same technology. Further, if many POs are allowed, then they specialize on different 
technologies. This result provides a novel explanation for specialization within and across 
organizations. Third, we briefly discuss the endogeneity of the size of the firm 𝜆, and its impact in 
our analysis. Finally, by adding the idea of know-how and incremental innovation we provide a 
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broader interpretation of our model. This interpretation allows to expand the positive that POs bring 
to society. 
2.3.1. Secrecy in productive organizations 
In this subsection, we study the impact of secrecy on the fitness of POs. In terms of the model this 
means that social learners outside the PO can't imitate members of the PO. Consequently, outside 
the PO we are back to the original case without PO where the fitness of social learners outside the 
PO is 
𝑓𝑆 = (1 − 𝑝)𝑞
𝑒 − 𝑐 ,                                                          (3) 
independent of the size of the PO. The fitness of social learners inside the PO is as before, given 
by 
𝑓?̃? = (1 − 𝑝)[(1 − 𝜆) ∙ 𝑞
𝑒 + 𝜆 ∙  ?̃?𝑒] − [(1 − 𝜆)𝑐 + 𝜆𝑐 ̃].                        (4) 
In this case, it is not straightforward whether 𝑓𝑆 or 𝑓?̃?  is higher. This is so because although inside 
the PO individuals benefit from cheaper social learning (𝑐 < 𝑐 ̃), individuals outside the PO benefit 
from copying relatively more tuned population (𝑞𝑒 > ?̃?𝑒). In the case without secrecy, the PO 
imposes a negative externality on social learners outside the PO, so that the share of individual 
learners increases with 𝜆 (and social learners inside the PO gradually substitute the social learners 
outside the PO) (see figure 1C). In the case with secrecy, this negative externality is not present, and 
thus social learners outside the PO copy more tuned agents on average (as compared to social learners 
inside the PO). 
It is relatively straightforward to show that in this setting, proposition 1 still holds, that is, provided 
the PO is sufficiently small, it increases the fitness of the population. However, society benefits 
less from secretive POs and in order to be productive, their size needs to be smaller (see figure 
2D). This is stated formally in the next proposition. 
Proposition 2: The positive impact of the PO on the fitness of the population decreases if the PO 
is secretive. 
Intuitively, the benefit of POs are now smaller because under secrecy outsiders are not allowed to 
learn from the organization's members. Therefore to make sure that in equilibrium all members 
outside the PO have a fitness of  1 − 𝐶, the share of social learners outside the PO increases, which 
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in turn implies a negative externality for the PO, because there are less individual learners to learn 
from. In other words, secrecy creates a relative disadvantage to social learners inside the PO because 
on average they learn from a less tuned pool than social learners outside the PO. 
This also forces the size of POs to be smaller, because this disadvantage is smaller when 𝜆 is small 
because then level of tuning inside the PO 𝑞 ̃ is closer to the level of tuning outside 𝑞 (or 
alternatively, the relative tuning advantage of social learners outside the PO is lower). 
Notice that, just like the case of uncertainty discussed above, the prediction of lower fitness and size 
of PO under secrecy runs opposite to what TCE would indicate (Williamson, 1991). Secrecy, as a 
symptom of weak appropriability regimes and threats of leakage, would be correlated in TCE with 
higher benefits of using POs, moving transactions away from market and increasing the size of POs. 
In the empirical section we show which of these opposing predictions fares better in our data. 
The finding that secretiveness decrease fitness seems to be at odds with the fact that historically 
several POs have been secretive. For example, guilds tended to be protective of their knowledge and 
techniques (Ogilvie, 2014). This suggest that, in order to evolve, secrecy in POs must have provided 
an additional benefit. We speculate that secrecy might generate a lower learning cost 𝑐 ̃ because 
secrecy can galvanize the notion of "us vs. them" that promotes within group identity, trust and 
cooperation (Bowles, 2009). It is also possible that secretive organization evolved first, with the 
benefits of non-secretiveness being discovered latter, perhaps in current times. 
An interesting finding is that secrecy is more detrimental (compared to non-secrecy) when the cost of 
social learning outside the PO is reduced (figure 2D, green line). This result can explain the trend 
towards more transparent and open organizations that have occurred in the last thirty years (e.g., 
Wikipedia). This trend has largely been a result of better communication technologies that generate 
a higher reduction of social learning costs outside POs (Benkler, 2006). 
2.3.2. Specialization 
We now add multiple technologies to our model. Suppose there are M technologies and as before, 
nature can change with probability p, rendering the technologies less useful. For example, a society 
living in an island with dry climate, and thus non-fertile soil, would exploit a myriad of sea 
technologies, such as net fishing, spearfishing, angling, shellfish harvesting, boat building, among 
others. If the environment changes, then the optimal way of executing each of these activities would 
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change, making the techniques less beneficial. For example, a migration of larger fish might render 
current nets too weak, requiring stronger nets for effective net fishing. 
Agents, like before, can be either social learners or individual learners but now their behavioural 
strategy also specifies an activity (𝑗 ∈ 𝐽) whose share in the population will depend on the 
replication dynamics. All activities are assumed ex-ante equally productive, with fitness levels 
equal to the previous section. The behavioural strategies and proportion of tuned agents in the 
population now have a superindex 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽 that specify activity. Social learning occurs randomly 
but is restricted to the set of people that executed the same technology 𝑗 in the previous period. This 
requires the assumption that a social learner can identify people that executes the same activity that 
they do. Following our example, if a social learner uses net fishing, she will be copying agents in the 
population that executed net fishing in the previous period, some of which will be tuned -using the 
optimal net fishing technique for the current environment- and some of which will be not tuned -
using a less optimal but still identifiable net fishing technique. 
Replication dynamics in this model drives the fitness among social and individual learners 
and among all surviving activities to be the same. Because in this model there could be 
multiple (but qualitatively identical) equilibria, in order to make comparative statics we focus 
our attention on the symmetric equilibria where individual learners are uniformly distributed 
among activities. (This could be the result, for example, of uniform natural preferences of individual 
learners, or some decreasing returns to scale in each activity).  
The results of this model is straightforward, and mirrors the case with only one technology. 
Social learners are selected into the population but the overall fitness of the society does not 
increase. Given our assumptions, individual and social learners will be distributed evenly across 
technologies. The total share of social learners will decrease with 𝑐 and 𝑝. 
We now allow for the existence of one productive organization of size 𝜆. A social learner with 
activity 𝑗 will now bear a cost c when imitating agents on activity 𝑗 whom are sharing her PO, 
and cost c when learning from agents with activity  𝑗 located outside her PO. Thus, inside the PO 
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social learners only copy agents that have their same technology. This captures the idea that is 
more difficult to learn across than within technologies24. 
To show our main result, define 𝑥𝑗 = 𝑟𝑆
𝑗 + 𝑟𝐼
𝑗
 as the share of agents that execute activity 𝑗 
outside the PO, and equivalently define 𝑥 ̃𝑗 = 𝑟 ̃𝑆
𝑗 + 𝑟 ̃𝐼
𝑗
 as the share of people outside the PO 
that executes activity 𝑗. The fitness of the social learner outside the PO is given by 
𝑓𝑆
𝑗 = (1 − 𝑝) [
𝜆 𝑥 ̃𝑗
𝜆 𝑥 ̃𝑗 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥𝑗
 ?̃?𝑒 +  
(1 − 𝜆)𝑥𝑗
𝜆 𝑥 ̃𝑗 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥𝑗
 𝑞𝑒] − 𝑐.                     (5) 
Inside the PO the fitness can be written as follows 
𝑓 ̃𝑆
𝑗 = 𝑓𝑆
𝑗 + (𝑐 − 𝑐 ̃)
𝜆 𝑥 ̃𝑗
𝜆 𝑥 ̃𝑗 + (1 − 𝜆)𝑥𝑗
.                                           (6) 
Observe that the advantage in fitness of social learners within the PO is increasing in the share 
of members in the PO that execute the same activity. Therefore, the evolutionary dynamics will 
drive social learners inside the PO to specialize in the same activity. This is stated formally in 
the next proposition. 
Proposition 3: Given a sufficiently small 𝜆, the PO specializes in a specific technology. 
The intuition for this result is that the advantages of lower social learning costs increase when you 
have a larger group that can learn from each other and reap the benefit of cheaper social learning. 
The total costs of social learning will be reduced within the PO if everybody specialized in the 
same activity. If there are several PO's in the society, each PO will specialize in a different activity. 
                                                 
 
24 The results of this section also hold if we assume that social learners learn disproportionately from within the PO. 
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The standard explanation for specialized productive organizations is that they al- low to take 
advantage of economies of scale and comparative advantage by trading with other specialized 
POs. Our results suggest an alternative and likely complementary explanation. Even in societies 
that haven't discovered trade (both internal or external) and where comparative advantages are 
absent (i.e., all agents bear the same opportunity cost of doing any technology, or in our model, a 
constant c), specialization within productive organization will be beneficial. This is so because it 
maximizes the social learning advantage of POs which in turn maximizes the fitness benefits that 
POs (of limited size) bring to society. In the empirical analysis, we provide evidence that 
specialized POs are beneficial even in the absence of trade. 
It is interesting to point out that in standard economic theory, the benefits from firms driven by 
specialization and trade are increasing in the environmental uncertainty (Burgess and Donaldson, 
2010), while the benefits from social learning we discuss in this paper are decreasing in environmental 
uncertainty (see figure 2C). Thus, it is possible to empirically test whether the benefit of having 
specialized POs is mostly obtained by social learning or trade by analysing the impact of POs on 
fitness at different levels of environmental uncertainty. We discuss this point with more detail in 
the empirical section. 
2.3.3. The size of the firm 
So far we have taken the size of the firm as exogenous.  Although it is not difficult to endogenize 
size, we choose not to do it, in order to keep the message of the paper as simple as possible. Below 
we provide a brief discussion regarding the main issues surrounding the size of POs. 
First, observe that regardless of the size of the PO, people will always weakly prefer to belong to 
a PO. Therefore, to endogenize the size it is sufficient to assume people will be admitted as long 
as doing it increases the fitness of the PO members. The model clarifies a crucial trade-off in this 
process: a small PO doesn't take full advantage of cheaper social learning but a large PO loses 
track of environmental changes. Given that our model is continuous it follows that there exists an 
interior size that maximizes the average fitness of its members (see figure 1A). Several 
mechanisms of modifying the number of members, will make the size of the PO to converge (via 
trial and error) to the size that maximizes the members' average fitness. These mechanisms can be 
purposeful (e.g., voting in a partnership) or exogenous (e.g., a deadly disease). In both cases, 
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especially the latter, it is necessary to assume that PO members track the resulting fitness of a 
change and update 𝜆 as a result. It is important to notice as well that the PO, as it changes its size, 
retains its exclusivity condition. Endogenizing size means adjusting the size while keeping access 
restricted; otherwise, the size of the firm would be expanded until its benefits are completely 
diluted. 
Second, given the continuity of our environment it is possible to show that the size of the PO that 
maximizes fitness (which is the natural candidate for a model with endogenous ,\) is always small 
from a social perspective. To see this let 𝑓 ̃(𝜆) + (1 − 𝐶) be the fitness of agents inside the P O 
At the level that maximizes fitness it must be that  𝑓 ̃′(𝜆) = 0. Overall fitness in the population is 
given by 1 − 𝐶 + 𝜆 𝑓 ̃(𝜆) therefore  the derivative with respect to the size 𝜆 at the point that 
maximizes member's fitness is 𝑓 ̃′(𝜆) > 0, meaning that the society will benefit from increasing 
the size of the PO further. 
Third, we deem likely that 𝜆 and 𝑐 ̃ are connected. If POs can generate a lower cost of social 
learning through group identity, trust and cooperation, then it follows that a larger 𝜆 will probably 
increase 𝑐 ̃, which in turn would reduce the size of the PO. 
2.3.4. Extended interpretation 
The interpretation of the model can be extended by acknowledging that in order to perform an 
activity (or apply a technology) both learning and production are required. One has to learn not 
only what to do, for example learn that net fishing generates a good catch in the current 
environment, but also develop an understanding and capacity of how to do it, for example, know 
which are the best raw materials to produce the net, how to assembly it properly, how to use it 
best, when and where it provides more benefits, and so on. An individual learner has to figure out 
these two challenges, learning what to do and then refine how to do it; similarly, a social learner 
has to copy both elements and then execute properly. 
By adding the production stage, we can introduce the idea of incremental innovation, defined as 
the process through which the execution of an activity can be improved bit by bit over time. 
Evidence from the organizational learning literature indicates that these accumulated 
improvements can be substantial (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011; Levitt, List and Syverson, 
2013). Incremental innovation contrasts with the innovation that is executed solely by individual 
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learners, which can be equated to radical or disruptive innovation: they spend a lot of effort to 
understand the new state of nature, and then generate a novel and well-adapted technology. In 
addition, incremental innovations are not protected from a change in environment: no matter how 
refined the technique has become, the environment can change in favour of a different technology. 
By allowing agents to engage both in learning and production, the parameters 𝐶, 𝑐 and 𝑐 ̃ would 
now include not only learning costs but also the costs of production. The difference between 𝐶 and 
𝑐 would also capture any advantages in production costs by social learners. If we assume that in 
every instance of social learning the learner can introduce incremental improvements on execution 
(which can then be passed down to other social learners), then the aggregate cost advantage 
generated by social learners can be very large. 
Within this framework, POs can further generate benefits to society by providing an increased 
capacity to generate incremental innovations (which would be reflected in a larger difference 
between 𝑐 and 𝑐 ̃). This capacity can be positive and substantial if incremental innovation is 
complementary with the effectiveness of social learning. This is not unlikely, as it is easier to 
improve upon a well-replicated technology. This seems particularly true under specialization of 
POs. Although a full fledge development of this idea is beyond the scope of this paper, this 
interpretation allows for a larger impact of POs: any improvement in incremental innovation they 
generate would be beneficial for society. 
2.4. Empirical analysis 
Our empirical analysis has five parts. First, we introduce the Ethnographic Atlas data and the 
variables measurement, and we show that the fitness of pre-modern societies is correlated with the 
presence of technologies only when the technologies are performed within POs. Second, we make 
the argument that there is causal relation between POs and fitness by using instrumental variables 
and by using bounds that show that our results are not likely to the reverted by omitted variables. 
Third, we do a comparative statics analysis to see how the benefit of POs depend on uncertainty and 
the cost of social learning. Here, we find that the results favour our theory of POs over standard 
TCE reasoning. Fourth, we execute several robustness checks that allow us to show consistency 
across different dependent variables and rule out alternative explanations, such as the presence of 
trade. Finally, we replicate the results of Giuliano and Nunn (2017) in order to do an out-of-sample 
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test of a separate prediction of the model: we show that use of POs in ancestors increases the reliance 
and persistence of tradition in modern populations. 
The combination of these five empirical exercises provides compelling evidence that POs 
played an important role in making social learning adaptive as our theory predicts. Still, as indicated 
in the introduction, an important part of our empirical exercise is to provide a "proof of concept", 
that is, as a way to verify that the theory has practical potential and that it can be empirically 
productive. 
2.4.1. Data 
To test the predictions of the model, we use the Ethnographic Atlas (EA) and the Standard 
Cross Cultural Sample (SCCS) provided by the D-Place dataset (Kirby et al., 2016). The EA 
describes cultural practices for 1291 pre-modern societies, ranging from societies with complex 
agricultural economies and political systems to small hunter- gatherer groups. The societies are 
globally distributed with especially good coverage of Africa and western North America (see figure 
3). The SCCS is a subsample of the EA where additional information about societies is provided. We 
use the SCCS to measure several variables that are needed to test the predictions of the model. These 
datasets were created by coding the available information about societies that is present in the 
extensive ethnographic accounts in the anthropology literature. 
The EA provides information on the presence of eleven productive activities (or technologies) in 
the society: metalworking, pottery making, weaving, leather working, hunting, boat building, 
house construction, gathering, agriculture, fishing, and animal husbandry. The dataset identifies 
whether each activity was present in the society, and if so, whether it was "normally performed 
by many or most adult men, women, or both" or whether it was "largely performed by a small 
minority who possess specialized skills". Following our theoretical model, we identify the second 
condition as the addition of a PO to the execution of a specific activity. We measure PO in this 
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way because the types of “small minorities" covered by the EA fit the requirements of our 
theoretical model.25  
The minorities in the EA can be of four types: senior age specialization (i.e., only men or women 
beyond the prime of their life), junior age specialization (i.e., only boys or girls before the age of 
puberty), craft specialization (which includes occupational castes where the rights to execute 
certain activity were inherited), and industrial specialization (i.e., specialization is removed from 
age or craft specialization and is executed using industrialized techniques). Aggregating across 
activities, craft specialization covers roughly 85 percent of the societies that have a minority 
executing the activity, industrial specialization accounts for eight percent (aprox.) and 
senior/junior specialization split the rest.  
Our model requires that PO possess three characteristics in order to benefit society: easier social 
learning, small size and exclusivity. In the discussion that follows, the lower costs of social 
learning of the PO of the EA become evident; therefore, we do not expand on it. Regarding small 
size, the very definition in the EA specifies a “small minority". Exclusivity requires more care to 
be mapped to the EA. Industrial specialization and senior/junior specialization comply with the 
exclusivity criteria. In the former, exclusivity is predicated on employment, and in the latter, it is 
defined by age. To understand exclusivity in craft specialization, we sampled the ethnographies 
in the EA. Roughly, there are three types of craft specialization. First, the original ethnographies 
describe organizations that could be described as “proto-guilds" --the most common type of craft 
specialization in the EA. Similar to medieval guilds, these organizations had experts, sometimes 
called “masters", and apprentices, which would come together regularly --or seasonally, in the 
case of fishing at high latitudes-- in order to exchange work for teaching and to learn from each 
other. Apprentices typically needed to prove their capacity in order to fully access the community 
of experts, so access was not freely granted. Being a master often carried prestige in the society. 
Frequently, the right to execute a particular craft/activity was hereditary (e.g., the Chekiang 
society in China for fishing), generating occupational castes (or a specialized clan). This 
                                                 
 
25
 In addition to providing a proxy of POs, the EA allows us to align the empirical test with our evolutionary argument. 
We posit that the first POs evolved, in some ancestral time, because of their ability to foster the accumulation of 
culture. This argument about “origins" requires evidence coming from pre-modern societies. 
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hereditary element compounded exclusivity because, even in this case, skill was also a frequent 
pre-requisite to enter the “proto-guild". The second type of “specialized minority" were the small 
and scattered workshops, where one or more skilful specialists, with the help of a handful of 
workers, would serve the needs of a portion of the society, typically the local town or region (for 
example, metalworking in the Rifian culture in Northern Africa). The third type is “attached 
specialists" where skilled crafstmen were appointed and funded by the rulers of the society (e.g., 
metalworking in the Inca Empire). Either by the selection of workers or their funding, the second 
and third types also seem to ensure exclusivity. All considered, even though there is heterogeneity 
in the “craft specialization" of the EA, the basic idea exclusivity in these organizations seems to 
hold ground.26  
This characterization of pre-modern craft specialization in the EA --and our use of it as a proxy 
for PO-- is consistent with the broader archaeological literature. For example, in its review of the 
evidence Sterelny (2012) indicates that “craft expertise --the kind of skill sets that forager lives 
depend on-- is fine-tuned at a generation and reliably transmitted across generations by this mode 
of organized human learning environments" (p. 35; emphasis added). When discussing the 
prominent example in Stout (2002), an ethnographic study of stone adze making in Irian Jaya, 
Sterelny indicates: “The social and informational organization of adze making is strikingly akin 
to a medieval guild. The apprenticeship system is quite formal. There is a master adze maker who 
has at least formal authority over the distribution of raw material to adze makers. Apprentices 
have to be accepted by a recognized master, and while apprentices are typically close relatives of 
their master, that is not sufficient. [....] The parallels with the formal, institutionalized system of 
apprentice guilds could hardly be clearer." (p. 40-41). In metalworking, this guild like structure is 
prevalent in the literature (Rowlands, 1971).  
There is a final correspondence between the POs of our model and the measure we use. In section 
2.3.2 we indicate that our model can accommodate multiple POs which, in the presence of 
                                                 
 
26 However, in roughly a third or a quarter of the cases we sampled, the EA doesn’t provide indication about the 
presence of a (exclusive) group of specialists; instead, it might indicate, for example, that in each clan there was an 
specialist in a particular craft without specifying whether these specialists would come together as a group (or which 
were the rules of entry). This is referred to in the literature as “home production" (Costin, 2001). We believe that this 
might introduce a downward bias in our empirical analysis. 
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multiple technologies, would specialize in a particular technology. This is reflected our measure: 
the EA identifies minorities that are specialized in a particular technology. 
2.4.2. Baseline model 
We computed two variables: the percentage of activities that are present in the society ("% 
presence") and the percentage of those activities that are executed within a PO ("% within PO"). 
In the dataset, there is missing information on the activities due, for example, to the fact that the 
ethnography did not study productive activity. Only 263 societies had complete information on the 
eleven activities. The variable "% presence" is computed as the division of the count of activities 
that were present in the society over the count of activities for which we had available information. 
The variable "% within PO" is computed as the division of the count of activities "largely 
performed by a small minority who possess specialized skills" over the count of activities that were 
present in the society. The relationship between "% presence" and "% within PO" is positive, with 
a correlation coefficient of 0.4 (see figure 4A). The variable "% presence" captures, partially, the 
cultural complexity of a society. A society with more activities has accumulated more culture over 
time. 
To test the impact of the presence of activities and PO on the fitness of the individuals in 
society i, we use the following econometric model27: 
Populationi = b1 + b2 x %Presencei + b3 x %Presencei x %withinPOi + Controlsi + Errori  
Population as a dependent variable captures the standard notion of fitness as reproductive success. 
It also captures the fact that in pre-modern Malthusian economies, progress translates into increases 
in population and not into per-capita wealth (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013; De La Croix et al., 2017). 
                                                 
 
27
 In this model, we do not include an individual term for "% within PO" because this variable is nested within the 
presence of technologies (e.g., when "%presence" is zero, then "%withinPO" is zero as well). If this individual term 
were included, then it would mean that even if "%presence" is zero, "%withinPO" can have an impact on population, 
and this would be contradictory. As a result, the marginal effect of "%withinPO" is scaled by the variable 
"%presence". Even if the variable “%presence” is different from zero, an individual term for “% within PO” would 
still be very difficult to interpret, and it would be capturing an effect that is distinct to the one in our theory, which 
requires the scaling. We executed an estimation adding the individual term (available upon request) and we could 
verify that the majority of the impact of “% within PO” is exerted via the interaction term. 
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We use "size of local communities" which is a categorical variable with 8 categories: 1 is "less than 
50 people" 2 is "from 50 to 99 persons", 3 is "from 100 to 199 persons", 4 is "from 200 to 399 
persons", 5 is "from 400 to 1,000 persons", 6 is "more than 1,000 in the absence of indigenous urban 
aggregations", 7 is "one or more indigenous towns of more than 5,000 inhabitants but none more than 
50,000", and 8 is "one or more indigenous towns with more than 50,000 inhabitants". In figure 4B and 
4C we plot the "size of local communities" against the variables "% presence" and "% within PO". 
As controls, we added geographical variables (absolute latitude, average temperature, distance to 
coast, slope of terrain), resource endowment variables (amphibian richness, bird richness, mammal 
richness, vascular plants richness), intensity of agriculture dummies (complete absence, casual, 
extensive/shifting, semi-intensive, intensive), regions dummies (36 regions in our final sample), type 
of settlement dummies (e.g., nomadic, semi-nomadic, etc.) and year of the ethnographic record. From 
the 263 societies with complete information on the technologies, we lost some societies due the 
missing data on the dependent variable (54 societies) and in some controls (mostly, resource 
endowment), leading to a final sample of 173 societies. In figure 3, we display these societies on a 
geographical map. 
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Figure 3. Societies included in table 1. 
 
 
The ordered probit estimates are presented in table 1. Assuming that there are no POs, the 
results of column 2 of table 1 show that moving from 0% to 100% presence of activities does not 
generate an increase of local population. This is depicted in the blue line with circle markers in figure 
4D. The presence of a wider set of activities in most of the adult population does not translate to a 
larger population. Although this might seem surprising, it is consistent with Rogers' paradox, in the 
sense that culture does not necessarily leads to increased fitness. However, consistent with the 
proposition 1 of the model, activities do increase the local population when POs are present in the 
society. This increase is economically and statistically significant and is depicted in the red line with 
triangles in the figure 4D. 
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Table 1. Impact of presence of technologies and PO on the size of local population 
 Dependent variable:  
Size of local population 
 1 2 
% presence 1.137  
(0.818) 
0.016  
(0.846) 
% presence x % within PO  4.298*** 
(1.278) 
% within PO   
Geographic controls? Yes Yes 
Resource endowment controls? Yes Yes 
Year of ethnography? Yes Yes 
Agriculture intensity dummies? Yes Yes 
Continent dummies? Yes Yes 
Type of settlement dummies? Yes Yes 
Observations 173 173 
Pseudo R Square 0.329 0.352 
We execute ordered probit regressions. The dependent variable is the size of 
local population. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions and are 
reported in parentheses. *** indicates p-value<0.01.  
2.4.3. Endogeneity 
As difficult as it is with this type of data, in this section we address concerns about endogeneity in 
our key variables. 
Omitted variables 
The first threat to identification of causality is omitted variables. We executed a test that uses 
selection on observables to assess the extent to which selection on unobservables would need to 
be in order to overthrow the results (Oster, 2016). In the table 2 we replicate column 2 of table 1, 
and columns 2, 5, and 8 of table 6 (see section 2.4.5 for a robustness check with different dependent 
variables). We report the "Oster delta" in the last two rows of the table, assuming a maximum r-square 
of 1 and 0.95 respectively. Given the inherent measurement error of ethnographic data, the assumption 
of 0.95 is a good benchmark for the test (and perhaps conservative). This test assumes a linear model, 
so we estimate columns 1 and 3 using OLS (in section 4.4.1 we use the more appropriate ordered 
probit estimation for these dependent variables). The results show that the Oster delta is on average 
0.97 when an R-square of 0.95 is  assumed. This means that selection on unobservables would need to 
be at least 0.97 times the selection on observables in order to overthrow our results. A delta of 1 is 
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a good indication against the threat of omitted variables, particularly if a comprehensive set of 
controls is used (Oster, 2016). 
Figure 4. The impact of the presence of activities and POs on the size of local population. The 
figures use the sample used in table 1. (A / B / C) Scatter plots where the size of the bubbles represents frequency 
of societies. (D) Here we plot of the second column of results in table 1. We evaluate how much the probability of each 
one of the eight size categories changes if the presence of activities goes from 0 to 1. We present the average of the 
marginal effects. To explore how this impact varies with POs we set the variable "% within PO" equal to zero and 
equal to 0.5. 
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Table 2. Selection on observables versus selection on unobservables 
 1 2 3 4 
 Local 
community size 
Total population 
size 
Population 
density 
Cultural 
complexity 
% presence -0.143 
(1.166) 
-0.564 
(1.997) 
-0.669 
(0.939) 
-0.029 
(5.155) 
% presence x % within PO 5.238*** 
(1.592) 
5.818*** 
(2.241) 
3.159*** 
(1.202) 
14.887*** 
(5.650) 
All controls of table 1? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 173 153 125 125 
R-Square 0.771 0.819 0.409 0.888 
Oster delta (R2 max = 1) 0.41 0.52 0.71 0.93 
Oster delta (R2 max = 0.95) 0.51 0.69 0.98 1.69 
Robust standard errors are used in all regressions and are displayed in parentheses. *** indicates p-value<0.01, 
** indicates p-value<0.05, * indicates p-value<0.1. The Oster delta is computed for the interaction term 
"%presence x within PO" 
 
Reverse causality 
The second threat to identification is reverse causality, both in the presence of activities and in the use 
of PO. We analyse each one in turn. 
An important proposition of Cultural Evolution is that a larger and more inter- connected 
population would generate more cumulative culture (Henrich, 2015). In our case, this would 
translate into a higher presence of activities in the society which could be channelled through the 
interaction with POs (assuming, for now, exogeneity in POs). In order to address this issue we 
instrumented "% of presence" using two variables: "sex differentiation" (which we detail in section 
4.3.2) and the index of "kinship tightness" developed by Enke (2017). On the first instrument, there 
is evidence that the presence of activities coevolved with sex differentiation in pre-modern 
societies (Haun and Over, 2013). For example, men specialize in large game hunting while women 
specialize in gathering. Sex differentiation might affect population size if it affects fertility. We 
con- tend that conditional on the total amount of activity executed by women, and therefore 
controlling for the time restriction that differentiation might place women fertility, the exclusion 
restriction should hold. 
Kinship systems regulates the pattern of relatedness in society through family structure (e.g., 
independent nuclear families vs. extended families, post marriage residence in wife or husband's 
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group vs. independent residence), marriage patterns (e.g., cousin marriage allowed vs. forbidden, 
polygamy vs. monogamy), and descent (e.g., unilineal vs bilateral descent group, presence of clans 
sharing a geographical location). Kin- ship tightness is a key variable affecting social organization 
of a society (Enke, 2017). Tight kinship (i.e., extended families, cousin marriage allowed, clans, 
polygamy, unilineal descent, etc.) generates high in-group bias, less cooperation with outsiders, 
strong conformism, and local institutions. The opposite occurs with loose kinship, with the 
consequence of being much more open to external groups. We argue that Kinship tight- ness affects 
the presence of activities in society. A tight kinship system should increase the presence of basic 
and widely known activities through less reliance on sourcing activities from neighbouring 
societies28. A "closed" society does not have an alternative but to provide the basic activities 
internally. A society with loose kinship, and therefore open, can source part of the basic activities 
from neighbours. The exclusion restriction for "kinship tightness" is sustained on the documented 
ancestral origins of kinship systems (Passmore and Jordan, 2017). Kinship systems can be traced 
back into the societies from which the focal society descent from. Thus, this element of societies 
can be treated largely as an exogenous variable, particularly when controlling for agriculture 
intensity and settlement type29. Furthermore, there are no a-priori reasons to think that Kinship 
tightness might generate larger or smaller populations through changes in fertility. For example, 
the polygamy-fertility literature is not at all conclusive. Accordingly, and consistently with Enke 
(2017), we do not find a relationship between kinship tightness and population in our data, 
conditional on covariates. 
In the table 3, we present the instrumental variables estimations. In the column 1 we present the 
first stage. As expected, both sex differentiation and kinship tightness are positively related to the 
presence of technologies. (Kinship tightness has a p-value of 0.16; if we drop sex differentiation, 
the p-value increases to 0.04.) By comparing the Cragg-Donald F-test of the first stage (reported 
                                                 
 
28 A society with high kinship tightness tends to be more isolated from neighbouring societies. This would increase 
the need for having all the activities provided inside the society. A society with low tightness would be much more 
willing to provide some of the activities from abroad. Notice that this would hold for basic activities that have long 
being invented and diffused. For the case of innovation of newer and more complex activities, the impact of kinship 
tightness is detrimental to the adoption of innovations from other societies, as shown in Enke (2017). 
29 There are arguments and evidence that indicates that kinship tightness evolved to optimally match the needs of 
agricultural subsistence, away from nomadism (see Enke, 2017). 
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in columns 2 and 3) with the values in Stock and Yogo (2002) we can conclude that our instruments 
are not weak. The Hansen-test indicate that the instruments are indeed exogenous, in line with the 
theoretical arguments laid out above. 
In columns 2 and 3 we present the second stage, with and without the interaction with % within 
PO respectively. The results do not change from those of the table 1: the presence of technologies 
increases the local community size, but only when PO are in place. In columns 4 and 5 we use 
total population of the society as the dependent variable (see the section 4.4 below for the details of 
this alternative dependent variable). The results show that the presence of technologies has a positive 
impact independent of the percentage executed within PO. However, consistent with our prediction 
(and column 2 of table 6), this impact is larger when POs are in place. In column 5, if we assume 
absence of POs, then the impact of presence of technologies is statistically not different from zero. 
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Table 3. Instrumenting the presence of technology 
Stage:  1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 
Dependent variable: % presence Local community size Population size 
 1 2 3 4 5 
% presence  4.793 
(4.219) 
2.958 
(3.791) 
12.982** 
(6.492) 
6.221 
(5.114) 
% presence x % within PO   5.475*** 
(1.217) 
 10.865*** 
(2.669) 
Kinship Tightness 0.061 
(0.044) 
    
Sex differentiation 0.119** 
(0.053) 
    
Same controls as in table 1? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies and resource 
endowment controls? 
No No No No No 
Observations 194 194 194 160 160 
Cragg Donald f-test first 
stage (p-value) 
 9.55*** (0.008) 9.62** (0.022) 8.884** 
(0.012) 
8.085** 
(0.044) 
Hansen test (p-value)  0.309 (0.578) 0.707 (0.702) 3.438* (0.064) 3.843 (0.146) 
Robust standard errors are used in all regressions and are displayed in parentheses. *** indicates p-value<0.01, ** indicates p-
value<0.05, * indicates p-value<0.1. In columns 3 and 5, we use "kinship tightness x % within PO" and "sex differentiation x % 
within PO" as instruments for "% presence x % within PO". We drop the controls of geographical region because the local 
geographical variation in our instruments is not high. Given that we rely on inheritace from ancestral societies, the societies 
occupying a particular region tend to share the several cultural traits from their common ancestor. We drop the resource endowment 
variables in order to avoid data loss and to avoid small sample bias in the IV estimation (results are consistent if we include these 
controls). 
 
The third and main threat to identification is endogeneity problems with the variable "% within 
PO". In particular, in case there is a minimum size to POs, large populations might make it easier 
to have POs. In addition, a common argument is that specialization is favoured by the extent of 
the market. If any of these cases is correct, we might have a reverse causality problem. We address 
this issue by instrumenting the presence of POs following the idea of Depetris-Chauvin and Ozak 
(2017). These authors explore the drivers of the presence of POs in pre-modern societies using the 
ethnographic atlas. They explore the extent to which diversity in the population of a society --
measured by genetic diversity in the societies of the Atlas-- drives the presence of POs. The 
theoretical argument is that a genetically diverse population has many different skills in place 
which would lead to the creation of specialized groups. These authors instrument genetic diversity 
using the distance of the society from East Africa (specifically, modern day Ethiopia) which is the 
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origin of the spread of the human species out of Africa (starting approximately 80,000 years ago). 
As the distance from Africa increases, the diversity within a society goes down because migrant 
societies are not a random sample of the society of origin30. The authors find substantial evidence 
in favour of their arguments: distance reduces genetic diversity which in turn decreases the 
presence of POs. 
In table 4, we follow these authors and we use "Distance from Africa" as an instrument for "% 
within PO". We measure the distance from Addis Adaba in east Africa to the focal society; for 
societies in America, we calculate the distance going through the Bering strait. We do not use the 
mediating variable of genetic diversity, and thus, we implement a "reduced form" model of 
Depetris-Chauvin and Ozak (2017)31. In the column 1 we present the first stage. Consistent with 
Depetris-Chauvin and Ozak (2017), the distance from Africa reduces the presence of POs in 
societies. Although the Cragg-Donald test (reported in columns 2 and 3) indicate that the 
instrument is relevant, by comparing the values with Stock and Yogo (2002) we cannot rule out 
weakness in the instruments. In order to address this issue, in the second stage of column 2 and 3 
we use the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) technique, which partially mitigates 
the problem of weak instruments. The results we obtain with both dependent variables are 
consistent and supportive of our predictions. By comparing the values of the coefficient with those 
of table 1 and table 6, we also find that the coefficients display an increase in their size.32 
                                                 
 
30 This also implies that cultural heterogeneity across societies would increase with the migratory distance to a 
common ancestor. Becker et al (2018) corroborate this prediction. 
31 This reduced form allows other mechanism to impact the presence of POs. For example, given the non-
randomness of the migratory sampling process it could also be the case that traits are lost. As migrant groups are 
typically small, the likelihood of loss increases due to drift. 
32 We also instrumented "% presence" and "% within PO" at the same time.  We used the three instruments 
simultaneously following Wooldridge (2010, chapter 8). The results are consistent with table 3 and table 4. The 
coefficient for "% presence" is 1.32 and for "% within PO" is 3.83. However, statistical significance is lost. The 
instruments retain their properties: for strength, they surpass Stock and Yogo thresholds on strength; for exclusion, 
the Hansen test indicates that the instruments are valid. 
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Table 4. Instrumenting the percentage within PO 
Stage:  1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 
Dependent variable: % presence x % 
within PO 
Local 
community size 
Total population 
 1 2 3 
% presence 0.278*** (0.082) -0.408 (1.223) -1.316 
% presence x % within PO  6.606* (3.751) 17.70*** (6.071) 
% presence x Distance from Africa -5.37e-06** 
(2.73e-06) 
  
Same controls as in table 1? Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies? No No No 
Observations 173 173 153 
Cragg Donald f-test first stage  
(p- value) 
 5.228** (0.022) 
 
5.790** (0.016) 
Hansen test (p-value)  n/a n/a 
Robust standard errors are used in all regressions and are displayed in parentheses. *** indicates p-
value<0.01, ** indicates p-value<0.05, * indicates p-value<0.1. We use LIML in the estimations. We exclude 
region dummies because the variation of our instruments within regions is low. 
An additional way to address the problem of reverse causality is that both theoretical arguments 
(i.e., minimum size of PO and extent of the market) would predict that the positive relationship 
between population and the presence of PO would be much stronger at higher levels of population. 
However, in figure 4D we show that this is not the case. The impact of PO on the increase in 
population size is exerted throughout the different size categories of the variable "size of local 
community". For the case of the dependent variable of total population, we replicated column 2 of 
table 6 using a quantile regression estimation (and dropping the region controls, as they limit the 
estimation). In figure 5A we display the value of the coefficient related to "% presence" as it varies 
across the dependent variable. In figure 5B we do the same for the interaction term "% presence x 
% within PO". In both cases, the graphs show that the positive impact of POs on population is 
exerted evenly across different population sizes, reducing the concern for reverse causality. 
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Figure 5. Coefficients in quantile regression. 
 
2.4.4. Comparative statics 
In this section, we test the comparative statics derived from our model and summarized in figure 2. 
The econometric model we use is the following33: 
Populationi = b1 + b2 x %Presencei + b3 x %Presencei x %withinPOi + b4 x %Presencei x Z + b5 
x %Presencei x %withinPOi x Z + Controlsi + Errori  
In this model we generate a triple interaction to explore whether the impact of POs is affected by 
the variable Z. We use different variables as Z in order to capture the different parameters p, c and 
c, as well as the prevalence of secrecy. If the coefficient b5 is positive (negative), then the impact of 
PO is enhanced (diminished) by the variable Z. 
                                                 
 
33 For the same reasons explained in the footnote 8, the interaction term between "%withinPO" and Z is not included. 
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Uncertainty 
We first test the impact of environmental uncertainty, the parameter p of the model, by using climate 
unpredictability as the proxy. Climate data has already been successfully used to empirically test the 
parameter p in cultural evolution models (Giuliano and Nunn, 2017). The D-PLACE dataset reports 
"temperature unpredictability" and "precipitation unpredictability" which are measured using 
yearly data between 1901 and 1950, the period that has the largest proportion of ethnographies in 
the ethnographic atlas. The measure of unpredictability captures both the extent to which 
temperature or precipitation patterns are predictable because these conditions are constant or whether 
they oscillate in a predictable manner (Colwell, 1974). We multiply these two measures to obtain our 
measure of climate unpredictability (if used individually results don't change). Consistent with the 
comparative statics of the model, the results from the column 1 of table 5 show that the impact of 
POs on population decreases when climate unpredictability is high. A joint t-test shows that the 
impact of PO is again highly significant and importantly moderated by climate unpredictability. 
This result is graphed in the figure 6A. 
Social learning costs 
We studied three variables that decrease the costs of social learning. First, the SCCS provides 
information on how rooted apprenticeship and teaching are in the society. "Apprenticeship" is a 
dummy variable we computed from the variables v427 and v428 of the SCCS that measure the 
extent of guidance and/or formal schooling in late boys and girls respectively. The dummy takes 
the value of 1 when either variables indicate that the society displays "predominant apprenticeship" 
or when "formal schooling is frequent and typical", and zero otherwise. Clearly, if schooling and 
apprenticeship is predominant in society, this will decrease both c and c. Given that a lower c has 
an ambiguous impact on the fitness of POs (see figure 2A), but a lower c has a unequivocal increase 
in the fitness of POs (figure 2B), we predict that "apprenticeship" should boost the impact of POs 
on population size. (It could also be argued that this dummy would be more tightly connected to a 
decrease in c, than in c, because teaching and apprenticeship probably coevolved with POs.) Many 
hunter-gatherers societies --which lack POs-- possess less teaching (relative to more advanced 
sedentary societies) and it is restricted mostly to kin (Hewlett and Roulette, 2016). This possibility 
would reinforce our prediction. The results are displayed in column 2 of table 5 and are consistent 
with our prediction: the positive impact of POs on population are higher if apprenticeship is 
predominant. We graph this result in figure 6B. 
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The second variable that reduces cost of social learning is "sex differentiation". The variables v44 
to v54 of the EA provide information on the extent to which the eleven activities are executed by 
women and/or men.  For each activity we coded a dummy that took the value of 1 in case the 
activity was executed by "males only or almost alone" or by "female only or almost alone". Then 
we added these dummies and divided the result by the total number of activities that have available 
information. We label this variable "sex differentiation" and it captures the percentage of activities 
that are done by either sex exclusively. There is plenty of evidence that social learning is facilitated 
by similarity, in which sex plays an important part (Haun and Over, 2013; Henrich, 2015; Rendell et 
al, 2011). Similar to "apprenticeship" this variable reduces both c and c, and therefore our model 
predicts more sex differentiation would lead to an increase in the impact of POs. This is what we find 
in our estimations. In the third column of table 5 we obtain a positive and significant coefficient in 
the interaction term. 
The third variable that reduces the cost of social learning is "Trust". We use the variable v335 of 
the SCCS which measure the degree to which trust in inculcated in childhood in the society. This 
variable is ordinal, with 0 meaning "no inculcation or opposite trait" to 9 meaning "extremely 
strong inculcation". As with "apprenticeship" and "sex differentiation", high "trust" decreases both 
in c, than in c leading to the prediction of a higher impact of POs. The result is displayed in column 
4 of table 5 and is consistent with the prediction from the model: POs have a larger positive impact 
on population when trust is high. This result is graphed in figure 6C. 
Secrecy 
Finally, we analyse the impact of the variables "Honesty" and "Generosity". These are the variables 
v336 and v334 of the SCCS and are analogous to v335, namely, a categorical variable identifying 
inculcation of honesty and generosity in childhood. It is possible to identify these variable with a 
decrease in the degree of secrecy in the POs and therefore a boost in their fitness. Oftentimes, secrecy 
is related to selfish behaviour, a desire to keep useful knowledge proprietary. The zeal to maintain 
secrecy could also benefit from dishonest behaviour, deflecting requests to share knowledge with 
negation of its possession. It would also be possible to relate "honesty" and "generosity" to a 
decrease in the costs of social learning. When agents are generous and honest it is very likely that 
communication and learning would improve. In any of both cases, the prediction from our model is 
clear, these variables should increase the fitness benefits of POs. The results are presented in the 
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columns 5 and 6 of table 5 are consistent with the prediction of our model. In the figure 6D we graph 
the result for generosity. 
  
 
Table 5. Heterogeneity in the impact of POs 
 Dependent variable: Size of local population 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
% presence -3.24 (3.62) -0.536 (1.590) 0.125 (1.241) 1.112 (1.694) 1.364 (1.701) 0.973 (2.679) 
% presence x % within PO 12.28# (8.56) 2.629*# (1.547) -0.811# (4.684) 0.066 # (2.920) 0.690 # (2.999) 1.898 # (3.231) 
Climate unpredictability -3.25 (4.06)      
Clim. unp. x % presence 4.75 (5.03)      
Clim. unp. x % pres. x % within PO -10.66# (11.38)      
Apprenticeship  -0.553 (1.129)     
Appren. x % presence  0.237 (1.556)     
Appren. x % pres. x % within PO  3.336*# (1.860)     
Sex differentiation   not included    
Sex differ. x % presence   -0.078 (1.216)    
Sex differ. x % pres. x % within PO   6.955# (6.468)    
Trust    0.250 (0.179)   
Trust x % presence    -0.275 (0.314)   
Trust x % pres. x % within PO    0.768 # (0.644)   
Honesty     0.313 (0.271)  
Honesty x % presence     -0.622 (0.392)  
Hon. x % pres. x % within PO     1.148*# (0.652)  
Generosity      0.574** (0.289) 
Gen. x % presence      -0.517 (0.426) 
Gen. x % pres. x % within PO      0.598 # (0.615) 
Resource endowment control? Yes No Yes No No No 
All other controls of table 1? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 173 136 173 101 84 79 
Pseudo R Square 0.354 0.335 0.353 0.239 0.281 0.299 
Notes: Robust standard errors are used in all regressions and are displayed in parentheses. *** indicates p-value<0.01, ** indicates p-value<0.05, and *** indicates p-value<0.1 . # 
indicates p-value<0.01 for joint two tailed F-test of dsize/d%withinP O. To avoid losing excessive observations by using the SCCS variables, the sample of columns 2, 4, 5, and 6 allow 
at least 6 technologies with available information. 
32 
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Figure 6. Heterogeneity of impact. In this figure, we analyse the predictions from the comparative statics 
of our model. We use the estimation of table 5. (A) We plot the average of the marginal effects of "% within 
PO", that is, the change the probability of each one of the eight size categories is this variable goes from 0 to 1. 
To show how this impact varies with climate unpredictability we set this variable to the minimum and maximum 
values in the sample used in the estimation. (B / C / D) Analogous to graph A. Confidence intervals are not 
displayed due to multicollinearity in the estimates (see legend of table 5). 
 
 
Comparison with Transaction Cost Economics 
The results we obtain for the comparative statics --except for apprenticeship-- are opposite to the 
ones that TCE would predict (Williamson, 1991; Tadelis and Williamson, 2013). TCE predicts that 
uncertainty would increase the benefits and the frequency of POs as opposed to market exchange; 
trust and reputation would move transactions away from hierarchical POs and towards market or 
hybrid governance; and the risk of leakage (and thus, secretive behaviour) would lead to heavier 
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reliance on POs34. As discussed in sections 2.2 and 3.1 above, our theory provides opposing 
predictions  which, at least in our data, are supported. 
Given the empirical support for the mechanisms proposed by TCE (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007), 
how can we make sense of this divergence? We speculate that this might indicate that when 
studying the evolution POs, the explanatory logic changes.  In our theory, we do not consider 
incentives and governance issues in order to focus on the impact that POs have on cumulative 
culture, that is, on the increase in the pool of useful knowledge and technologies. In contrast, TCE 
assumes a knowledge pool in order to focus on the governance of the transactions. Consistently, 
the unit of analysis in cultural evolution is the population, while in TCE it is the PO and its 
transactions. Thus, these theories need not be contradictory, instead they can complement each 
other by operating at different levels and time scales. For example, the advantage in social learning 
costs of POs might have its roots not only in identity and self-enforced cooperation, but also in 
hierarchical governance devices that minimize the hazards of knowledge transmission. The 
exploration of these different explanatory logics, and how they interact, is a topic for further 
research35. 
2.4.5. Robustness checks 
Robustness to alternative dependent variable 
The results of table 1 are robust if the following three alternative dependent variables are used: 
"total population", "population density", and "cultural complexity". We address each one in turn. 
The variable "total population" is obtained from the Ethnographic Atlas and is a continuous 
variable that indicates the total population of the society. We use natural logarithms to normalize 
                                                 
 
34 Higher generosity and honesty could also be related to lower opportunism. Transaction costs economics would 
again predict that using POs would provide less benefits, the opposite of what we find. 
35 One possible connection that can be done is in the type of “comparative assessment” that TCE and our theory 
executes. TCE evaluates under which circumstances a particular organizational arrangement –for example, in-house 
versus outsourcing– is performing better. Therefore, it is a contingent comparative assessment: depending on the 
circumstances, one or the other is better. In our theory, we aim at establishing an absolute advantage of PO over its 
alternative (i.e., the execution of the activities/technologies by independent individuals). If an absolute advantage can 
be established (which in our case happens if p>0, so almost always), then we can argue that the evolutionary processes 
of cultural selection will slowly select and diffuse the PO, which will ultimately invade the landscape. In a way, we 
are explaining the object that TCE plays with: executing the transaction ‘x’ inside the firm versus supply it from 
another firm; in both cases it is a firm. 
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its distribution. In the columns 1, 2 and 3 of table 6 we display the results. In order to assess 
robustness of the comparative statics, in column 3 we include the interactions with climate 
unpredictability (other interactions were also robust to change in the dependent variable across 
table 6; these estimations are available upon request). The results show that total population 
increases with the presence of technologies, but only when these are executed by POs. The positive 
impact of POs on total population increases when climate unpredictability is low. 
"Population density" is the variable v1130 of the SCCS and is a categorical variable with 1 equal 
to "less than 1 person per square mile", 2 equal to "1 - 4.9 persons per square mile", 3 equal to "5 
- 24.9 persons per square mile", 4 equal to "25 - 99.9 persons per square mile", 5 equal to "100 - 
499.9 persons per square mile", and 6 equal to "500 or more persons per square mile". The results 
of column 4, 5 and 6 of table 6 show that our findings are also robust to the use of population 
density as dependent variable. 
Finally, "cultural complexity" is the variable v158.1 of the SCCS, where they sum the scores of 
10 variables that capture the degree of cultural sophistication: writing and records, fixity of 
residence, agriculture, urbanization, land transport, money, density of population, political 
integration, social stratification, and specialization in metal working, weaving and pottery. In our 
case, we subtracted from the variable the last component of specialization. Overall, the results of 
columns 7, 8 and 9 of table 6 show that the results presented are robust to this alternative dependent 
variable. 
  
 
Table 6. Robustness to other dependent variables 
Dependent variable: Total population Population density Cultural complexity 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
% presence 0.773 
(2.253) 
-0.564 
(1.997) 
-21.167*** 
(5.947) 
0.789  
(0.859) 
-0.116 
(0.877) 
-6.213 
(3.694) 
4.660 
(4.794) 
0.313 
(4.683) 
-8.208 
(13.050) 
% pres. x % within PO  5.818*** 
(2.241) 
24.996# 
(14.409) 
 3.584*** 
(1.101) 
8.537# 
(5.423) 
  64.518*** 
(18.426) 
Climate unpredictability   -12.314** 
(5.659) 
  -1.256 
(4.509) 
  -2.943 
(14.188) 
Climate unp. x % 
presence 
  29.596*** 
(8.307) 
  8.808 
(5.519) 
  11.606 
(20.434) 
Climate unp. x % 
presence x %  within PO 
  -27.183# 
(19.840) 
  -7.028# 
(6.976) 
  -61.207*** 
(23.719) 
All controls of table 1? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 153 153 153 128 128 127 128 128 127 
Pseudo R-Square (r-square) 0.801 0.819 0.835 (0.341) (0.373) (0.388) 0.807 0.828 0.835 
Robust standard errors are used in all regressions and displayed in parentheses. *** indicates p-value<0.01 and # indicates p-value<0.01 for joint two tailed F-test of 
8size/8%withinP O in columns 3, 6 and 9. High multicollinearity-frequent in interaction models- requires a joint test. Columns 4, 5 and 6 use Ordered Probit, the rest 
OLS. For the columns 4 to 9 we use societies with information in at least 8 technologies in order to accommodate for the smaller sample size in these dependent variables 
(in the table 6 below we show that the results are robust to data stringency). 
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Alternative explanations 
There are three main alternative explanations for our empirical results. We address each one in turn. 
First, it could be argued that the positive impact of POs is due to POs generating improvements on 
the costs of individual learning, rather than on the costs of social learning. To assess this possibility 
we studied a model where a PO decreases 𝐶 instead of 𝑐. A model with this characteristic generates 
POs populated entirely by individual learners and, importantly, their benefits are increasing in the 
uncertainty parameter 𝑝. The latter implication is directly contradicted by our interaction with 
uncertainty: we find that uncertainty reduces the impact of POs on population (column 1 of table 5 
and figure 5A). Of course, this mechanism could also be present, but the results show that the 
opposing mechanism, that is, POs decrease social learning costs, is stronger. The former implication 
--POs are populated by individual learners-- is rebutted by simple perusal of organizational reality: 
in general, social learners dominate individual learners inside POs (and the opposite occurs in the 
market). Guilds are a good example. 
A second alternative explanation to our empirical findings is related to trade. Specialized POs 
might have a positive impact on population because they are a marker for the presence of trade in 
the society. And trade could be the fundamental driver of larger populations and the key force 
behind the evolution of specialized POs. To test this alternative explanation we use as controls 
several variables from the SCCS that proxy for the presence of trade in the society. Specifically 
we use four variables: i) "inter-community trade" (v1 of the SCCS) is a categorical variable that 
measures the extent to which inter-community trade is a source of food (from "no trade" to "food 
imports present and contribute more than 50%"), ii) "presence of money" (v17) is a categorical 
variable with five categories (from "no media of exchange or money" to "indigenous coinage or 
paper currency"), iii) , "presence of credit" (v18) is a categorical variable with four categories 
(from "Personal loans between friends or relatives" to "banks or comparable institutions"), iv) and 
"importance of trade" (v819b) is a continuous variable measures the percentage that trade 
contributes to subsistence in the society (i.e., food provision)36. 
                                                 
 
36 This variable is computed by the SCCS from using v1 and other five variables that provide categorical information 
on the extent that agriculture, fishing, gathering, animal husbandry and hunting contribute for subsistence (the mean 
is 8% with a maximum of 65%, a median of 5% and a 90th percentile equal to 25%). 
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In column 2 of table 7 we add "Inter-community trade" as a control; in column 1 we use the same 
societies used in column 2. This allows to cleanly assessing the impact of the control variable on 
the impact of PO. The same is done in columns 4 and 3 for "money" and "credit" and in columns 
6 and 5 for "importance of trade". Across these three comparisons, the coefficients decrease in size 
by an average of 16% but remain statistically significant. The largest decrease is experienced in the 
model that includes "money" and "credit". These reductions in the size of the coefficients indicate 
that some of the impact of POs is indeed generated through trade benefits, but that it is not the 
main mechanism. Instead, this result is consistent with our proposition 3 that states the origin of 
specialized POs is driven by the need to make social learning useful in society, without requiring trade 
as a force for its evolution. Thus, even in societies without trade specialization within POs would 
be beneficial A secondary way to assess the alternative explanation of trade is by exploring the 
interaction with uncertainty. The literature on trade has proposed and documented that trade (and 
thus the specialization it drives) is particularly useful to mitigate the effects of shocks to local 
productivity, such as weather changes (Burgess and Donaldson, 2010). Therefore, if the benefits of trade 
is the key driver of the impact of POs we should find a positive interaction of POs with uncertainty; 
however, we find the opposite in our results (column 1 of table 5 and figure 6A). 
Table 7. Robustness to trade. 
 Dependent variable: Local community size 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
% presence 1.079 
(1.235) 
0.762 
(1.267) 
0.751 
(1.243) 
1.892 
(1.421) 
0.980 
(1.227) 
0.925 
(1.259) 
% presence x % within PO 4.237*** 
(1.530) 
3.897*** 
(1.524) 
3.978** 
(1.551) 
2.630* 
(1.559) 
4.261*** 
(1.532) 
4.072*** 
(1.503) 
"Intercommunity trade" dummies? No Yes No No No No 
"Money" and "Credit" dummies? No No No Yes No No 
"Importance of trade" control? No No No No No Yes 
Resource endowment controls? No No No No No No 
All other controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 130 130 124 124 131 131 
Pseudo R-Square 0.367 0.379 0.368 0.422 0.367 0.375 
Notes: We execute ordered probit regressions. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions and are displayed 
in parentheses. *** indicates p-value<0.01, ** indicates p-value<0.05, * indicates p-value<0.1. In order to avoid data 
loss, in all regressions we use societies with information in at least 8 technologies and drop resource endowments 
controls. 
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The third alternative explanation for the origin of POs is that they emerge as a result of political 
complexity. The idea is that having a complex political organization in the society, allows to better 
define, monitor and enforce POs. Thus, it might be that political complexity is really driving both 
the presence of POs and a larger population. In table 8 we show that our results are robust to adding 
"political hierarchy" as a control. This variable is a categorical variable from the Ethnographic 
Atlas that indicates whether the society has political authority, and if it does, the reach of this 
authority (local chiefdoms, large chiefdoms, small states, large states). In these models we replicate 
column 2 of table 1 and columns 2, 5 and 8 of table 6 but with the addition of the control of political 
hierarchy. Comparing the estimated coefficients with those of table 1 and table 6, the results shows 
that the coefficients are reduced by 23% on average (across dependent variables). This results 
indicates that this alternative explanation carries some weight, but not enough to overthrow our 
results. Of course, it could also be argued that political complexity is driven by POs in the first 
place. If that is the case, including this control would be biasing downward the true impact of 
POs. 
Table 8. Robustness to political hierarchy 
 1 
Local 
community size 
2 
Population size 
3 
Population 
density 
4 
Cultural 
complexity 
% presence -0.190 (0.861) -0.253 (2.053) -0.669 (0.939) -0.020 (3.350) 
% presence x % within PO 3.790*** 
(1.428) 
4.851** (2.490) 3.159*** 
(1.202) 
8.964** (4.360) 
Political hierarchy dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies? Yes Yes No No 
All other controls from table 1? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 171 151 125 125 
R-Square (Pseudo R-Square) (0.358) 0.830 (0.409) 0.888 
For "Population density" and "Cultural complexity" we don't use region dummies and we use societies with 
information in at least 8 technologies in order to accommodate for the smaller sample size in these dependent 
variables. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions and displayed in parentheses. *** indicates p-
value<0.01. Columns 1 and 3 use OLS, columns 2 and 4 use Ordered Probit. 
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Data stringency 
The results are also robust to being less restrictive on the information available on the activities 
(table 9). In many societies, there is information only for portion of the activities. In columns 1 to 
4 we change the minimum number of activities have available information in the society and the 
results do not change. In addition, in columns 5 and 6 we restrict the sample to regions that have at 
least 2 and 3 societies in them, leading to a loss of 7 and 19 societies respectively. The results are 
robust to changing both of these information criteria.  
Table 9. Robustness to available information on activities and regions 
 Dependent variable: Size of local population (Ordered probit) 
 Number of activities Societies per region 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
sample: at least 7 at least 8 at least 9 at least 10 at least 2 at least 3 
% presence 0.998** 
(0.472) 
0.956* 
(0.525) 
0.912 
(0.590) 
-0.047 
(0.647) 
0.013 
(0.828) 
-0.246 
(0.832) 
% presence x  
 %  within PO 
3.230*** 
(0.715) 
3.346*** 
(0.759) 
3.201*** 
(0.837) 
3.412*** 
(0.978) 
4.185*** 
(1.243) 
3.513*** 
(1.261) 
All controls of ta- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ble 1 included?       
Observations 430 393 330 269 166 154 
Pseudo R-Square 0.287 0.286 0.295 0.306 0.342 0.3 
We execute ordered probit regressions. Robust standard errors are used in all regressions and are displayed in 
parentheses. *** indicates p-value<0.01, ** indicates p-value<0.05, * indicates p-value<0.1. 
2.4.6. Testing the impact on the contemporary importance of tradition 
The final empirical test we execute is drawn from Giuliano and Nunn (2017). These authors test 
an important implication of the baseline model: the use of social learning decreases with 
environmental uncertainty (see footnote 7). When the environment changes frequently, people 
increase the use of individual learning and decrease their reliance on inherited tradition (i.e., social 
learning). To test this idea, Giuliano and Nunn generate a measure of the environmental instability 
that the ancestors of a country's population were subject to. First, they create a mapping that breaks 
down a country's population according to their ancestry in different societies present in the 
ethnographic atlas. Second, they use the intergenerational temperature variability that was in place 
between 500 and 1900 in the regions of the country's ancestors to generate a measure of climate 
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instability at the country level. Third, they analyse the impact of this measure on several measures 
that capture the use of tradition. Using several empirical approaches across countries, individuals, 
and descendants of immigrants, they find extensive support for an increase in the reliance on 
tradition if the ancestors lived in a stable environment. 
We use the same idea but instead of relying on weather variability, we rely on the extent of use of 
PO in the pre-modern societies of the Ethnographic Atlas. Our model predicts that the introduction 
of POs leads to higher use of social learning in the population, particularly when their advantage 
in social learning is high37. Thus, countries with ancestors that used POs intensively would display 
a higher use of tradition today. In table 10, we replicate the table 1 of Giuliano and Nunn (2017). 
The dependent variable is the country level average of likert scale from the World Values Survey 
(WVS) that assess the agreement with the sentence "Tradition is important to this person; to follow 
the family customs handed down by one's religion or family" (we use last two waves of the WVS). 
Using the mapping of Giuliano and Nunn (2017), the independent variables "% presence" and "% 
within PO" measure the presence of activities and POs for a country's ancestors (which typically 
comprise more than one society from the Atlas). The column 1 of table 10 shows that POs are 
associated with less tradition, contrary to the model's prediction. However, the presence of POs in 
ancestors is strongly associated with modern economic success (Depetris-Chauvin and Ozak, 
2017), which in turn is strongly associated with less tradition. In column 2, we introduce the natural 
logarithm of current GDP per-capita as a control and, as expected, the coefficient related to POs 
reduces its size and loses its significance. In column 3 we expand the controls using controls built 
from the EA that measure progress in pre-modern times and that are also correlated with modern 
success (Depetris-Chauvin and Ozak, 2017). The impact of POs on tradition becomes positive, but 
not statistically significant. 
The prediction of our model suggest that lower social learning costs within ancestral POs would 
further the reliance on tradition. In column 4 we test this idea by adding the interaction with "sex 
differentiation". Social learning improves dramatically when learning from the same sex (Haun 
                                                 
 
37 The exception to this prediction is in the case of no-secrecy when the size of the PO is below it point of maximum 
fitness (see figure 1A). In this case, an expansion of the PO reduces the share of social learners outside, leaving the 
total share of social learners unchanged at the population level. Thus, our prediction is true on average. 
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and Over, 2013; Rendell et al, 2011) and increases the impact of POs (column 3 of table 5). This 
would expand the use of social learning in ancestors and translate into increased more reliance of 
tradition. The result of column 5 is consistent with this logic: when ancestors had POs that were 
differentiated by sex (and thus boost social learning), countries rely more on tradition today. This 
correlation is not small: using the mean of presence of technology, and setting sex differentiation in 
its 90th percentile, the impact of one standard deviation increase in the use of POs increases the 
importance of tradition by a bit more than half standard deviation. 
Table 10. Impact of POs on the contemporary importance of tradition 
 Dependent variable:  Importance of tradition 
 1 2 3 4 
% presence 0.824 
(0.687) 
0.449 
(0.668) 
0.283 
(0.653) 
0.484 
(0.604) 
% presence x % within PO -0.840** 
(0.345) 
-0.122 
(0.453) 
0.256 
(0.445) 
-2.926** 
(1.364) 
% presence x  Sex  differentiation   -0.811* 
(0.434) 
-1.557*** 
(0.451) 
% pres. x % within PO x Sex diff.    5.646** 
(2.406) 
Absolute latitude  -0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.007 
(0.004) 
Complexity of settlements  -0.041 
(0.041) 
-0.019 
(0.047) 
-0.005 
(0.044) 
Political hierarchies  0.028 
(0.099) 
0.003 
(0.104) 
0.056 
(0.102) 
Ln (GDP per capita)  -0.134** 
(0.060) 
-0.134** 
(0.057) 
-0.139** 
(0.053) 
Observations 72 72 72 72 
R-squared 0.124 0.248 0.280 0.355 
We use OLS estimation. The dependent variable is an ordinal variable (1-6) taken from the WVS. The 
control GDP per capita is contemporaneous. The rest of variables are constructed from the EA. Robust 
standard errors are used in all regressions and are displayed in parentheses. *** indicates p-
value<0.01, ** indicates p-value<0.05, * indicates p-value<0.1. 
 
In table 11, we also replicate the tables 3, 4 and 5 of Giuliano and Nunn's paper. In these tables, 
they analyse the impact of temperature variability on the persistence of cultural traits. Again, 
instead of using temperature variability, we use the presence of POs. In the columns 1, 2 and 3 we 
study how the presence of POs shifts the degree of persistence in female labour participation (FLP). 
The data on FLP is drawn from the World Bank Development Indicators. In column 1 we show that 
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the persistence is 0.32 between 1970 and 2012 (1 being the maximum and 0 the minimum). In 
column 2 we show that this persistence varies systematically with the presence of POs. Consistent 
with table 10, we find that POs generate a significant increase in the persistence of female labour 
participation (positive coefficient on the term "female labour participation in 1970 x % presence 
x % within PO"). The size of this correlation is not small: setting "% presence" at its mean, a one 
standard deviation increase in "% within PO" increases the coefficient of persistence by 0.17 
(e.g., from 0.3 to 0.47), which equals half of the baseline coefficient in column 1 (we analyse the 
expression [d F LP 12 / dF LP 70 d%withinP O]  x  St. Dev %withinP O). In column 3, we control 
for all the interactions between FLP in 1970 and the other variables in the model. Although this 
addresses the impact that ancestral POs have on tradition persistence through their impact on 
development, it also generates high multi-collinearity, which weakens the statistical significance 
in this model.38 
In columns 4, 5, and 6 we repeat the analysis but now we study the persistence of FLP in ancestors 
on FLP in 2012. Following Giuliano and Nunn, we use the v54 of the EA that measures the 
presence of females in pre-industrial agriculture. We normalize this variable to make it between 0 
and 1. Column 4 shows that the persistence is 0.164 and statistically significant. Compared to 
column 1, a lower persistence is expected due to the longer time span. The results displayed in 
column 5 and column 6 indicate that the presence of POs has a positive impact on the persistence 
of FLP from ancestry to modernity. However, we only obtain statistical significance on the column 
6. This could be due to fact that we explore the persistence from ancestry to modernity and most 
of the interactions added to column 6 control for the impact of other EA variables on persistence. 
The effect size is large: setting "% presence" at its mean, a one standard deviation increase in "% 
within PO" increases the coefficient of persistence by 0.19 (e.g., from 0.1 to 0.29), which is slightly 
larger that the baseline coefficient in column 4. Significance is only at 10% because 
multicollinearity in high in this model. 
                                                 
 
38
 In  the  models  of  table  11  we  don’t  explore  the  heterogeneity  of  impact  with  respect  to  "sex differentiation". 
Sex differentiation in productive activities can impact female labour participation (or polygamy) through many 
different ways other than the channel we care about, social learning within POs. Thus, estimations would not be 
reliable. That said, we do find, particularly for Polygamy, that of Sex differentiation boost the positive impact of POs 
on the reliance on tradition. 
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In columns 7, 8 and 9 we analyse the persistence of polygamy in ancestors on polygamy in 2009. 
Polygamy in 2009 is a dummy variable drawn from the OECD Gender, Institutions and 
Development Database and we follow Giuliano and Nunn for it operationalization: it takes the 
value of 1 if having more than one spouse is accepted or legal. For polygamy in ancestors, we 
follow Giuliano and Nunn and use the variable v9 of the EA. We build a dummy that takes the 
value of 1 if there is presence of polygamy in the ancestors and 0 if the society is monogamous. In 
column 1 we find a statistically significant persistence coefficient of 0.33. In columns 8 and 9 we 
find a positive impact of the presence of POs on the persistence of polygamy. However, due to 
high multicollinearity significance is not present but the effect size is large: using column 9 and 
setting "% presence" at its mean, a one standard deviation increase in "% within PO" increases the 
coefficient of persistence by 0.14 (e.g., from 0.2 to 0.34), which is roughly half of the baseline 
coefficient displayed in column 7. 
Although these tests are subject to confounds, the correlations we document are consistent with 
the prediction of our model. Two features of this exercise provide additional confidence to our 
account of POs. First, the dependent variable are not drawn from the EA making this an "out-of-
sample" exercise. Second, we test a different prediction of our model which is not about fitness 
but about changes in the share of social learning (and therefore about the reliance on inherited 
culture). 
  
 
Table 11. Impact of POs on the persistence of cultural traits 
Dependent variable: Female labour 
participation in 2012 
Female labour 
 participation in 2012 
Poligamy in 2009 
Persistence variable "P": Female labour 
 participation in 1970 
Female labour  
participation in ancestors 
Polygamy in ancestors 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
P 0.324*** -1.338* -1.673 0.164** 0.158 0.062 0.337** 0.497 2.815 
 (0.123) (0.708) (1.062) (0.068) (0.302) (3.921) (0.146) (0.899) (4.537) 
P x % presence  1.573** 1.624*  0.024 -0.290  -0.333 -0.434 
  (0.756) (0.895)  (0.369) (0.467)  (1.024) (0.969) 
P x % pres. x % within PO  0.956** 0.662  0.174 1.032*  0.626 0.752 
  (0.435) (0.683)  (0.396) (0.579)  (0.985) (1.168) 
% presence, % within PO and their required 
interactions? 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Controls of table 10? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% presence x Sex differentiation? No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Interactions between P and controls of table 
10 and "% presence x Sex diff."? 
No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Region dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year of ethnography? No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 74 74 74 149 149 149 96 96 96 
R-Square 0.545 0.695 0.749 0.451 0.506 0.543 0.634 0.675 0.722 
Notes: Robust standard errors are used in all regressions and displayed in parentheses. *** indicates p-value<0.01, ** indicates p-value<0.05, * indicates p-value<0.1. 
In models 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 there is high collinearity (this is frequent in models with interaction terms). Following Nunn and Giuliano (2017), in models 1 to 6 we added 
the square of ln(GDP per capita) and in models 4 to 9 we added the year of the ethnography and we excluded ethnographies that occurred before 1800 (many 
ethnographies are dated BC -these are drawn from historical studies). For FLP in 1970 we used the average of a five-year window around the year 1970 (the data is 
sparser in 1970 than in 2012). 
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2.5. Conclusion 
In this article, we have developed a theory that explains the evolution of Productive Organizations 
(POs). We used a cultural evolution model to show that improvements in social learning within POs 
can favour the hard-to-propel process of cumulative culture. Under this account, POs evolved because 
they facilitate the transmission of knowledge between individuals, particularly if the PO specializes in 
a specific activity or technology. If access to POs is restricted, as is typical, then this knowledge 
transmission advantage leads to higher fitness of societies and therefore, to the selection and invasion 
of POs. We provide evidence from a sample of pre-modern societies that is largely consistent with the 
predictions of our model.  The theory applies straightforwardly to pre-modern POs such as guilds and 
long-standing POs such as partnerships; as a descendant of these older POs, our theory also informs 
the origin of modern firms. 
Our findings provide several main contributions. First, we are the first to show that social learning can 
be beneficial to society even if it does not generate a positive externality on individual learning (cf., 
Boyd and Richerson, 1995). Second, we provide an explanation for the origins of POs based on social 
learning, knowledge transmission and cultural accumulation. Mainstream theories of POs focus on 
governance and incentive, assuming a pre-determined pool of knowledge and culture. Knowledge 
issues have been addressed but mostly in relation to knowledge integration and problem solving 
(Garicano, 2000; Grant, 1996). Third, we provide a theory for the origins of specialization within POs 
that does not rely on trade and comparative advantage as the driving force; specialization evolves 
because it favours the social learning benefits of POs. Fourth, as our comparative statics and empirical 
results attest, our findings on the role of uncertainty, trust, and secrecy run counter the conventional 
wisdom. This suggest that an evolutionary lens changes the predictions that one would derive when 
the problem of knowledge and culture accumulation is not considered. 
As with any trait that has been selected in a population, a full explanation of the nature of POs requires 
adding an evolutionary perspective to the mix. We need to consider not only the mechanisms that 
explain the inner workings and immediate benefits of POs, such as governance and protection from 
hazards, but also the evolutionary motive as to why they might have increase in frequency in the first 
place. As a first step into this direction, we hope that this paper stimulates further research on this 
important evolutionary foundation. 
We can point to several limitations in our paper, all suitable for future research efforts. First, although 
we test our model on pre-modern societies using a good proxy for POs, it would be interesting to test 
the model using data on guilds or early partnerships. There are interesting new datasets that could be 
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used for this purpose (e.g., Comino et al, 2017). Second, the link of our theory with modern firms is 
derivative, mainly as descendant of early POs. Knowledge and technology in our model is transmitted 
across individuals, that is, we deal with accumulation of individual level traits. However modern firms 
combine specialized knowledge to generate complex technologies that are beyond the capacity of any 
single individual to produce or imitate. It would be very interesting to study how our model can be 
extended to study the evolutionary origin of modern firms. Third, the behaviour in our model is 
simplified to copying by social learners and "radical innovation" by individual learners. The model 
can be enhanced by introducing incremental innovation: agents could improve the technology while 
the state of nature remains unchanged. We suspect that the introduction of this element will further 
expand the beneficial impact that POs bring to society. 
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3. The Evolution and Impact of Cooperation in Large Groups: 
Evidence from Administrative Data and a Field Experiment 
 
Abstract 
We study the adoption of cooperation in large groups, defined as voluntarily incurring a cost in order 
to benefit other group members or the group at large. Cooperation is vulnerable to group size, as the 
benefits of cooperation are diluted over more members while the cost to the cooperator stays the same; 
that is, cooperation is a social dilemma. A large body of theoretical research in evolutionary biology, 
anthropology and economics has proposed mechanisms that favour the evolution of cooperation, 
however, empirical evidence comes mostly from lab experiments with scant evidence from the field. 
In addition, these mechanisms haven’t informed much collaboration research within management. In 
this paper, we study a workplace safety methodology in which an initial small group of 10 workers is 
trained first to observe and counsel co-workers on safe behaviour, and then to expand the group by 
enrolling and training new workers to become observers within the implemented site (e.g., a plant). 
The methodology leverages cooperation: training and counselling is costly to observers while the 
benefits of improved safety flows mostly to the observed workers. First, we use archival data from a 
representative sample of 88 implementations to show that the methodology is effective -- it reduces 
accidents and improves safety culture, which in turn improves other aspects of culture such as team 
spirit and the workers’ relationship with the organization; however, this positive impact decreases as 
the number of observers expands beyond 25 about observers -- the data empirically confirm the 
cooperation breakdown in large groups. Specifically, we show that the cooperation decrease comes 
from a substantial lower and less sustained cooperative effort by the additional enrolled observers as 
the observer group increases. Second, we conduct a field experiment in four sites where we manipulate 
the safety methodology with three treatments aimed at mitigating the cooperation breakdown. We 
show that: i) the effort of the additional observers is restored when the expansion of observers is 
structured around small groups (1st treatment – “direct reciprocity”), ii) partially lifting the anonymity 
of the observed workers is detrimental to observers’ effort (2nd treatment – “identity”), and iii) public 
display of cooperative effort of observers does not change effort (3rd treatment – “reputation”) --- but 
interacts with the ‘private enforcement’ –measured with administrative data– in subtle ways. We find 
that these treatment effects on cooperation effort indeed matter: they modify the speed of diffusion of 
cooperation and the incidence of risky behaviour and accidents in the workforce.  
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Overall, our study provides novel field evidence of the cooperation breakdown when groups grow 
large, as well as of a group structure design that supports its recovery. The result on anonymity suggests 
a not-yet-explored angle in cooperation research: if the cooperation benefit entails pointing at 
“mistaken” behaviour (i.e., behaviour causing safety risks), then transparency might reduce 
cooperation (and anonymity be preferred), in contrast to standard prescriptions in the cooperation 
literature (e.g., indirect reciprocity). 
KEYWORDS: Cooperation, Field Experiment, Culture, Evolution, Direct Reciprocity, Workplace 
Safety 
3.1. Introduction 
Achieving and sustaining cooperation in large groups is a crucial ingredient in the success of divisions, 
departments and whole companies. Given that organizations consist of complementary assets, 
processes and tasks (Argyres and Zenger, 2012; Milgrom and Roberts, 1995), the willingness of 
organizational members to exert consummate effort that benefits the group and co-workers is a basic 
condition for effective integration of efforts and high performance (Gibbons and Henderson, 2013; 
Fehr, 2018; Organ et al, 2005; Puranam, 2018). In addition, several valuable intangible assets, such as 
the firm’s reputation and brand, require collective cooperative effort to be built and maintained. 
Barnard (1938) long argued that a central role of the CEO is to engineer cooperation in the 
organization. Consistently, research has documented a strong positive association between cooperative 
behaviour of workers and the performance of their units/firms (Podsakoff et al, 2009); Grennan (2014) 
is a rare study that establishes a causal link. 
High levels of cooperation within organizations is hard to achieve due to several motives. First, 
cooperation poses a social dilemma: cooperative behaviour benefits the group, but individuals face an 
incentive to free-ride, that is, to enjoy the benefits of others’ cooperation without incurring the costs 
of cooperation him/herself. Second, consummate cooperative behaviour is relational and discretionary 
in nature, and therefore it lies largely beyond the direct control of basic managerial levers –such as top 
down monitoring or formal contracting (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012 and 2013; Organ, Podsakoff 
and Mackenzie, 2005). In simple, while perfunctory cooperation can be enforced, consummate 
cooperation is voluntary. Third, the degree of cooperation in groups is a self-enforcing equilibrium, 
making it stable and hard-to-change. This is the condition that makes cooperation a key driver of 
persistent-performance-differentials among seemingly-similar-enterprises (Gibbons, 2006) 
The importance and difficulty of achieving high cooperation is reflected in senior executives. In a 
survey of CFOs/CEOs in 1348 large US Firms (Graham et al, 2018), responses indicate that while 
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cooperation among workers is the main antecedent to an effective culture and that improving their 
culture would increase their firm's value, only 16% believe their culture is where it should be. Put 
simply, CEOs seek cooperation in their workforce but struggle with it. 
The literature has pointed at some drivers of voluntary, consummate cooperation in large groups39: the 
role of leaders as examples, guides and enforcers (Barnard, 1938; Schein, 2010; Kosfeld and Rustagi, 
2015; Hermalin, 2013); promoting the identification of workers with the organization (Akerlof and 
Kranton, 2005); eliciting joint goal motivation using symbolic management and organizational design 
(Lindenberg and Foss, 2015); firm-wide financial incentives coupled with small groups (Knez and 
Simester, 2001); modifying the relational architecture of jobs such as connecting employees with 
internal and external beneficiaries (Grant, 2007); and governance that focus on the long term, not the 
short-term shareholder benefits (Grennan, 2014).  
In this paper, we use the notion of an “interaction structure” from evolutionary biology/anthropology 
(Rand and Nowak, 2013) to inform this issue and guide our archival empirical analysis and the design 
of our experiment. For cooperation to evolve, whether in nature or society, a mechanism is required 
that allows favouring cooperators over defectors (Nowak, 2006). In the models of this literature, a 
mechanism is an interaction structure that specifies who interacts with whom in a population –these 
interactions could be random or structured, and on the latter, the structure could be fixed or flexible– 
and how the agents interact in order to receive payoffs what –for example, information availability, 
degree of repetition (before random reshuffling), order of play, details of payoff functions, 
enforcement technology. In this paper we focus on a particular condition, the repetition of play. When 
this is the case, the player in a social dilemma can condition its behaviour on the past behaviour of the 
other player(s). There are many ways of conditioning –known as “strategies”– with tit-for-tat being an 
excellent strategy for sparking cooperation in repeated prisoners’ dilemma (Axelrod and Hamilton, 
1981; Rand and Nowak, 2013). This strategy starts cooperating and then copies the other player’s 
previous move: cooperate if cooperation was experienced, defect is defection was experienced. Other 
successful strategies (e.g., grim, win-stay-loose-shift, generous tit-for-tat) share this condition of 
reciprocating the other player’s move: cooperate but punishing defection by withdrawing cooperation. 
                                                 
 
39 In small teams, decades of research have unveiled important parts of the cooperative chemistry (Mathieu, 2008). Plenty 
of research has been done in pairwise infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma (see Dal Bo and Frechette (2018) for a review). 
In organizational economics, attention has been given to relational contracts between the principal-agent dyad, both within 
and across the firm (e.g., Gibbons et al, 2002; Halac, 2011; Chassang, 2010). In strategic management, attention has 
concentrated on trust and cooperation in repeated interfirm relations (e.g., Vanneste et al, 2014; Elfenbein and Zenger, 
2013). 
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Hence, the mechanism associated with repetition of contact is referred to as “direct reciprocity”40. 
However, in repeated public goods games – where interactions occur over a N-player prisoner dilemma 
– direct reciprocity breaks down very quickly as the group grows (Boyd and Richerson, 1988). In a 
public goods scenario, punishing non-cooperators by withholding cooperation not only punishes 
defector(s), it also punishes co-operators; this makes direct reciprocity inefficient.  
Repeated public good games are ever-present in organizations; therefore, understanding how direct 
reciprocity can be rescued is important for cooperation in organizations. First, direct reciprocity has a 
higher chance to favour the evolution of cooperation in public good games with continuous choice 
(instead of the binary choice cooperate-defect) (Takezawa and Price, 2010). Second, prior research has 
shown that if pairwise targeted reciprocity is introduced in between rounds of the public good game –
in the form of costly punishment or reward to a defector– (e.g., Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Rand et al, 
2009; Gürerk et al, 2006), then reciprocity regains its power to sustain cooperation in large groups. 
However, in many cases, such as noisy observability of consummate cooperation, judgement about 
behaviour will be dichotomized and rewards can be costly or non-feasible. In addition, punishment is 
frequently inefficient, as it leads to lower total payoff, retaliation spirals or antisocial punishment 
(Rand et al, 2009; Hermann et al, 2008).   
We focus on a simpler solution, the role of formal structure of the organization. An important part of 
the organizational formal structure defines the grouping of organizational members (i.e., defining 
teams, areas, divisions). We argue that even grouping can generate a boost in the degree of repeated 
interactions. For example, if a population of 50 workers get arranged into groups of 5 –and interactions 
are bound to the group– then, even if grouping and interactions are random, repetition of contact would 
increase: if players are playing a pairwise prisoners’ dilemma, repeated interaction increases by a factor 
of by a factor of 10; If players are engaged in a public goods game, simulation shows that the odds that 
cooperation evolves increase exponentially from 50 to 5 (Boyd and Richerson, 1988). This intuition is 
supported by research: in public goods setting, the odds of direct reciprocity to support cooperation 
                                                 
 
40 As indicated above, models repeated interactions and relational contracting in organizational economics and strategic 
management uses dyadic relations with a principal-agent. Given that we seek to understand large group cooperation, we 
instead draw on models from evolutionary biology/anthropology. The main advantage using these models is that they 
brings a population point of view with many agents interacting, which is exactly what is required when addressing large 
scale cooperation (or any other group level behaviour such as culture). This comes at a cost of a simplified view of the 
capacities of interacting human agents (i.e., no foresight and fixed strategies in evolutionary game theory), plus an 
oversimplification of the replication dynamics for social traits. However, at least on the first issue, a long research pedigree 
in organizational research has been founded precisely on taking these assumptions seriously and working out their 
consequences (Cyert and March, 1963).  
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are higher if the population is structured (Boyd and Richerson, 1988), particularly if cooperation is 
continuous (Takezawa and Price, 2010). The same has been found to be true for a population playing 
pairwise prisoners’ dilemma: van Veelen et al (2012) finds that “a strong dose of repetition and a 
pinch of population structure” (p. 5) is crucial for cooperation to evolve and that these “findings are 
noteworthy because human interactions are typically repeated and occur in the context of population 
structure” (p. 5).41 
The role of formal organization in solving social dilemmas informs a nascent literature that explores 
how formal organization impacts informal organization within firms (McEvily et al, 2014; Clement 
and Puranam, 2018). Our results are particularly complementary to Clement and Puranam (2018); 
while they show that a minimal and random formal organization helps agents in finding valuable 
interactions by saving coordination costs, we show that it can also favour cooperation among agents. 
Together, a compelling theory for organizational structure emerges, that is, the facilitation of 
coordination and cooperation, the two underpinnings of collaboration.  
To empirically explore these issues, we collaborated with DEKRA Insight, a global workplace safety 
firm, by studying their BAPP methodology. This methodology consists of training a group of 10 
workers of a site (e.g., a plant, a warehouse, a store) in observing how their colleagues execute their 
tasks and then giving them safety feedback. The identity of the observed worker remains anonymous. 
Then, this group of ‘observers’ expands within the site by enrolling and training other workers to 
become observers themselves. Thus, the starting group of observers might become a group of several 
tens, even above a hundred. Becoming an observer and executing observations is a cooperative act: 
getting trained and observing workers takes time and effort – on average 5% of their time – and the 
benefits flow mostly to the workers receiving the feedback. BAPP is voluntary, workers are not obliged 
to contribute or to remain observers, and it is “for the workers by the workers”, with minimal 
intervention of the managers and supervisors of the site. ‘Who observes whom’ and ‘who becomes an 
observer’ is not structured by the methodology; observing and recruiting are executed in a free form 
by sites with many sites doing it quasi-randomly. BAPP only specifies the goal of ideally, over time, 
having all the workers of the site being observed once a month. The absence of an “interaction 
                                                 
 
41 Population structure is another independent mechanism driving the evolution of cooperation (Nowak, 2006). This 
mechanism doesn’t require strategic behavior (i.e., players have fixed strategies), and include models of “spatial/network” 
selection (Nowak and Sigmund, 1992; Ohtsuki et al, 2008) and “group selection” (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006).  
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structure” in observing and enrolling workers suggests that the expansion of cooperators (observers) 
and the amount of the effort they exert might be systematically limited.  
To study BAPP, we had access to a dataset with a representative sample of 88 implementations. We 
first document that BAPP indeed promotes cooperation: observers expand within the site reaching 
20% of workers in the third year, cooperative effort is exerted, and workers end up being observed 
once a month. We find that BAPP is associated with a substantial decrease in accidents. However, 
consistent with the absence of an “interaction structure” we document that the impact of BAPP suffers 
as the number of observers expands, especially after 20 workers. The additional observers that are 
enrolled in a site conduct substantially lower numbers of observations and display higher rotation. 
Exploiting the natural variance in implementations, we also find that BAPP’s impact is higher when 
observers focus on particular areas of the site and therefore interact with fewer workers repeatedly 
(facilitating direct reciprocity). Overall, cooperation through BAPP is powerful and collectively 
beneficial, but without an interaction structure in place, its spread and impact are limited by free-riding. 
The second part of this study consists of a field experiment. With the support of DEKRA, we 
collaborated with ACHS –one of the three private non-profit organizations in Chile that provide 
workplace services to Chilean companies (prevention, medical services, compensations and 
pensions)– and with one of ACHS’s clients, SODIMAC –a Chilean multinational that operates a home 
improvements stores. We introduced experimental variations into the BAPP implementations taking 
place in SODIMAC. We conducted three treatments. In the first treatment we randomly assigned half 
of the workers in the site, typically 250, to 5 groups of 25 workers, which then were assigned to 
randomly selected 5 observers (out of 10 observers that initiate BAPP in the site). These five observers 
were restricted to execute observations within their respective groups. The remaining workers and 
observers constituted the control group, where the BAPP was executed as usual, without structure. 
New observers that were enrolled from the workforce were also bound to this structure (if a worker of 
group “a” became observer, he was bound to observe within that group). This treatment generated 
approximately a fivefold increase in the amount of repeated interactions between a specific observer 
and a specific worker (as compared to control). In addition, the treatment also led to a dramatic 
reduction of the group size over which observers play a public goods game of consummate cooperative 
effort. With the group structure, the public good game is played among few observers, only those 
within a group (about 3 in our experiment, as compared to approximately 30 in control). This 
dramatically improves the chances of direct reciprocity in the public good game (Boyd and Richerson, 
1988).  
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We find that this treatment was highly effective: it increased in the number of observations and the 
received coaching, especially for new observers. Outcomes were also affected by this treatment: the 
workers within the groups displayed less risky behaviour and a lower likelihood of having an accident. 
Finally, the workers in the treatment increased the likelihood of becoming observers themselves. The 
magnitudes of all these estimates are economically meaningful. As a whole, these results suggest that 
putting in place an “interaction structure” that facilitates direct reciprocity, improves the spread of 
cooperation, the effort exerted by cooperators and the ultimate impact on outcomes. End-of-
experiment interviews executed in the field provided confirming evidence for the mechanisms and our 
interpretations of the findings, especially for the role of increased reciprocity between observer and 
worker. 
The second and third treatments are ‘interaction effects’, designed to boost the impact of treatment 1. 
In the second treatment, we named the groups of treatment 1 and revealed the names of group members 
within the group. The idea was to promote group identity by creating “minimal groups” that have 
common knowledge of group membership (Tajfel, 1970 and 1982; Guala et al, 2013; Goette et al, 
2006). This treatment also serves to probe the main alternative explanation to the findings in treatment 
1: it could be that psychological predisposition to small teams and identification processes, and not 
direct reciprocity, are driving the results. In the third treatment, the number of observations executed 
by observers was made public in two stores in the form of posted lists, in which observers were ranked 
in decreasing order. This treatment tapped into the reputation concerns of observers, possibly 
triggering the mechanism of “indirect reciprocity” (Nowak and Sigmund, 2006): I cooperate (defect) 
with you, if I observe that you have cooperated (defected) in the past. This strategy is useful when 
interactions are not repeated, but reputation (i.e., previous actions) is observable. Roberts (2008) 
studies the interaction between of indirect reciprocity and direct reciprocity and shows that under high 
repetition of contact, direct reciprocity will dominate.  
Treatment 2 reverted the benefits of treatment 1. This treatment reduced observations and the 
likelihood of becoming an observer, and it increased risky behaviour and accidents by workers. Exit 
interviews strongly suggested that this treatment lifted the anonymity condition of 
observations, generating additional costs for workers in terms of suspicion and distaste for surveillance 
and blame. The treatment clashed with the motto of BAPP (“no spying, no naming, no blaming”) and 
its voluntary character. We executed several tests that confirmed this interpretation and ruled out 
alternative explanations. This result raises an interesting new angle for the cooperation literature: when 
the benefit that is provided entails pointing at and correcting erroneous behaviours, anonymity might 
be necessary. 
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Treatment 3 did not affect the impact of treatment 1. This null effect is be consistent with the prediction 
of Roberts (2008): when repeated interactions are high, using private information (direct reciprocity) 
dominates using public information (indirect reciprocity). Nonetheless, post-hoc revealed interesting 
reputational dynamics. Our exit interviews indicated that the observers’ effort was displayed in 
meetings, generating informal peer control; thus, treatment 3 simply made public what was already 
known privately within the groups. We developed a measure of private reputational enforcement and 
we found it had a positive impact on cooperative effort. We found that treatment 3 decreased the impact 
of private enforcement, suggesting that a public reputation mechanism can substitute for private 
enforcement.  
Overall, this study contributes to research on the determinants of successful collaboration in 
organizations (Puranam, 2018; Gibbons, 2018). We study the anatomy of large scale cooperation 
breakdown and recovery “in-the-wild”, complementing the dominance of lab evidence in the literature 
(Kraft-Todd et al, 2015; Nowak and Rand, 2013; Dal Bo and Frechette, 2018; Balliet and Van Lange, 
2013). Perhaps more importantly, we illustrate how the concept of “interaction structure” from 
evolutionary biology/anthropology informs the role the formal structure of organizations have.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a detailed description of the BAPP 
method. Section 3 provides evidence using a large sample of previous implementations. Section 4 
introduces and analyses our field experiment.  Section 5 concludes. 
3.2. BAPP Methodology 
We collaborated with DEKRA Insight, a company specialized in workplace safety prevention. One of 
the services that DEKRA provides to its clients is BAPP (Behavioural Accident Prevention Process)42. 
BAPP is a methodology based on co-worker feedback that seeks to improve workplace safety among 
the employees of a treated site, such as a plant, a store, or a warehouse. Sites are typically large, 
employing at least 50 employees. This methodology started in the late 1980s and it has been 
implemented across the world and in many different industries. The BAPP methodology works as 
follows: 
                                                 
 
42 The BAPP methodology was originally developed by BST (Behavioural Science Technologies), the company that was 
acquired by DEKRA Insight in 2012.  
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- In the first month, DEKRA consultants meet the site manager and lay out an implementation plan. In 
the second month, a focus groups and a culture survey are performed in order to assess in detail the 
status of the site.  
- In the third month, a team of 8 to 12 employees (depending on the site’s size) is trained by the 
consultants to become “observers”. The selection of employees doesn’t follow a pre-defined criteria, 
other than striving to be representative of the site and focusing on front-line workers (no supervisors 
or managers are selected). The selection process is steered by the manager of the site and the 
consultant. Importantly, becoming an “observer” is voluntary. 
- A leader of the team is selected (ideally) by consent between the manager of the site, the consultant 
and the workers of the team. This leader takes on the role of being the “BAPP enabler”. Unlike the rest 
of the team members, the enabler is 100% devoted to the project. The enabler reports directly to the 
site manager, and he is the direct owner of the implementation of the methodology. The site manager 
has the role of being the “sponsor” of the BAPP initiative, which includes advocating for and 
supporting the initiative, providing resources, and participating in the barriers removal committee (see 
below). 
- Over the course of BAPP, the enabler and the team meet regularly, typically once a month, in a 
“BAPP committee”. This committee is led by the enabler, and its purpose is to track progress, assess 
challenges, define priorities, plan ahead and propose barrier removals.  
- In the third month, the consultant and the team develop an inventory of critical behaviours in terms 
of safety (known as CBI, “critical behavior inventory”). The behaviours are adapted to their site and 
the inventory typically includes around 25 behaviours (e.g., placing your body in front of the line of 
fire, not using the safety equipment, clotted workspace).  
- On the fourth month, the observers receive training on how to provide constructive feedback to a 
worker of the site on safe working behaviour. This feedback event is known as an “observation”, which 
is the core unit of BAPP. After training, observers start immediately executing real observations of the 
site’s workforce. 
- An observation consists of approaching the worker and, after his consent, observing its behaviour for 
10 to 20 minutes. A detailed observation sheet is filled during the observation. This sheet contains at 
the top general information as date, place of the site, time of the day, and presence of coaching (to be 
explained below). At the bottom, the list of critical behaviours with a space to indicate whether it was 
observed as safe or risky. If a risky behaviour is identified, verbal feedback is then provided to the 
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observed worker. The sheet provides space to provide written details about the behaviour and the 
interaction with the worker.  
- Only front-line workers are subject of observation; this makes BAPP a method that is “by the workers, 
for the workers”. BAPP doesn’t establish any criteria regarding which observer observes which 
workers of the site. This decision, if any, is discussed and worked over time by the enabler and the 
joint committee. 
- DEKRA stresses that a very important feature of BAPP is anonymity, meaning that the identity of 
the observed worker remains anonymous, it is never recorded by the observer in any shape or form. 
This is told to workers in advance. Related to this, observers do not “spy”, they are open and frank 
about the act of observing a worker. BAPP has a frequently repeated mantra: “no spying, no name, no 
blame”.  
- All the information of the sheets is uploaded to a local data storage system. This feeds the analysis 
that is performed by the enabler and presented discussed at the committee (e.g., number of observations 
per observer, number and place of risky behaviours). 
- In the fifth month, the consultant monitor the progress of observers as they execute observations in 
the site. In addition, the workers are trained to become trainers themselves. From the sixth month 
onwards, the methodology establishes that new workers are enrolled and trained to become observers. 
This training is executed by the members of the committee.  
- The selection of new workers to become observers is similar to the selection of the committee 
members: it is unstructured and BAPP doesn’t impose any criteria, except for the fact that only front-
line workers are allowed. The site manager, the enabler and the committee, they are all able to 
participate; and is voluntary, it cannot be imposed on workers.  
- The new observers do not become part of the committee, so they don’t attend progress meetings. 
BAPP doesn’t specify a structure of engagement for these new observers. Instead, the enabler (and to 
some extent the committee) organically defines and executes a way to relate to the new observers. 
- In addition to observations, observers also perform coaching. Coaching consist on observing a fellow 
observer execute an observation and then providing feedback and suggestions for improvement to him. 
Coaching is provided mostly by committee members with the occasional coaching by non-committee 
observers. On average, 10% to 20% of observations are executed with a coach. 
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- Between the 6th and the 12th month, the consultant accompanies the enabler and committee and helps 
them in: ramping up observations, enrolling new observers, analysing the accumulated sheets data to 
spot patterns and problems, monitoring observation quality. In the month 12th the consultant performs 
a sustainability review and report after which the site is left to their own devices. From month 3 to 
month 12, each observer of the committee receives around 18 days of training by consultants.  
- As observations accumulate, systematic barriers to safe behaviour can be identified. A barrier is any 
impediment to safe behaviour, from lack of safety gear to a managerial practice that is compromising 
safety. To deal with this, BAPP includes setting up a barrier removal committee which has ad-hoc 
meetings to decide and take action upon barrier proposals. This committee is constituted by the site’s 
leader, the enabler and (some) area managers of the site.    
- The goal of BAPP is to generate good quality observations in the site. A key variable that is tracked 
is the “contact rate” which is equal to the number of observations in a month divided by the number 
of workers in the site on that month. The unwritten rule of thumb of BAPP consultants –which is a 
widely accepted and communicated– is that sites should reach a contact rate of 1 over time (a specific 
time is not specified as implementations may vary). Given that BAPP is typically applied to sizeable 
sites, on average 250 workers, getting to a contact rate of 1 requires a fair share of new observers. 
Without new observers a committee of 10 would need to execute 25 observations per month (plus 
coaching) which is difficult to accomplish. If 40 new observers were added to the committee, then 5 
observations per month would be needed per observer, which is feasible. However, there are many 
possible other combinations. BAPP methodology doesn’t specify nor recommends an execution 
strategy in terms of number and timing of new observers (nor, as indicated above, specifies how new 
observer should be incorporated to the process). In practice, there is a lot of variance in the number of 
new observers and in the observations per observer. 
- Over the course of BAPP, being an observer entails: participating in regular meetings (for committee 
members), training/coaching new enrolled observers (for committee members), executing coaching 
(mostly to committee members) and executing observations.  
- While being part of BAPP, the employees continue to execute their regular work in the site. BAPP 
is an additional activity that they execute. For observers that are part of the committee, DEKRA 
estimates that approximately during the first year, 8% of a worker’s time is devoted to BAPP. After 
that, that figure drops to 5%. Non-committee observers spend a bit less, 3% to 5% on average. 
Although Sites attempt to provide flexibility to workers; however, this is not always achieved, leading 
to possible role tensions.  
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3.2.1. BAPP is an ideal setting to study the evolution of cooperation 
This setting is well suited to study the cooperation in the field. First, BAPP requires that observers 
devote time and effort in order to provide a feedback to colleagues. Here the observer bears a cost 
while the benefits of decreased likelihood of accident flows (mostly) to the worker that received the 
feedback. This fits into the textbook definition of a cooperative act. (Fellow observers may also receive 
observations, but as we show below, this doesn’t eliminate the cooperative/social dilemma in BAPP.)  
Second, the number of observers is sought to grow and expand in the site; in other words, the setting 
allows to study how cooperative trait increases in frequency in a population. This evolution problem 
is a central to theoretical and experimental literature on cooperation (Nowak, 2006). 
There are three types of social dilemmas occurring in this setting: a public good game between workers 
in becoming observers; a public good game between observers in contributing to the success of BAPP; 
and a prisoner’s dilemma between an observer and a worker when an observation is conducted. As we 
explain below in more detail, these games are not independent of each other. Their 
introduction/distinction serves a practical purpose: it helps delineating and thinking about all the 
different interactions in BAPP that are subject to social-dilemma tensions, and many results we display 
in our empirical analysis of sections 3.3 and 3.4 can be better interpreted and understood if we refer to 
a specific game. 
 
The first social dilemma occurs among workers in their decisions of becoming (or not becoming) 
observers, both when workers are approached to be part of the initial team and also when BAPP grows 
within the site. This interaction conforms to the structure of a public good game because of the 
following elements: 
Cooperation (exposes the worker to benefit and cost): Becoming an observer and execute 
observations of other workers. 
Defection (exposes the worker to only the benefit): Continue as a worker. 
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Benefit (flows to everyone): Safety feedback from observations (observers also receive 
observations).43 (This matters because BAPP does meaningfully reduce accidents, as we 
demonstrate below.) 
Cost (of cooperating): Effort and time in getting trained and in executing observations, minus the 
“reputational” benefits to observers for being part of BAPP44. 
 
The second social dilemma occurs among the group of observers that are in place at any point in time 
during the implementation. This can also be identified as a public good game by the following 
elements: 
Cooperation: Consummate (high) effort in the number and quality of observations (and coaching). 
Defection: Perfunctory (low) effort in the number and quality of observations (and coaching). 
Benefit: Safety feedback from observations (observers also receive observations), plus the 
“reputational” benefits to observers for being part of BAPP. 
Cost: Additional effort and time in executing consummate effort (more and better observations), 
minus the marginal “reputational” benefits to observers for implementing BAPP in a consummate 
way.  
 
In the section 3.3.8 we provide estimations of these costs and benefits and show that these two games 
are very likely a public goods dilemma. However, we also show that the “reputational” benefits, which 
are hard to estimate, might generate a relaxed social dilemma such as the snowdrift game. Below we 
                                                 
 
43 This benefit is the contact rate (total observations divided by total workers) and the reduction that it generates in on 
accidents. This number is 0.5 on the 6th month of observations, and approaches 1 by the end of the third year in the 
average BAPP implementation (see Figure 7 in page 12). In section 3.3.3 we estimate the reduction in accidents. Although 
that estimation is based on ex-post values, one could expect “a priori” that the expected benefits would be similar to the 
past experiences of BAPP. 
44 BAPP is very costly to execute as firms pay considerable sums to implement it. Therefore, site managers –who are 
sponsors of BAPP– are typically invested and hold part of the responsibility of BAPP’s success. This means that the 
implementation of BAPP has non-negligible relevance in the site. This generates “signaling” or “reputational” benefits 
to be an observer which can flow immediately as status or recognition, or in the future as reciprocity from colleagues or 
potential advancements in their careers. Importantly, these benefits are more salient or clear to observers that part of the 
committee than to the additional new observers. For the latter, the benefits also decrease with the number of new 
observers. For example, career benefits quickly exhaust with more observers: there aren’t that many job vacancies within 
the site to promote all them. This puts a strong limit to the potential career benefits flowing to observers. This means that 
the social dilemma is more acute for additional/new observers.  
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detail how this might affect the interpretation of the results of section 3.3 and the predictions/results 
of the section 3.4. 
 
The third social dilemma occurs between the observer and the worker being approached for an 
observation. This interaction can be identified as a prisoner’s dilemma by the following elements: 
Cooperation by the observer: Frequent observations of high quality.  
Defection by the observer: Few (or no) observations of bad quality. 
Cooperation by the worker: Accepting being observed – workers can reject being observed – and if 
observed, be open, be engaged, and be willing to change his/her behaviour. 
Defection by the worker: Dismiss the observation, or be unengaged and unwilling to change his/her 
behaviour.   
Costs and benefits: These are more diffuse for this third dilemma. For an observer, the execution of 
observations generates a contribution to the team of BAPP observers in achieving their goals, and 
from it some “reputational” benefits may flow (e.g., status, recognition, career prospects). The cost 
is the same as before, effort and time of frequent consummate observations. For the worker being 
observed, the benefit is the safety feedback he receives. The cost is a combination of: i) any 
annoyance or perceived risk that is generated by being observed while executing his/her work (e.g., 
they are “spying on my behaviour,” workers here (as elsewhere) are always nervous about looking 
bad or being criticized), ii) devoting time to the feedback, iii) changing his/her behaviour (this can 
be quite costly if behaviour is engrained and routinized, or imposes adjustment costs on other 
interacting workers). Also, as part of the costs one could add the “moral debt” that is acquired by 
being observed. This debt can eventually be collected, for example, when asked to be an observer. 
 
Of course, these games are endogenous. Cooperation in game 2 and 3 is the same decision for the 
observer. Or consider game 1 and 2: If a worker deciding whether to cooperate in game 1 thinks that 
the cooperation is low in game 2, he/she will have a lower expected benefit and thus will be less willing 
to cooperate. This could happen, for example, if the number of observers is already high, and thus 
cooperation in game 2 is harder. At the same time, an observer deciding whether to cooperate in game 
2 will face different incentives to cooperate depending on the equilibrium of the 1st game.  
  
91 
 
The impact of group size on cooperation. Given that we explore in this study the impact of 
organization size on cooperation, we now discuss how the number of observers affects these games. 
These are not predictions, but an exploration of what one might expect. In the empirical section we 
use the foundation from this discussion to more incisively interpret the results. 
The outcome of the game 1 is the number of workers cooperating voluntarily, that is, the number of 
observers. In order for cooperation to spread beyond the starting group of (typically) 10 observers, a 
mechanism – an interaction structure – needs to be in place. However, BAPP doesn’t include any 
structural mechanism to generate this expansion of cooperating workers. Thus, in principle, the 
expansion of observers would need to appeal to the cooperative spirit of workers. This may lead to 
some penetration of BAPP, but perhaps not enough. The structure of the benefits is such that as the 
number of observers expands, the additional observer will face lower “reputational benefits”. This will 
cause the likelihood of cooperation to decrease with an increasing number of observers. 
In game 2, the impact of size operates through repeated interactions. Given the absence of structural 
mechanisms in BAPP (which could, for example, a centralized punishment of low effort; see Boyd et 
al, 2010 or Kosfeld and Rustagi, 2015), a natural mechanisms that is applied in BAPP is peer pressure 
and reciprocity, particularly within the starting team of observers, the committee that meets regularly. 
As BAPP is voluntary, “formal” or “direct” pressure are absent (for example, the enabler does not 
“enforce” effort or “fire” an observer). However, social control can operate in two ways: informal peer 
to peer communication that puts pressure on observers of low effort, or it can be sustained by the 
implicit threat by cooperating observers to withdraw their high effort. Both mechanisms would become 
less effective as the number of observers expands. Informal peer pressure becomes harder to execute, 
particularly for new observers that aren’t part of the monthly committee, and reciprocity in public 
goods games breaks down fairly quickly as the group grows (Boyd and Richerson, 1988).  
In the game 3, as a consequence of game 2 and also as a decrease in the “reputational” benefits when 
there are many observers, we would expect that a higher number of observers would make observers 
less prone to cooperate. In addition, in the absence of an interaction structure, having more observers 
means that a worker is observed by multiple and different observers, hampering the ability of direct 
reciprocity to operate. This would decrease the workers’ incentives to cooperate. 
3.3. Evidence from large scale administrative data 
In this section we use a representative sample of BAPP projects in order to answer the following 
questions:  
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i. How does the number of observers and the contact rate expand over?  
ii. What is the impact of BAPP on site accidents and culture?  
iii. Does the impact on accidents varies according to the number of observers?  
iv. Are there any interaction structures that can be useful to improve the impact of BAPP on 
accidents? 
3.3.1. Data 
We worked closely with DEKRA in generating a dataset that would allow us to study the impact of 
BAPP on accidents. DEKRA had already collected in 2013 an administrative dataset of 1,352 sites 
with a BAPP implementation. This dataset contains projects executed between 1989 to 2013. Although 
these projects do not represent the entirety of the projects executed by DEKRA over this period, it 
covers a substantial percentage of their BAPP activity over the years45. We refer to this dataset as the 
population of BAPP projects. The unit of the dataset is a site-month. For each site and month, we have 
information on: date, name of site, company of site, industry of company, country of site’s location, 
name of consultant, presence of culture, number of observers, number of observations, number of 
workers observed (in a minority of cases, an observation is done to two workers at the same time), 
number of coached observations, method of BAPP implementation, method of training (in a small 
share of cases, training of new observers is done by DEKRA and not the observers of the committee), 
number of critical behaviours that are tracked, the number of critical behaviours that were observed, 
the number of observed critical behaviours that were safely and riskily executed, number of workers 
on the site, and number of accidents. Regarding accidents, DEKRA took great care in harmonizing 
accident data across countries as they might be different rules in the reporting of these events. 
In order to execute the analysis we restricted the sample to those projects that have information on 
workplace accidents at least 2 years before and 3 years after the start of BAPP. The start of BAPP is 
measured by the month when observations start. This generated a sample of 88 sites. In the Table 11 
we compare the sample and the population and executed statistical test for several variables in our 
dataset. Except for year of start of BAPP, all the other variables are not statistically different between 
the population and the sample. Regarding year of start, in the sample we have newer projects (see 
appendix 3.7.1).  
                                                 
 
45 The reason for this is that the data of BAPP projects (observations, sheets, accidents, etc.) is stored in a software that is 
local and proprietary to each site. In 2013 DEKRA decided to collect all the historical information by asking the 
collaboration of its clients to share and retrieve the data to DEKRA. A substantial portion of their clients collaborated in 
this effort. 
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Table 11. Comparison of population and sample of sites 
 
Population 
Average (S.D.) 
Sample 
Average (S.D.) 
Statistically 
different? 
Workers 279 (223) 245 (160) No 
Accidents 1.59 (2.33) 1.22 (1.39) No 
Industry (Categorical) 
 
No 
Country (Categorical) 
 
No 
States within US (Categorical) 
 
No 
Year of start BAPP (Categorical) 
 
Yes 
Who trains observers (Categorical) 
 
No 
Type of Implementation (Categorical) 
 
No 
Number of critical behaviors 27.6 (7.2) 27.3 (6.6) No 
 
3.3.2. Evolution of the number of observers and the contact rate 
In this section, we explore how cooperation evolves within a site as a BAPP implementation gets 
implemented. In particular, we explore the expansion in the number of observers, the expansion of the 
reach to workers (i.e., the contact rate), and the individual effort of observers.  
To study this, we define three terms using the following equation: 
“Contact rate” = observations / workers = observations / observers x observers / workers   
                                                     =              “intensity”             x    “participation”                          (6) 
“Contact rate” is the number of observations per worker in a site in a given month. Workers excludes 
supervisors or managers, it only considers “frontline” employees which are eligible for observations 
and for becoming observers. Contact rate reflects the expected number of observations that worker 
could expect to receive in a month. As indicated, BAPP aims to achieve a contact rate of 1 over time.  
The contact rate can be broken down into two components: “Intensity” which captures the number of 
observations per observer per month, and “participation” which captures the share of workers that have 
become active observers. Active means that the observer has done 1 or more observations in a month. 
Intensity measure the magnitude of the cooperative effort by cooperators, and participation captures 
the penetration of cooperators in the site. 
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In the Figure 7, we display the average and percentiles 25 and 75 for these three variables over the 36 
months of a BAPP implementation (considering the 88 sites of our sample). Contact rate (green line) 
approach the goal of 1 by the end of year 3, but there is considerable variation across sites (dotted 
green lines). This indicates that overtime, BAPP reaches approaches to its goal of 1 observations per 
worker. Intensity (red line) is very stable over time, displaying a very slight decrease from ~5.3 in the 
first year to ~4.8 in the third year. Variation is also high (red dotted lines): sites at the 25th percentile 
display around 3 observations per observer per month, while at the 75th percentile this increases to 6.5. 
This indicates that the average cooperative effort is stable over time. Participation has a steady and 
uniform increase from 6%-8% in first few months to 20% at the last months of the third year. Given 
the average number of workers of 245 in our sample, this translates into a change from ~10 observers 
to ~50 observers over the span of 36 months. 
Overall, taken at face value, the evolution of these indicators suggest that overall cooperation does 
diffuse within the average BAPP implementation. Although participation is not high, and its expansion 
is slow, we see a steady increase over time. In addition, average intensity doesn’t seem to significantly 
decrease as the number of observers expand. This is surprising given the lack of a defined “interaction 
structure” in BAPP. 
However, these average values conceal a much richer underlying dynamics. As we will show in section 
3.3.5, if we break down the analysis by cohort of observers, we find that the new additional observers, 
as compared to the observers of the committee, have: i) much lower intensity, and therefore, 
cooperative effort does suffers as observers expand; ii) have and much higher rotation, and therefore, 
and the adoption of cooperation becomes fragile as observers expand: for the same increase of active 
observer it is needed to train an increasing number of workers as BAPP expands. Below we will dive 
deeper into these dynamics by studying its impact on performance. For that, we have to turn first to 
the analysis of the impact of BAPP on performance.  
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Figure 7. Evolution of contact rate, intensity and participation over a BAPP implementation 
 
3.3.3. Impact of BAPP 
The previous section indicates that on average BAPP gets cooperation going (abstracting for now the 
interesting dynamics that are generated across different cohorts of observers). Therefore, studying is 
impact To study the impact of BAPP on accidents, we use the following model: 
ACCIDENTSit = b1 + b2 x BAPPit + b3 x TRENDit + b4 x (BAPPit x TRENDit) + b5 x ln(WORKERSit) 
+ Ui + ERRORit    (1) 
In equation (2) we model the accidents of the site i in the month t. BAPP is a variable that takes the 
value of 1 in the month where the first observation is executed in the site. TREND equals to (t – θi) 
where t is the month and θi is the month when the BAPP started in the site. Given our sampling, this 
variable goes from -24 to +36. We added a site fixed effect Ui to the estimation in order to control for 
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time-invariant store unobservables. As a control, we added the natural logarithm of workers as more 
workers translate into more accidents46.  
The test we perform with this model is a within site before and after comparison, where we control for 
a common trend for all sites. Given that we include BAPP x TREND in the model, the coefficient b3 
captures the average accidents trend without BAPP.  
In Table 12 we display the results. All models include site fixed effects. In column (1) we explore the 
simplest model, only with BAPP and Ln(workers) as control. In (2) we add the trend. In (3) we add 
the interaction between BAPP and TREND. In column (4) we display the POISSON fixed effect 
estimates as a robustness.  
From columns (1) we that the impact of BAPP has a high statistical significance. Model 2 shows that 
the TREND is negative and statistically significant, but that BAPP looses its statistic significance. This 
is expected as there is collinearity between BAPP and TREND (BAPP equals o when TREND is lower 
than zero and 1 when TREND is higher than zero). This model not only introduces collinearity, it also 
generates the doubt of whether really the impact of BAPP in (1) is simply capturing a trend. But model 
(3) dispels this concern: it is easy to appreciate that the trend turns negative only after BAPP. The trend 
without BAPP (b3) is flat and non-significant. 
In columns (3) and (4), we find a negative and statistically significant impact of BAPP on the accidents 
of the site. The p-value of the joint t-test for BAPP, TREND and TREND*BAPP is below 0.001 (a 
joint t-test for BAPP and BAPP*TREND is significant at 5%); this test is required because, as 
discussed, BAPP and TREND are highly collinear (in model 3 the VIF is above 6 for these variables). 
In all the models, the impact of number of workers is well behaved, with a strong positive impact on 
accidents. 
Using column (3), we find that BAPP is related to a decrease in the level of accidents of 0.2 accidents 
(b2) and then for each month to a decrease in the accidents by 0.011 per month of implementation 
                                                 
 
46 The safety literature has documented a downward secular trend in accidents over time. This might require adding year 
fixed effects to control for this trend. However, there are two reasons that argue against this. First, in the appendix we 
show that the majority of the projects start between 2003 and 2007 but that we still have long tails before and after. In 
these tails, only a few projects –in many cases one or two– start in each year. Given this small number of projects in the 
tails, the year fixed effect might capture the effect of BAPP on not a secular trend. For the fixed effect to capture properly 
the secular trend, a high density of projects is required. Second, the site fixed effects can capture part of the potential 
impact of a secular trend. The 3 years over which the project was executed is part of the unobserved characteristics 
captured by Ui. That said, we ran several models adding year fixed effects, month fixed effects, year*industry fixed 
effects, and year*country fixed effects and the results did not change; instead, they became stronger.  
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(b4), which after twelve months amount to 0.132 accidents. Given the mean of our dependent variable, 
these estimates are large, accounting for 15% each (or a total decrease of 30% at the end of the first 
year of BAPP). We graph this result in the Figure 8. We performed power calculations on these 
estimates. Assuming significance of 5% and a standard deviation conditional on year, number of 
workers and site dummies (equal to 1.66 accidents) we find that the power of the effect of BAPP after 
1 year is 48%, after 2 years is 73%, and after three years is 92%. This suggests that, although the 
statistically significant effects may be false positives, it becomes more likely that we are uncovering a 
true effect as the implementation progresses (particularly at the end of the third year).  
Table 12. Impact of BAPP on accidents 
  Accidents – OLS 
(1) 
Accidents – OLS 
(2) 
Accidents - OLS 
(3) 
Accidents - POISSON 
(4) 
BAPP -0.357*** (0.087) -0.162† (0.104) -0.198*†   
(0.115) 
-0.156*†  (0.085) 
TREND  -0.007*† (0.004) 0.001†  (0.007) -0.001† (0.005) 
BAPP x TREND   -0.011†  (0.009) -0.011† (0.007) 
Ln(WORKERS) 1.030*** (0.300) 1.028*** (0.306) 1.028*** 
(0.302) 
0.714*** (0.088) 
Site fixed-effect? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.171** (1.61) -4.241** (1.61) -4.149**  (1.60)  
R-square  
(Log Likelihood) 
42.20% 42.28% 42.32% (-5,390.16) 
Observations 4,762  4,762 4,762 
Mean of dependent 
variable before 
BAPP 
1.338  1.338 1.338 
Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the site level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 in two-tailed test. † indicates 
p<0.01 in a two-tailed joint t-test (this test is required as there is multicollinearity between BAPP, TREND and their interaction). 
A joint t-test on BAPP and BAPP x TREND in model (3) is also statistical significant at p<0.05. 
 
Figure 8. Impact of BAPP over time 
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However, given our sample of project that only received a BAPP implementation, it is not possible to 
assess whether BAPP would be effective if it were to be randomly assigned to a population of sites. 
The absence of information on projects that don’t have BAPP precludes us to say anything in this 
regard. Therefore, all of our estimates, including the power calculations, should be placed in reference 
to the population of projects that received or are prone to receive BAPP47. What we can do, 
notwithstanding, is to probe whether within our (biased) sample the effects are causal. Given that we 
already included site fixed effects, the main threat to identification is time-variant unobservables at the 
site level. For example, it could be that a year before the start of BAPP, the site changed its manager 
which happened to be safety-conscious, and thus it is this manager that is related to both to BAPP and 
a reduction in accidents. 
To tackle this issue we executed two analyses. First, we do a flexible placebo test using the following 
model: 
ACCIDENTSit = b1 + ∑j (πj x YEAR_BAPP_Pj x BAPP_Pit) + b3 x TRENDit + ∑j (ρj x YEAR_BAPP_Pj 
x BAPP_Pit x TRENDit ) + b5 x ln(WORKERSit) + Ui + ERRORit    (2) 
In this model, BAPP_P is the “placebo BAPP” and takes the value of 1 after the 12th month preceding 
the real start of BAPP (i.e., BAPP starts in month -11). YEAR_BAPP is a dummy set that identifies 
                                                 
 
47 In the parlance of the experimental paradigm, we estimate an intent-to-treat effect and not a treatment on the treated. It’s 
as if: we had 200 BAPP programs to deliver; we randomly generated control and treatment groups of, say, 200 sites each; 
the treatment consisted on telling the treated sites that they could implement BAPP; in the end, only 88 sites self-selected 
to get the treatment; and data was collected only for the 88 sites. Given that we didn’t collect baseline data on the control 
and those that self-selected, we cannot assess the representativeness of our findings beyond those with an “intent” to be 
treated. 
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the year preceding the real start of BAPP (from -11 to 0, where 0 is the month preceding the start of 
observations), the first year of observations (from 1 to 12), the second year of observations (from 13 
to 24) and the third year of observations (from 25 to 36). (Thus, J=4.) Essentially, this models breaks 
down the impact of BAPP on the level and slope into four parts, including one year before the actual 
start, the placebo year. If the sites were already experiencing a change in their safety due to an 
unobserved time-variant element, then we would expect to find movement in the placebo year. The 
coefficient b3 now identifies the trend in the months going from -24 to -12.  
Table 13 presents the estimates of equation 2. Interpreting this table can be tricky, so we graph the 
result in Figure 9.This figure clearly shows that there is no effect in the year before BAPP, neither at 
the level or slope. The effect of BAPP is concentrated in the years 1 and 3 (and the year number 3 can 
be partly attributed to culture change; see analysis below).   
 
Table 13. Placebo test on the impact of BAPP 
  Accidents - OLS 
BAPP_P x  PLACEBO YEAR 0.049   (0.246) 
BAPP_P x  FIRST YEAR -0.085  (0.246) 
BAPP_P x  SECOND YEAR -0.323  (0.404) 
BAPP_P x  THIRD YEAR 0.220   (0.524) 
TREND -0.002  (0.014) 
TREND x BAPP_P x  PLACEBO YEAR -0.000  (0.018) 
TREND x BAPP_P x  FIRST YEAR -0.016  (0.023) 
TREND x BAPP_P x  SECOND YEAR 0.002   (0.020) 
TREND x BAPP_P x  THIRD YEAR -0.019  (0.019) 
Ln(WORKERS) 1.028*** (0.303) 
Site fixed-effect? Yes 
Constant -4.211**  (1.610) 
R-square (Log Likelihood) 42.34% 
Observations 4,762 
Mean of dependent variable before BAPP 1.338 
Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the site level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 in two-
tailed test. † indicates p<0.001 in a two-tailed joint t-test (this test is required as there is 
multicollinearity between BAPP, TREND and their interaction). The joint t-test on BAPP and BAPP 
x TREND is also statistical significant at p<0.05. 
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Figure 9. Impact of BAPP in placebo year 
 
 
The second analysis that we execute in order to check for time variant unobservables is a random trend 
model. This model fits an individual slope for each site: 
ACCIDENTSit = b1 + b2 x BAPPit + bi x TRENDit + b4 x (BAPPit x TRENDit) + b5 x ln(WORKERSit) 
+ Ui +  ERRORit      (3) 
In this model, the coefficient of TREND is indexed, meaning that each site has their own trend. To 
estimate this model we use first differences (to which we add a constant a1) and a fixed effect technique 
on the new data: 
∆ACCIDENTSit = a1 + b2 x ∆BAPPit + bi + b4 x ∆(BAPPit x TRENDit) + b5 x ∆ln(WORKERSit) 
 + ∆ ERRORit          (4) 
Controlling for a specific trend for each site allows to control for unobservables that vary over time 
within the site and that might generate a systematic change in the accidents. The results are displayed 
in the Table 14. In column 1, we find that BAPP decreases their coefficients, both at the level (from -
0.198 to -0.056) and the slope (from -0.011 to -0.008). The result is graphed in the Figure 10. Statistical 
significance suffer in these models, as models in difference are noisier (see the r-square).  
However, controlling for site-specific trend could also capture the quality of the BAPP 
implementation. The coefficients b2 and b4 are capturing the average impact of BAPP, thus bi can be 
capturing the variation in the quality of the BAPP implementation. This implementation quality is a 
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time variant unobservable at the site level. Therefore, the estimates of 4 could be biased depending on 
the rarity of the different extremes of implementation quality. In the columns (2), (3) and (4) we 
attempt to accommodate for that possibility by eliminating the top and bottom 5%, 10% and 20% of 
the slopes bi (eliminating the top and bottom 1% yields similar results to column 1). Here we find that 
the impact of BAPP increases and recovers its statistical significance. This is suggestive that the 
extreme values of time-variant unboservables are tilted toward the cases that are not favourable to 
safety; for example, more extreme cases of low implementation quality than high. This resonates with 
intuition and with the values displayed above in Figure 7. 
Table 14. Impact of BAPP adding a site-specific trend as control 
  ∆Accidents 
(1)  
∆Accidents 
(2) 
∆Accidents 
(3) 
∆Accidents 
(4) 
Sample: Full Excluding top and 
bottom 5% of bi 
Excluding top and 
bottom 10% of bi 
Excluding top and 
bottom 20% of bi 
∆BAPP -0.056  (0.189) 0.066 (0.180) 0.197 (0.174) 0.065 (0.189) 
∆(BAPP x TREND) -0.008  (0.013) -0.017 (0.014) -0.022* (0.013) -0.025** (0.009) 
∆Ln(WORKERS) 1.317** (0.609) 1.274* (0.719) 1.268 (0.799) 1.755* (0.971) 
Site fixed-effect? (bi) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.000  (0.008) 0.003 (0.008) 0.004 (0.007) 0.008 (0.006) 
R-square 1.54% 1.44% 1.45% 5.9% 
Observations 4,748 4,199 3,776 2,773 
Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the site level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 in two-tailed test. 
All models are estimates using OLS panel fixed effect. 
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Figure 10. Impact of BAPP adding a site-specific trend 
 
The placebo and random-trend test, although not definitive, provide evidence that the impact of BAPP 
we document is likely to be causal (within the sample of sites prone to implement the methodology). 
Another way to assess the credibility of the estimates is to assess mechanisms. Given how it is 
structured, we should expect BAPP to operate in some predictable ways. First, BAPP is a methodology 
that taps into the voluntary cooperation of workers. As the circle of cooperation enlarges we should 
expect BAPP to experiment difficulties as the number of observers expand. In the section 3.3.4 we 
exploit this in great detail and find strong evidence of this breakdown in cooperation.  
The second mechanism we explore is how the pre-implementation culture of the site affects the impact 
of BAPP. As indicated above, DEKRA provides a service of surveying the culture of the site. This 
survey is always executed before any implementation of BAPP, typically around three months before 
the start of the implementation. This survey is used as an input at the planning stage. In the Table 15 
we describe the 10 cultural dimensions of this survey. DEKRA developed and refined this survey in 
the early 2000s in collaboration with organizational behaviour scholars. The survey is executed 
typically to all workers of a site using a web-based interface. Each one of the 10 factors/dimensions of 
the survey comes for a set of 5 points likert-scale items, whose psychometric properties (e.g., 
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reliability) were assessed by previous scholars collaborating with DEKRA48. In non-reported 
regressions (available upon request), we executed a detailed analysis on how the impact of BAPP 
varies according to culture. We find that the overall score in the survey doesn’t affect the impact of 
BAPP. Regarding the dimensions, we find that BAPP has a lower impact when the score for “Group 
relations” and “Approaching others” was high. Given that these dimensions are correlated themselves 
with a decrease in accidents, we interpret these findings as evidence of a substitution effect. BAPP 
operates by improving group relations (it teaches workers how to relate to one another in a good way) 
and teaching workers how to approach co-workers and provide feedback on their risky behaviour. If 
the pre-existing culture already displays these elements, then the impact of BAPP diminishes: the site 
are already doing what BAPP is supposed to do. The only additional dimension that is significant is 
“teamwork” which boosts the impact of BAPP. This dimension is not related to accidents, so it can’t 
operate as a substitute. Instead, we believe this finding shows that BAPP is implemented in a better 
and more effective way when teamwork is high, which is intuitive. Finally, given that BAPP is a 
technology “by a for the workers” is not unexpected not to find heterogeneity of impact with respect 
to the factors grouped as “organizational factors”. 
                                                 
 
48 The underlying items and their scores was not provided by DEKRA due to copyright. We only obtained the value for 
each aggregate value for factor/dimension of the survey. More information about the survey can be found at https://dekra-
insight.com/en/topic/organizational-culture-diagnostic-instrument-ocdi. In private conversations with DEKRA, I was 
reassured that the psychometric properties of the survey were closely scrutinized to secure its validity.   
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Table 15. Dimensions of culture survey 
Area Dimension  Definition by Dekra 
Organizational 
factors 
Procedural justice The extent to which individual workers perceive 
fairness in the supervisor’s decision-making 
process. 
Leader-member exchange The relationship the employee has with his or her 
supervisor. In particular, this scale measures the 
employee’s level of confidence that his 
supervisor will go to bat for him and look out for 
his interests. 
Perceived organizational 
support 
The employee’s perception of the employee that 
the organization cares about him, values him, and 
supports him. 
Management credibility The employee’s perception of the employee that 
what management says is consistent with what 
management does. 
Team factors Teamwork The extent to which employees perceive that 
working with team members is an effective way 
to get things done. 
Group relations The employee’s perception they employee has of 
his relationship with co-workers. How well do 
they get along? To what degree do they treat each 
other with respect, listen to each other’s ideas, 
help one another out, and follow through on 
commitments made? 
Safety factors 
 
Organizational value for 
safety (or Safety climate) 
The safety climate scale measures the extent to 
which employees perceive the organization has a 
value for safety performance. 
Upward communication The extent to which communication about safety 
flows upwards in the organization. 
Approaching others The extent to which employees feel free to speak 
to one another about safety concerns. 
Injury reporting The degree to which it is easy and secure to 
report safety incidents within the site 
 
Impact on culture 
Now we turn to the impact of BAPP on culture. In this subsection, we don’t expand theoretically on 
the concept of culture. Instead, we take as face value the conceptualization of culture by DEKRA along 
with the instrument that they developed and used. Instead, the purpose of this subsection is to simply 
explore the impact of BAPP on culture thus understood. If BAPP operates as expanding cooperation 
in safety, then we should expect to find impact on culture. Particularly, we should find an impact on 
safety impact. 
DEKRA collected data on before and after culture surveys for 78 sites. The first survey occurred 
between 2001 and 2006 as part of the survey development and refinement effort executed by DEKRA 
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with scholars. This effort included 94 sites and ended up in a proprietary report. The follow up occurred 
between 2005 and 2009, with some attrition occurring.  
The model we use to assess the impact of BAPP on site culture is the following: 
CULTURE iw = b1 + b2 x SECOND_SURVEYw + b3 x SECOND_SURVEYw x YEARSi + b4 x  
Ln(RESPONDENTS)iw + MONTHiw +  Ui + ERRORiw          (5) 
Culture is the average of the items of the survey, whether as a specific area or the survey as a whole, 
for the site i on the wave of survey w, which can take the value of w=1 or w=2. The dummy 
SECOND_SURVEY takes the value of 1 if the survey is the follow-up survey (w=2). Given that the 
follow-up survey is not executed at the same time, the variable YEARS capture the number of years 
that separate the follow-up from the baseline survey (which goes from 1 to 6, quite uniformly 
distributed). The variable RESPONDENTS measures the number of workers that responded the survey 
(which is close to the number of workers). We add a site fixed effect (Ui) to control for time invariant 
unobservables and a month of survey fixed effect (MONTHiw) to control for any seasonality that might 
affect responses49.  
In the Table 16 we present the results for the survey as a whole, that is, the average for the 10 
dimensions. Column 1 shows that average impact of BAPP on overall culture is 0.123, statistically 
significant at 99% and representing a bit more than half a standard deviation. In column 2 we find that 
this effect is increasing over time. At the course of 3 years, the impact on culture is 0.121, and over 6 
years is 0.22, or 1 standard deviation.  
Of course, these estimates are subject to endogeneity from omitted variables, specifically from time 
variant unobservables at the site level. For example, just like the case of accident, it could be that 
BAPP coincided with a change in top management that generates a change in culture while 
implementing BAPP. We provide four elements against this possibility. First, the gradual increase of 
culture coincides with the gradual impact that BAPP has on the sites, as shown in Figure 8 and in 
Figure 7. A time variant unobservable would need to generate this pattern, which excludes, following 
our example, of a change in the management team, which is a one-off change. Second, in model 3 we 
add an interaction between the second survey with the number of respondents (or number of workers, 
                                                 
 
49 We don’t add a year of survey dummy set because the overlap between baseline and follow up very small (less than 15 
sites). This generates a big bias as the year fixed effects would be capturing a large part of the SECOND_SURVEY  
variable.  
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as survey compliance is high). This variable can capture some of the time variant unobservables of the 
site. However, we find that the results are robust to the inclusion of this interaction.  
As a third argument, we study the different areas of the survey. In the Table 17 the results indicate 
that the increase in culture is exerted primarily on the “Safety Factors”, the area where BAPP is poised 
to exert the greatest direct impact. The impact on safety culture is significant: after three years, an 
increase of 40% of a standard deviation; after six years, an increase of 80%. The impact of BAPP on 
the “organizational factors” and “team factors” areas is indirect. In columns (2) and (4) we see that 
safety factors is positively associated to the remaining two factors. Therefore, one can compute the 
indirect effect of BAPP on them. On its third year, BAPP exert an indirect impact on “organizational 
factors” that is equivalent to 24% of its standard deviation (using column (6) and (2) we compute 
[0.006 + 0.028*3] * 0.752 / 0.278). On the 6th year, the increase is 47%. Analogously, the indirect 
effect of BAPP on “team factors” is 21% and 40% of its standard deviation on the third and sixth year 
respectively.  
 The fourth and final argument is the result for Oster delta. For model (5) of Table 17 we obtained a 
delta of 3.6 (assuming a maximum r-square of 1). This means that in order for unboservables to 
overthrow our results, the selection on unobservables would need to be 3.6 times the selection on 
observables. Overall, evidence suggest quite strongly that BAPP exerts a causal impact on culture. Of 
course, as discussed above, given our sample, this impact is circumscribed to the sites that received 
(or are prone to receive) the BAPP methodology50.  
Table 16. Impact of BAPP on site culture 
  CULTURE 
(1) 
CULTURE 
(2) 
CULTURE 
(3) 
SECOND_SURVEY 0.123*** (0.019) 0.022† (0.055) 0.105‡ (0.117) 
SECOND_SURVEY x YEARS  0.033*† (0.017) 0.030*‡ (0.016) 
Ln(RESPONDENTS) -0.069 (0.051) -0.068 (0.049) -0.056 (0.054) 
SECOND_SURVEY x Ln(RESPONDENTS)   -0.015 (0.020) 
Site fixed-effect?  Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.856  (0.008) 3.855*** (0.259) 3.808*** (0.274) 
                                                 
 
50 We also did an additional model replicating column (6) of Table 17. We added an interaction between the second survey 
and the “organizational factors” and the “teamwork factors”. These two interaction would capture time variant 
unobservables that changed these areas in the survey. The results remained the same as compared to column (6): the 
coefficient SECOND_SURVEY x YEARS was 0.027 significant at 10% and the joint t-test significant at 1%. 
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Adjusted R-square 81.43% 82.18% % 
Observations 156 156 156 
Mean (st. dev.) of culture on first survey 3.526 (0.228) 3.526 (0.228) 3.526 (0.228) 
Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the site level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 in two-tailed test. All 
models are estimated using an OLS panel fixed effect. † indicates p<0.01 in a two-tailed joint t-test. ‡ indicates 
p<0.05 in a two-tailed joint t-test. 
 
Overall, the impact that we document for BAPP indicates that cooperation is beneficial, as is it 
typically assumed in the literature. Here we provide much needed field evidence of the power of 
cooperation. BAPP allows to explore the impact of cooperation as it evolves within a site quite cleanly, 
without the confounds that other types of approaches face (for example, the organizational citizenship 
literature).  
The large impact on accidents and culture is impressive. This begs the question of why companies 
haven’t executed this type of cooperation-based-methodologies on their own, as a grass-root 
innovation that latter diffuses within and across companies? We believe there are four answers to this:  
i. “They might not know”. Just like evolution requires mutations, organizations require to come 
up with the idea of such a policy/practice (internally or from copying), and this might never 
occur. 
ii. “They know, but the incentives are not there”. As discussed above and documented in 3.3.8, 
becoming an observer and executing observations is a social dilemma, and therefore, any 
grass-root attempt a BAPP type of policy will have to fight against the resistance and friction 
generated by self-interested free-riding. Instead, BAPP provides a nice catalyzer to get the 
cooperative spark going. Whether these cooperation incentives get diluted as BAPP evolves 
within a site, is analyzed in the next section. 
iii. “They know, they have the incentives, but peer-to-peer coordination is hard”. Even if social 
preferences are prevalent in a site, workers would need to coordinate in order to execute such 
a policy. This is not easy to do, and if done poorly, it may generate unfair situations affecting 
the willingness to cooperate. This is related to the clarity problem in building relational 
contracts (Gibbons and Henderson, 2013). 
iv. “They know, they have the incentives, but hierarchical coordination crowds-out the 
incentives”. An alternative to peer-to-peer coordination is to have the company or managers 
to direct in a top-down fashion the collective effort. However, this can plausibly crowd out 
social preferences by the difficult in assessing and believing the true underlying motivations 
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of companies. This related to the credibility problem in building relational contracts (Gibbons 
and Henderson, 2013). 
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Table 17. Impact of BAPP on different dimensions of culture 
  ORGANIZATIONAL 
FACTORS 
(1) 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
FACTORS 
(2) 
TEAMWORK 
FACTORS 
(3) 
TEAMWORK 
FACTORS 
(4) 
SAFETY 
FACTORS 
 (5) 
SAFETY 
FACTORS 
(6) 
SECOND_SURVEY 0.037 (0.029) -0.008 (0.065) 0.038 (0.246) 0.028 (0.054) 0.088*** (0.022) 0.006† (0.044) 
SECOND_SURVEY x YEARS  0.016 (0.020)  0.004 (0.016)  0.028*† (0.016) 
Ln(RESPONDENTS) 0.043 (0.069) 0.040 (0.070) -0.096* (0.048) -0.097** (0.048) -0.067 (0.039) -0.063* (0.037) 
ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS   -0.254 (0.365) -0.256 (0.367) 0.324*** (0.081) 0.292*** (0.084) 
TEAMWORK FACTORS -0.226 (0.280) -0.226 (0.278)   0.219*** (0.073) 0.203*** (0.073) 
SAFETY FACTORS 0.793*** (0.196) 0.752*** (0.181) 0.599* (0.353) 0.591* (0.354)   
Site fixed-effect?  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.191  (1.041) 1.349 (1.039) 2.773*** (0.627) 2.808*** (0.615) 1.939*** (0.515) 2.115*** (0.519) 
Adjusted R-square 77.12% 76.79% 68.85% 65.07% 85.32% 85.98% 
Observations 156 156 156 156 156 156 
Mean (st. dev.) on first survey 3.258 (0.278) 3.258 (0.278) 3.680 (0.259) 3.680 (0.259) 3.740 (0.221) 3.740 (0.221) 
The dependent variables are the average of the factors within each area of the survey. Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the site level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
in two-tailed test. All models are estimated using an OLS panel fixed effect. † indicates p<0.01 in a joint two-tailed t-test.  
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3.3.4. Large groups decrease the impact of BAPP 
Thus far, we have documented the beneficial impact of BAPP on accidents and culture. In this 
section, we dig deeper and unveil the dynamics underlying this average effect. In particular, we 
study how different elements components of cooperation affect the impact of BAPP. To do so, we 
go back to the three variables defined in section 3.3.2: the contact rate and its two components, 
intensity and participation. These variables capture the essence of cooperation in BAPP as it 
evolves: intensity captures cooperative effort, and participation captures the spread of the 
cooperative trait, and contact rate captures the amount of cooperative benefits with workers. 
To explore the how the contact rate affect the impact of BAPP, we use the following regression 
model: 
ACCit = b1 + b2 x BAPPit + b3 x TRENDit + ∑j b4j x BAPPit x QUINT_CRj + b5 x ln(WORKERSit) 
+ Ui   + ERRORit  (7)     
In this model, QUINT_CR capture the quintiles of the contact rate, thus J = 5. In the Table 18 we 
present the results. The joint t-test indicates that BAPP as whole is significant51. In column (2) we 
add as a control the interaction between BAPP and TREND. However, the coefficients of the 
quintile of contact rate are stable across columns (1) and (2). (Contact rate grows as the time passes 
in the implementation (Figure 7). At the same time, BAPP changes the slope reducing accidents 
over time (Figure 8). And this could be driven by effects other than the increase in contact rate, 
such as the change in culture.) 
Each coefficient b4j captures that effect of BAPP at each quintile of contact rate. In the Figure 11 
we graph the result. Contract rate has a non-linear relation on the impact of BAPP on accidents. It 
increases in the first two quintiles, then drops slightly for the third quintile, and finally it drops 
quite sharply for the last two quintiles. These results begin to unveil the dynamics at play: the 
                                                 
 
51 Similarly to table 12, the joint t-test is required because contact rate has a high collinearity with trend. Notice that 
in column (1), if the baseline coefficient BAPP is dropped and its interaction with the 5 th quintile kept, then the 
interaction with the 2nd and 3rd quintile would display p-values of 0.014 and 0.034; the same for column (2). 
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benefits of cooperation seem to be decreasing. However, to fully understand what is going on, we 
study the components of contact rate. 
Table 18. Role of contact rate on the impact of BAPP 
  Accidents 
(1) 
Accidents 
(2) 
BAPP -0.124† (0.191) -0.123‡ (0.192) 
BAPP X 1ST QUINTILE OF CONTACT RATE 0.018† (0.145) -0.029‡ (0.142) 
BAPP X 2ND QUINTILE OF CONTACT RATE -0.155† (0.175) -0.188‡ (0.175) 
BAPP X 3RD QUINTILE OF CONTACT RATE -0.125† (0.125) -0.148‡ (0.121) 
BAPP X 4TH QUINTILE OF CONTACT RATE -0.004† (0.109) -0.020‡ (0.106) 
BAPP X 5TH QUINTILE OF CONTACT RATE (Omitted) (Omitted) 
TREND -0.006† (0.004) 0.001‡ (0.007) 
BAPP X TREND  -0.011‡ (0.009) 
Ln(WORKERS) 1.082*** (0.318) 1.085*** (0.319) 
Site fixed-effect?  Yes Yes 
Constant -4.528*** (1.690) -4.448*** (1.691) 
Adjusted R-square 41.00% 41.00% 
Observations 4,625 4,625 
Mean of dependent variable before BAPP 1.338 1.338 
Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the site level. *** p<0.01 in two-tailed test. All models 
are estimated using an OLS panel fixed effect. † indicates p<0.001 in a two-tailed joint t-test. If TREND 
is dropped from the Joint test in column (1), the p-value is 0.063; if dropped from the Joint test in column 
(2), the p-value is 0.087. In column (1), if the baseline coefficient BAPP is dropped and its interaction with 
the 5th quintile kept, then the interaction with the 2nd and 3rd quintile would display p-values of 0.014 and 
0.034; the same for column (2).  
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Figure 11. The impact of BAPP varies according to contact rate. 
 
 
A high contact rate can be achieved using two generic strategies: high intensity and low 
participation, or low intensity and high participation. In Figure 12 we display all the month-site 
combinations of participation and intensity for the three years of BAPP implementation. It can be 
readily seen that there is a trade-off between intensity and participation. For example, in red we 
display a site that achieved a contact rate of 1 by growing on intensity while keeping participation 
around 0.1. In green we display a site that achieved a contact rate of 1 by growing on participation 
while keeping its intensity around 2. We exploit this variation in strategies to estimate the isolate 
the impact of intensity and participation. 
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Figure 12. Two strategies to increase contact rate 
 
 
In order to explore the separate impact that participation and intensity exert on accidents, we use 
the following model: 
ACCit = b1 + b2 x BAPPit + b3 x TRENDit + ∑j b4j x BAPPit x QUINT_INTj + ∑j b5j x BAPPit x 
QUINT_PARTj + b6 x ln(WORKERSit) + Ui  + ERRORit     (8)  
This model is the same as equation (7) with the difference that now we break the five quintiles of 
the contact rate into two sets of five quintiles of intensity and participation. The coefficients b4j 
and b5j capture the marginal impact of each quintile of intensity and participation respectively. 
In Table 19 we present the results. Considering that intensity and participation grow systematically 
during the implementation, in column (2) we add the control of BAPP times TREND. However, 
the results don’t change compared to column (1) (this suggest that the individual term of TREND 
is a sufficient control). The results indicate that intensity decreases accidents, and that this impact 
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is increasing. On the contrary, participation decreases accidents at first, but then it increases them. 
Participation is not significant due to high collinearity with TREND. Participation increases with 
time. If the variables of participation and intensity are dichotomized into dummies –reducing the 
collinearity problem slightly, both dummies are statistical significant (see the table 23 below). 
In Figure 13 and Figure 14 we display the impact of intensity and participation, respectively. 
Each figure mirrors the two sites highlighted in Figure 12: while keeping one dimension constant 
at its second quintile, we display the impact of changing quintiles in the remaining dimension. This 
figure display a clear inverted-U relationship between participation and accidents. This means that, 
conditional on intensity, participation is only beneficial up to approximately a participation of 0.08. 
Given the average site size of 245 employees, this means that after having approximately 20 
observers, adding more observers is detrimental. This results provide supporting evidence for the 
prediction that cooperation would suffer as it expands: more observers mean that the free-riding 
temptation in providing cooperative effort increases. 
This results provide supporting evidence for the prediction that cooperation would suffer as it 
expanded. However, one would expect that there could be decreasing returns from adding more 
observers (as in the contact rate), but not a negative impact. In order to answer this question, in the 
next section we dig deeper using observation and observer level data.  
  Table 19. The role of intensity and participation on the impact of BAPP 
  Accidents 
(1) 
Accidents 
(2) 
BAPP 0.016 (0.149) -0.039 (0.152) 
BAPP X 1ST QUINTILE OF INTENSITY (omitted) (omitted) 
BAPP X 2ND QUINTILE OF INTENSITY -0.113 (0.089) -0.118 (0.091) 
BAPP X 3RD QUINTILE OF INTENSITY -0.144 (0.101) -0.147 (0.103) 
BAPP X 4TH QUINTILE OF INTENSITY -0.218* (0.126) -0.226* (0.130) 
BAPP X 5TH QUINTILE OF INTENSITY -0.267** (0.117) -0.266** (0.119) 
BAPP X 1ST QUINTILE OF PARTICIPATION (omitted) (omitted) 
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BAPP X 2ND QUINTILE OF PARTICIPATION -0.169† (0.119) -0.144† (0.113) 
BAPP X 3RD QUINTILE OF PARTICIPATION -0.016 (0.110) 0.015 (0.116) 
BAPP X 4TH QUINTILE OF PARTICIPATION 0.037 (0.096) 0.084 (0.094) 
BAPP X 5TH QUINTILE OF PARTICIPATION 0.141† (0.158) 0.218† (0.166) 
TREND -0.008* (0.005) 0.007 (0.007) 
BAPP X TREND  -0.013 (0.010) 
Ln(WORKERS) 1.126*** (0.321) 1.132*** (0.323) 
Site fixed-effect?  Yes Yes 
Constant -4.782*** (1.712) -4.713*** (1.172) 
Adjusted R-square 41.07% 41.11% 
Observations 4,625 4,625 
Mean of dependent variable before BAPP 1.338 1.338 
Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the site level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 in two-
tailed test. All models are estimated using an OLS panel fixed effect. †A test of equality of  BAPP X 5TH 
QUINTILE OF PARTICIPATION and BAPP X 2ND QUINTILE OF PARTICIPATION is rejected at the 
20% and 10% significance in column (1) and (2), respectively. 
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Figure 13. The impact of BAPP varies according to Intensity. 
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Figure 14. The impact of BAPP varies according to participation. 
 
 
3.3.5. Why do large groups decrease the impact of BAPP? 
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number of active observers into five quintiles of entry order, that is, into five cohorts of observers. 
For all observers that participated in BAPP, we recorded the “date of entry” as the date of their 
first observation and using that, an “order of entry” for each observer within their site. To generate 
the cut-offs of the quintiles/cohorts, we use the information at the observer-month level. There are 
many observers that participated over the 36 months, and plenty that participated in only a handful 
of periods. The cut-offs were computed to separate all the observer-months entries into equal sized 
groups according to “order of entry”. Thus, the cohorts are “weighted” by the number of months 
the observers were present or active. This allows to generate meaningful cutoffs that acknowledge 
the “importance/relevance” of the resulting cohorts52. The quintiles separate the total presence over 
time of observers according to their order entry.  
Figure 16 decomposes the total number of active observers by cohort. For example, the Figure 
15 indicates that at the period 12 there are, on average, 30 active observers per site. Figure 16 
shows that these come from the following cohorts:  
i. 7 observers from the 1st cohort (observers that with an entry order between 1 and 13), 
ii. 6.7 observers from the 2nd cohort (observers that with an entry order between 14 and 36),  
iii. 7.8 observers from the 3rd cohort (observers that with an entry order between 37 and 78), 
iv. 6.3 observers from the 4th cohort (observers that with an entry order between 79 and 168), 
v. 2.2 observers from the 5th cohort (observers that with an entry order between 169 or more), 
 
The weights of the cohorts in the total number of observers of course varies according to the period 
of the implementation. Early in the implementation the first cohort is more prevalent, and as the 
implement progresses, newer cohorts take more importance in the composition of the active 
observers. In the last year, the largest number of belongs to the last cohort. 
                                                 
 
52 The results we display below do not change if different criteria are used to generate the quintiles such as not 
weighting by active months, or weighting by the number of observations. 
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From Figure 8 we also learn that the amount of rotation of observers is not small. For example, 
four of the nine observers from the first cohort leave the project by the end of the third year. 
Notably, rotation increases as we move into higher quintiles. The second quintile has roughly 7 
active observers on average but the pool of observers where these active observers is drawn equals 
23 observers (36-14+1). This implies a larger rotation for the 2nd quintile compared to the first. 
The third quintile has roughly 8 active observers drawn from a pool 42 observers, while the fourth 
draws roughly 9 observers from a pool of 90 observers.  
Figure 15. Average number of active observers per site 
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Figure 16. Number of observers per quintile of entry (or cohort) 
 
Then, for each quintile, we computed the total number of observations executed for each month 
and we divided that by the number of observers displayed in Figure 16. This yields the intensity 
for each quintile. The results, for which we summarize at the year level, are displayed in the Figure 
17. Here we can clearly see that the intensity experiences an important drop as we move up in the 
quintiles. In the first year, the first quintile execute 7 observations per month, while the fifth 
quintile only executes 3.5. The data also shows some convergence over time. The first executes 
5.7 in the third year, while the fifth quintile executes 4.5. In the graphs, the dotted lines display a 
95% confidence interval. We see that the differences are statistically significant.  
How does these results explain the inverted U documented in Figure 14? These results strongly 
suggests that the increase in accidents from high participation comes from a decrease in the 
cooperative effort of the newer observers. The newer observers display higher rotation, and thus, 
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less time as observers; and while they are observers, they execute a substantively lower amount of 
observations. This lower intensity is not captured by the model estimated in the Table 19. The 
intensity used in that model is aggregate, and its level and the variance is quite stable over the 36 
months of implementation (see Figure 7). Instead, the effect that the inverted U is capturing is the 
lower intensity of the newer cohorts. Simple calculations can confirm this. Going from a 
participation of 10% --the peak of the inverted U-- to a participation of 20%, means going from 25 
observers in month 8, to 50 observers in the second semester of the third year. From Figure 16 we 
know that these 25 additional observers come in the most part from quintiles 4 and 5. At the eight 
period the weighted intensity is 5.9, while the intensity of the observers that will enter is no higher 
than 5, closer than 4 and 4.5 for the last two years. According to Figure 13 and Table 19, this 
decrease of (roughly) 1.5 in intensity translates into a 15% to 20% increase in accidents, which is 
the magnitude we observe in the inverted U.  
Figure 17. Newer observers execute fewer observations 
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However, the analysis executed so far in this section is subject to confounds. The most important 
is that the quintiles are generated for the whole sample, and as such, they do not consider any site-
specific elements such as size, the implementation strategy or the amount of coaching. For 
example, it could be that the lower intensity of higher quintiles is due to a higher participation rate: 
in order to achieve the aimed contact rate of 1, low intensity might be needed. In order to check 
whether the findings are robust to these confounding elements, we use the following regression 
model: 
INTENSITYijt = b1 +  ∑j b2j x OBS_QUINTij + b3 x TOT_OBSjt  + b4 x TENUREijt+ Tt + Uj  + 
ERRORijt     (9) 
In this model we regress the number of observations of the observer i in the site j in the month of 
implementation t (from 1 to 36) on the quintile of the observer (the cohorts defined above), the 
number of observers in the site (which captures participation), the tenure of the worker (measured 
as the months elapsed between the month of first observations and the focal month) which control 
for the impact of rotation (higher quintiles have higher rotation), and fixed effects of site and month 
of implementation (we also used the product of site and month as a fixed effect and results 
remained unchanged). Sadly, we could not add observer fixed effects as the cohort of the observer 
is time invariant. The results are displayed in the Table 20. The column (1) show that the 
detrimental impact of higher cohorts of entry is robust to the control variables we used.  
However, using cohorts has the downside that sites have different number of workers, and 
therefore quintiles that are defined by the distribution across sites (and not within) can be affected 
by the a size confound. For example, larger sites will have more observers in higher quintiles, but 
display lower intensity for another reason (e.g., they pursue a high participation). To accommodate 
this, in columns (2) and (3) we use the entry of order of the observer, and this variable, conditional 
on site (column 2) or site-month fixed effects (column 3) will not be affected by such concerns. 
Using column (3) estimates we find that the 50th observer in entry order within a site displays 0.95 
less observations, whereas the 100th observer displays 1.8 less observations. 
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Table 20. Regression of intensity on entry order 
  Intensity 
(1) 
Intensity 
(2) 
Intensity 
(3) 
1ST QUINTILE OF ENTRY ORDER 3.056*** (0.255)   
2ND QUINTILE OF ENTRY ORDER 1.993*** (0.253)   
3RD QUINTILE OF ENTRY ORDER 1.336*** (0.184)   
4TH QUINTILE OF ENTRY ORDER 1.085*** (0.127)   
5TH QUINTILE OF ENTRY ORDER (Omitted)   
ORDER OF ENTRY  -0.016*** (0.002) -0.02***(0.001) 
ORDER OF ENTRY ^2  0.00002*** (2.09e-06) 0.00002*** (2.34e-06) 
TENURE 0.022*** (0.007) 0.036***(0.007) 0.006 (0.006) 
NUMBER OF OBSERVERS -0.006*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.001) (omitted) 
Month of implementation fixed-effects? Yes Yes No 
Site fixed-effects?  Yes Yes No 
Site # Month of implementation fixed 
effects? 
No No Yes 
Constant 1.912*** (0.367) 4.965*** (0.268) 1.052 
R-square 8.51% 8.46% 27.99% 
Observations 91,145 91,145 91,145 
Mean of dependent variable  5.28 5.28 5.28 
Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the observer level. *** p<0.01 in two-tailed test. All models are estimated 
using OLS.  
 
The implications on worker rotation extracted from Figure 16 is also subject to confounds. We 
execute the same analysis as for intensity. The result is displayed in Table 21. For this model, we 
use observer tenure as the dependent variable. As we use this variable, it is crucial to include the 
“time implementation X site” dummies (model 2): both tenure and order of entry increase as the 
implementation elapses. The test that this regression performs is to assess whether the order of 
entry takes away (or adds) from to the “automatic” relationship between time of implementation 
and tenure. The results indicate a very robust and large negative relationship between the ranking 
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of entry and tenure. The 50th observer in entering BAPP has 5.7 months of lower tenure, equivalent 
to 60% of the mean tenure. Tenure is relevant: in the appendix 3.7.2 we show that higher tenure in 
new/additional observers improves the impact of BAPP on accidents. These results strongly 
suggest that cooperation becomes shakier as the number of observers expands and that this 
diminishes the impact of BAPP.  
Table 21. Regression of tenure as observer on order of entry 
  Tenure as observer 
(1) 
Tenure as observer 
(2) 
ORDER OF ENTRY -0.119*** (0.0006) -0.119*** (0.0005) 
ORDER OF ENTRY ^2 0.0001*** (1.33e-06) 0.0001*** (1.19e-06) 
NUMBER OF OBSERVERS 0.013*** (5.48e-04) (omitted) 
Month of implementation fixed-effects? Yes No 
Site fixed-effects?  Yes No 
Site # Month of implementation fixed 
effects? 
No Yes 
Constant 1.153*** (0.148) 0.415*** (0.084) 
R-square 75.12% 79.90% 
Observations 91,145 91,145 
Mean of dependent variable  9.33 9.33 
Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the observer level. *** p<0.01 in two-tailed test. All 
models are estimated using OLS.  
 
With these results, the picture is more complete: BAPP generates a positive average impact, but 
this impact is limited as the number of observers expands. The new additional observers provide 
a lower cooperative effort and stay less time, diminishing the capacity of cooperation to deliver 
results as it expands.  
3.3.6. Evidence on the benefits of an “interaction structure” 
The implementation of BAPP provides freedom to the site to try different tactics and strategies. In 
Appendix 3.7.2 we exploit this variance and execute a thorough analysis on the heterogeneity of 
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impact of BAPP. In this section we will focus on a specific aspect of the BAPP implementation 
that provides initial evidence on the importance of “interaction structures” for cooperation.  
Drawing for our conversations with DEKRA and ACHS we realized that some sites specialize 
their observers on different areas of a site, executing its observations mainly in that area. Also, 
some observers naturally specialize, even if the site doesn’t define a policy in that direction. The 
area specialization of observers has two main effects:  
i) A “learning effect”: the observer learns about the tasks being performed in the area and therefore 
can provide better and deeper feedback to workers,  
ii) An “interaction structure” effects: the observer now interacts with a reduced set of workers and 
this increases the frequency of interaction with observed workers and therefore the capacity of 
direct reciprocity to sustain cooperation. If the area where the observer specializes is 1/5 of the 
site, then the frequency of interaction can increase by a factor of 5. 
The observation sheet displays the different areas of the site where the observer can execute a 
particular the observation. The set of areas is pre-defined by the team of observers that set ups the 
implementation and stays fixed throughout the implementation. We measured specialization as an 
HHI index: the sum of the squares of the share of total observations by the observer in each area 
of the site53. Then we averaged this for a site for every month (this generated some variation over 
time as the pool of observers changes in the site). In the Figure 18 it can be appreciated that 
specialization at the site-month level has a wide distribution: some sites hardly specialize their 
observers while many do.  
                                                 
 
53 We also used a measure that computes the HHI monthly and the results did not change. We prefer to use the HHI 
across the whole tenure of the observer because HHI monthly is by construction higher, as only a handful of 
observations are executed each month. 
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Figure 18. Distribution of specialization 
 
To assess the impact of specialization we executed the following model: 
ACCit = b1 + b2 x BAPPit + b3 x TRENDit + b4 x (BAPPit x TRENDit) + b5 x BAPPit x Zit  
+ b6 x  ln(WORKERSit) + Ui  + ERRORit    (10) 
This is the same model as equation (1) with the addition of the interaction of BAPP and the vector 
Z. In Z we add our variable of interest, specialization, but also control variables. We control for 
the participation and intensity using dummies of high/low participation (based on the median), 
average observer tenure on the site, and accumulated experience. Accumulated experience is 
measured as the accumulated number of observations per observer (prior to the focal one), and 
then averaged it at the month-site level. This variable captures the degree to which learning can 
improve the impact of BAPP (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011) and can help to disentangle the 
“learning” from the “interaction structure” mechanisms of specialization. Tenure allows to 
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distinguish between simply the passage of time and actual experience (although positively 
correlated at .5, there is plenty of variance in experience for different level of tenure). 
In Table 22 we present the results. In column (1) we find that specialization can dramatically boost 
the impact of BAPP. If we move from the 10th percentile in specialization (0.17) to the 90th 
percentile (0.82), the decrease in accidents produced by BAPP is higher by 0.42 accidents a month 
which is roughly a third of the dependent variable and more than half of the average impact of 
BAPP documented in Figure 8. Regarding experience, it doesn’t affect the impact of BAPP, 
suggesting that learning is not crucial in BAPP54. Our conversations and interviews with DEKRA 
and ACHS suggest that this is the case. Learning how to execute observations properly is not 
tricky. Getting the worker to change its behaviour is the difficult part; and although accumulated 
experience might help to engage better with workers, the incentives that the worker faces might 
play a larger role in social dilemmas.  
Column (2) helps in disentangling the mechanisms of specialization. We fail to find any interaction 
between specialization and accumulated experience. If specialization were to be operating through 
the “learning effect”, one would have expected to find some movement with this variable. Instead, 
the lack of significance provides suggestive evidence that specialization operates through the 
“interaction structure” effect: specializing means that the interactions become much more frequent 
between the observer and workers, providing room for direct reciprocity to take hold. In section 
3.4 we will test this correlational result using a field experiment. 
                                                 
 
54 The result of tenure is not expected. In the appendix 3.7.2 we show that this effect is driven by tenure of earlier 
cohorts of observers, which according to interviews, if they stay too long, they might get demotivated from exerting 
cooperative effort too long, while many co-workers don’t do their share. For new observers (or latter cohorts), tenure 
is marginally beneficial. 
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Table 22. The role of specialization on the impact of BAPP 
  Accidents - OLS 
(1) 
Accidents – OLS 
(2) 
BAPP 0.210 (0.134) 0.212 (0.166) 
TREND -0.033** (0.014) -0.033** (0.014) 
BAPP x TREND   
BAPP x SPECIALIZATION -0.649** (0.212) -0.655** (0.291) 
BAPP x HIGH_INT -0.283*** (0.106) -0.283*** (0.106) 
BAPP x HIGH_PART 0.226** (0.098) 0.226** (0.097) 
BAPP x TENURE 0.034** (0.014) 0.034** (0.014) 
BAPP x EXPERIENCE 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) 
BAPP x SPECIALIZATION x 
EXPERIENCE 
 0.000 (0.005) 
Ln(WORKERS) 1.230*** (0.331) 1.230*** (0.330) 
Site fixed-effect? Yes Yes 
Constant -5.247*** (1.757) -5.246*** (1.755) 
R-square 43.30% 43.30% 
Observations 4,447 4,447 
Mean of dependent variable before BAPP 1.338 1.338 
Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the site level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 in two-
tailed test. † indicates p<0.01 in a two-tailed joint t-test (this test is required as there is multicollinearity 
between BAPP, TREND and their interaction). The joint t-test on BAPP and BAPP x TREND is also 
statistical significant at p<0.05. 
3.3.7. Independent evaluation by DEKRA 
The research project coincided, and ran in parallel, with an internal assessment and redesign of the 
BAPP methodology by DEKRA. This assessment effort was independent of this research project 
and a redesign team spearheaded it. They gathered data from several sources, with an important 
share coming from the experience of consultants and clients.  
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The assessment and new vision of the redesign team was very closely aligned to the assessment 
coming out if this research, particularly the picture drawn in the last sections. The fact that 
cooperation –that is, effort by observers– breaks down once participation increases too much, 
played a prominent role in their own assessment. Similarly, there was close convergence on the 
role of specialization, tenure and the other levers discussed in the appendix 3.7.2. We view this 
convergence as increasing the credibility of the findings presented so far. 
3.3.8. Alternative framework: Snowdrift game 
We interpreted the detrimental effect of high participation under the light of a standard public 
goods framework. Under this framework defection is dominant and thus, generating an increase in 
frequency in cooperation is always fighting against self-interested defection. In this case, as the 
expansion of observers becomes too large, BAPP lacks the mechanisms (or interaction structures) 
to support the cooperative effort of additional observers. If this is a correct framework, then BAPP 
is always in peril if a mechanism is not in place. And the more effective the mechanisms are, the 
larger the penetration of cooperation would be in the population. We took this approach in the 
design of the experiment present in section 3.4. 
However, there is another social dilemma framework that could apply to our setting, and if so, it 
might imply different interpretations of our findings as well as different policy prescriptions and 
experimental design. This alternative social dilemma is the Snowdrift Game (see Hauert et al, 
2006) (also known as the Hawk-Dove game in the context of aggression and conflict). To illustrate 
this game we borrow from Hauert et al (2006, p. 196): “consider two drivers on their way home 
that are caught in a blizzard and trapped on either side of a snowdrift. Each driver has the option 
to remove the snowdrift and start shoveling or to remain in the car. In contrast to the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, the best choice now clearly depends on the other driver: if the other cooperates and starts 
shoveling, it pays to defect and remain in the car but if the other defects, it is better to shovel and 
get home than to wait for spring. Similar situations may occur whenever the act of cooperation 
creates a common good that can be exploited by others, i.e. whenever the benefits of cooperation 
accrue not only to the partner but also to the cooperator itself.” Hauert et al (2006) explain than in 
a group of N-persons, the snowdrift situation can be generated when: i) the cooperator benefits 
  
 
130 
 
 
himself as part of his cooperative act and this amount is larger than his cost C (where B is the 
benefit provided to the whole group and B/N is the per-capita benefit that the co-operator provides 
other players and himself), and ii) the benefits that an additional cooperator generates is lower than 
the benefit the previous cooperator generated (i.e., benefits are decreasing, or there is a “discount”). 
As a consequence of i) and ii), there is a threshold in the number of observers below which the net 
benefit of cooperating is higher than defecting. Therefore, result of an N-person snowdrift game is 
that there is an internal equilibrium with a stable mix of cooperators and defectors. This is in 
contrast with a public good setting, where defection always dominates, that is B/N is always larger 
than C (unless a mechanism for cooperating is provided)55.  
If a snowdrift situation is present in our setting, then a stable share of observers (i.e., co-operators) 
would expected to be a natural outcome of BAPP. Then, the findings of the successful diffusion 
of BAPP within sites, of the reduction in accidents and the change in culture becomes, perhaps, a 
bit “less impressive”. And therefore, the problem of solving the cooperation breakdown in high 
participation becomes less challenging. Furthermore, it could be argued that keeping participation 
low in BAPP is a natural solution, one that is better not to fight against. 
How can we test whether our setting is a snowdrift situation? In the following we consider the first 
game we introduced in section 3.2.1, that is, the game played among workers in becoming 
observer.  
First, we check the first condition stated by Hauert et al (2006). As an initial step, we will check 
whether collective effort is beneficial (i.e., the benefits when everyone cooperates surpasses the 
cost, namely B > C). This is a necessary condition for a public goods game. The second condition, 
                                                 
 
55 A closely related game to the Snowdrift game is the “Volunteer game” (Diekman, 1985; Archetti, 2009). In this 
social dilemma, a benefit is provided to the group by only one or a few of the group members. In the two person case, 
the snowdrift and volunteer game are the same. In the N-person case, the volunteer game is very similar to the 
snowdrift game, yielding the same conclusion: in equilibrium, there is a stable group of co-operators. However, the 
volunteer game has a framework that is simultaneous; a game that admits a sequential interpretation, like the snowdrift 
game, fits much better our setting. In the latter, the additional player cooperating provides a lower benefit than the 
previous one while; in contrast, in the former the benefit for the group is fixed and all the players decide at once 
whether to volunteer or not to produce it.  
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in contrast to the N-person snowdrift, is that B/N is always lower than C (namely defection is 
always individually dominant). 
Let’s consider the benefits assuming that cooperation is extensive. We assume extensive to mean 
50 active observers, the average that BAPP achieves after three years (on an average site of 250 
workers and 50 active observers, this means that approximately 2 or 3 times as many additional 
observers were in place at some point.) From Figure 8 we derive that over the first three years of 
BAPP, the reduction in accidents is 25% across the site (including the observers)56. Assuming a 
yearly rate of accidents of 4% for developed countries (Hämäläinen et al, 2006), this means that 
they get a 1 percentage point reduction in the likelihood of experiencing an accident. The economic 
value of an accident has been documented to be in the range of US$20,000 to $70,000 by Viscusi 
and Aldy (2003)57. This means that the value of the benefit to the observers is in the range of 
US$400 to $1400 (used in Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, year 2000 US$). Considering inflation of 2% 
a year, this leads to a range of US$549 to $1,922 in 2016. On top of this, there are direct costs of 
accidents (cost of accident-indexed insurance rates, lost production, material lost, cost of replacing 
workers) which amount, approximately, to 50% of the value of an accident (Brahm and Singer, 
2015). Thus, the benefit coming from a reduction in expected accidents amount to the range of 
US$824 to $2,883. Productivity also improves if safety prevention policies improve (Brahm and 
Singer, 2015). Although the elasticity is hard to establish, a 0.3 has been found in some studies 
(Fernández-Muñiz et al, 2009). If we assume that one third of the productivity improvements flow 
to workers as increased wages (as documented in the vocational training literature; see Conti, 2005; 
Dearden et al. (2006); Colombo & Stanca, 2014), then the 25% in accidents translates into 2.25% 
increase in wage. Given a 2016 median wage of $30,000 USD for the workers in the US (where 
the majority of BAPP implementations have been executed), this translates into an additional $450 
USD. This puts the benefits on the range of $1,273 USD to $3,333 USD. This is the benefit that 
                                                 
 
56 If one assumes that 100% cooperation (everyone is an active observer) and accidents are fully eliminated, the 
conclusions do not change. As we’ll see, these would continue to hinge upon crucially on the size of the private 
“reputational” benefits (see footnote 58 below). 
57 This is correlational evidence. Experimental evidence from Brahm et al (2018) suggest correlational studies 
underestimate the true value of accidents. 
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each worker receives from having 50 active observers cooperating (with many more having been 
observers at some point in time). 
Let’s consider the cost of cooperation. The workers devote on average 5% of their time to BAPP 
(see section 3.2). Given the wage of $30,000 USD, the cost they experience is close to 1,500 USD. 
From this, one needs to deduct the extra benefit that observers receive by being an observer in 
terms of lower accident rate: given that they learn by observing, we estimate in our experiment 
that observers obtain 15% additional reduction in likelihood of having an accident (see section 
3.4.8). This translates to $165 USD and $576 USD of additional benefit, and therefore to a cost in 
the range of $924 USD to $1,335 USD. In addition, one needs to deduct the private reputational 
benefits that the observer receives from becoming an observer. If one assumes that these benefits 
amount to 2% of wage, then the final cost ranges between $324 USD and $735 USD. This is the 
cost that each observer experiences as he cooperates. 
Therefore, comparing benefits from collective effort versus its costs, we see that it is beneficial (B 
> C). We can also see that individually defection might always be dominant. If the benefit is 
divided by 250 workers, we have the benefit ranging between $5 USD and $13 USD (B/250)58, 
much lower than cost which ranges between $324 USD and $735 USD. These calculations fulfil 
the conditions for a public goods game: collective cooperation is beneficial, but the individual 
incentive is to defect. In order to meet the first condition of Hauert et al (2006), the private 
reputational benefit would have to offer at least an additional 2% to 2.5% of wages on top of the 
2% we already assigned. This would bring down cost to zero, or negative, and therefore fulfil 
Hauert’s condition i). 
                                                 
 
58 B/N is the value of the expected reduction in accidents that a single observer generates on co-workers from executing 
his observations. This includes himself, as he benefits from being observed by other observers (if he is the only 
observer, a “self-observation” would be needed as assumption). For computing B, we assumed a reduction of 25% 
based on “extensive cooperation” of 50 active observers. If one assumes 100% cooperation, and that accidents would 
disappear as consequence, then the benefits of $5 USD to $13 USD would need to be multiplied by a factor of 4, 
obtaining $20 USD and $52 USD. This different assumption doesn’t alter the consequence regarding the type of 
game being and the crucial role of the reputational benefits have on that regard. 
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This leads us to the crucial second condition. There are two values that are subject to changes as 
more observers participate: the private reputational benefits and the impact on accidents of the 
additional observers. First, the private reputational benefits (set at 2% above for all observers 
equally), are clearly higher for earlier observers and then they diminish as more observers 
participate in BAPP, potentially being eliminated altogether for the Nth observer. This would 
suggest that, if the private reputational benefits are higher than 4.5% for the first observers, then a 
snowdrift game might be in place. The second variable is whether the impact of observations on 
accidents diminishes as more observers are within the site. This is not to be confused with lower 
intensity by newer observers, which is a behavioural outcome: what needs to be assessed is the 
impact of the effort put by the additional observer on accidents. To test this we exploit the change 
in participation across months. The test we execute is to interact participation and intensity. The 
idea is to see whether the impact of the execution of observations (of “effort”) changes if you have 
a few or many observers. If there is a negative interaction between intensity and participation, it 
means that the marginal benefit of executing observations is lower when you increase the number 
of observers. This would be a sign of decreasing benefits of the additional cooperative behaviour 
by new observers.  
Table 23 displays the result of the interaction between intensity and participation. Instead of 
quintiles, we simplify the analysis by using dummies of low-high intensity and participation using 
their median as a cut-off. In the column (1) we find the same result as in Table 19. In column (2) 
we fail to find any statistical significance for the interaction term. The impact of changing intensity 
is the same whether you have a few or many observers. This strongly indicates that there is no 
decreasing return of the cooperative act of executing observations for the additional observer.  
Thus, considering only the benefits on private reputation, the “first game” in BAPP would be a 
snowdrift. In contrast, if one only considers the benefits on accidents, the game would be a public 
good. In weighting these two elements, reputation and accidents, we believe the second one is 
more important. First, accidents represent the direct benefit of BAPP, while reputation is an 
indirect benefit. Second, in our estimations above, the benefits from accidents are between 1.5 and 
3 times larger than the baseline benefits from reputation (2%). Third, reputational benefits of more 
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than 4.5% of wage for the initial observer in the joint committee might be plausible. But for the 
new observers, this represents a stretch. Therefore, we conclude that it is more likely that we are 
placed in a public goods setting. And if a snowdrift is in place, the threshold is probably the 
committee; after that, it is very likely that B/N is lower than C. Just like in biology, it is very 
difficult to definitively tell which type of game is being played in a social interactions (Hauert et 
al, 2006). 
We are not arguing that workers and observers actually perform these calculations. These 
calculations simply estimate that the costs and benefits are within the range of social dilemmas 
and that these costs will eventually play out over time in any given company that it is implementing 
BAPP. Consequently, behaviour should slowly follow. Evolutionary theory (which is the broad 
framework we are applying) indicates that a replicator dynamic is required to change behaviour 
over time in a population. Replicator dynamic is a process by which every period –every month in 
our case– a small percentage of workers changes strategy (i.e., defection or cooperation) towards 
the strategy that is faring better (either defection if interaction structures are absent, or cooperation 
if they are in place). In our case, we can envision several processes that make the benefits and costs 
gradually observable (even quantifiable) for workers/observers. From previous implementations 
and the execution of the focal one, workers may learn from managerial behaviour (and from peers) 
the level of reputational benefits attached to being an observer. In the same way, given the large 
impact of BAPP in accidents, the workers will eventually realize the improvement in safety (we 
have witnessed this on the ground!); and of course, workers do attach a (subjective) value to 
improved safety. Time away from everyday tasks will also be costly to the company and the 
worker. Many companies have tight and detailed budgets, typically broken down to specific areas 
in a site. In this case, someone (the worker, his/her supervisor or the area manager) will feel the 
pressure of time not spent according to budget. This will put pressure on observers as they “take 
time away” to execute observations. In our interviews, observers frequently feel this cost. In sum, 
we argue that cost and benefits will surface over time in various ways, this affects how different 
workers are feeling/assessing their position (or strategy), and if a position is advantageous, workers 
will gradually adopt it. 
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Table 23. Interaction of intensity and participation 
  Accidents 
(1) 
Accidents 
(2) 
BAPP -0.163 (0.117) -0.160 (0.119) 
BAPP X HIGH INTEN. 0.186** (0.089) 0.194* (0.103) 
BAPP X HIGH PART. -0.169* (0.094) -0.160 (0.121) 
BAPP X HIGH INTENS. X HIGH PART.  0.015 (0.101) 
TREND -0.001 (0.007) 0.001 (0.007) 
BAPP X TREND -0.013 (0.010) -0.013 (0.010) 
Ln(WORKERS) 1.105*** (0.319) 1.105*** (0.319) 
Site fixed-effect?  Yes Yes 
Constant -4.569*** (1.690) -4.569*** (1.692) 
Adjusted R-square 41.13% 41.12% 
Observations 4,625 4,625 
Mean of dependent variable before BAPP 1.338 1.338 
Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the site level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 in two-
tailed test. All models are estimated using an OLS panel fixed effect. mn (1) and (2), respectively. A joint 
t-test on BAPP and its interaction is significant at 10%. 
 
The second public good game that is played in BAPP is among observers. Here the choice is 
between consummate (high) and perfunctory (low) effort. Very similar calculations can be made 
to the first game (for example the benefits are the same). We reached stronger conclusion: the 
game 2 it is more likely a public good (instead than a snowdrift) than game 2. The main argument 
is that consummate effort provides a less strong and clear signal for reputation building than the 
fact of becoming observer (e.g., effort is not public, low effort can have “many” justifications). 
3.4. Evidence from experiment 
In the previous section, we document that the beneficial impact of BAPP is affected by the 
breakdown of cooperation when the group of observers grows large. Following this finding, we 
set out to conduct a field experiment with an intervention that might restore cooperation as groups 
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grew large. First, we introduce the setting where we carried out the experiment. Then we describe 
the three experimental treatments, explaining their implementation and logic. Then, we present the 
take-up and analyze the impact of the experiment on several outcomes: number of observations 
(intensity), coaching, risky behaviour, accidents, and likelihood of becoming an observer. 
3.4.1. Setting 
We executed the experiment in the years 2017 and 2018 in Chile. We collaborated with the Chilean 
Safety Association (ACHS) and one of their clients, SODIMAC. ACHS is a private non-profit 
organization that provides services in occupational safety and health (OSH). These services 
include prevention, medical treatments when accidents occur, and pensions and subsidies when a 
worker becomes handicapped. ACHS is one of the three non-profit organization providing OSH 
services in Chile (there is a fourth that is state-owned). These firms are regulated and monitored 
by the labour and health branches of the Chilean government. Half of the Chilean firms and 
workforce are affiliated with ACHS, making ACHS the market leader. Firms are mandated to 
contribute a percentage of their payroll (on average 1.2 percent) to ACHS or one of its competitors 
as an insurance premium. This percentage has a common sector component and a firm-specific 
component, both of which are tied to historical safety performance. ACHS is mandated to devote 
at least 12% of its budget to prevention services, of which the bulk is spent on training (at 
companies, in open classrooms, and using e-learning).  
ACHS partnered with DEKRA in 2012 (the partner was the company BST at that time, which was 
then acquired by DEKRA) in order to implement BAPP in their affiliated firms. DEKRA provided 
deep training to ACHS personnel for several years, generating the capability to deliver BAPP as 
designed and executed elsewhere. This included the training and mentoring of a cadre of BAPP 
consultants within ACHS, sharing handbooks, guidelines, IP and software. To secure the success 
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of the partnership and the integrity of the BAPP delivery, DEKRA relocated some permanent staff 
within ACHS59.  
With the support of DEKRA, the researchers approached ACHS, which agreed to support the 
execution of an experiment, modifying the BAPP methodology within one of their clients. The 
natural candidate among their clients was SODIMAC60, which subsequently also agreed to the 
project. SODIMAC is a home improvement stores company that has operation across South-
America. In Chile, they employ 20,000 employees and own about 75 stores scattered across the 
country. A SODIMAC store typically employs between 200 and 350 workers. SODIMAC had 
already implemented BAPP in 5 stores and a distribution centre, all of which started in 2014. In 
2017, they announced the implementation of BAPP in 4 new stores, which we were allowed to 
influence in an experiment from June-2017 through June-2018 in a staggered way (multiple stores 
don’t start BAPP implementation at the same time)61. BAPP implementations are coordinated by 
the SODIMAC OSH department at the company’s headquarters in Santiago. ACHS consultants 
work in tandem with this department and the store managers to plan and execute BAPP. The store 
manager becomes the sponsor of BAPP. The enabler and the site committee report directly to the 
store manager.  
3.4.2. Experiment design 
Stores, consultants and guidelines 
We executed the experiment in four stores, two located in Santiago, the “La Reina” and 
“Huechuraba” stores, one located in the south of Chile, the “Temuco” store, and one in the north 
                                                 
 
59 One big difference between BAPP implementations in ACHS and those normally executed by DEKRA, is that firms 
affiliated to ACHS do not pay the cost of the BAPP implementation (which is very costly). Just like other prevention 
services, ACHS finances BAPP with the insurance prime paid by firms. We believe that this, if anything, can play 
against the success of BAPP, as payment typically provides an extra motivation by top management to justify their 
investment. In this sense, BAPP in Chile –and our experiment– provides a better setting to test the “for the workers 
by the workers” spirit of BAPP (or using our theoretical parlance, the condition of voluntary cooperation). 
60 One of the authors had previously conducted research within SODIMAC, analyzing the relationship between 
productivity and safety. This research project was sponsored by ACHS’s research foundation, FUCYT.  
61 In 2017 they also embarked into 3 additional implementations in distribution centres. In mid-2018, they added 4 
additional stores. We did not intervene these BAPP implementations. 
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of Chile, the “Antofagasta” store.  These stores have average BAPP-relevant workforces of 258, 
268, 334, and 234 workers, respectively, and each has a store manager who is the sponsor of 
BAPP62. The stores where selected by SODIMAC in the third quarter of 2016 with a plan to 
implement in the first semester of 2017 and to start observations mid-year.  
The stores were assigned dedicated BAPP consultants from ACHS executing the implementation. 
There were three consultants in total (the two Santiago stores shared the same consultant). We 
worked closely with these consultants, who executed the experimental treatments on the ground 
as part of the implementation. First, we sent and discussed with them the experimental guidelines. 
These guidelines included the context of the research, the design of each treatment, a detailed 
implementation protocol (which provided details on how to execute the treatments), a 
communication protocol (which provided details on how to communicate the project and how to 
reply to questions that might arise), and materials (e.g, the slides to use).  
We describe the implementation as we introduce each treatment below. Regarding the 
communication of the research project, communication activities were precisely marked. In the 1st 
month, the consultant informed the store manager that, as part of the delivery of BAPP, some small 
changes would be introduced in the methodology in order to support a research project carried out 
by the University of Cambridge, which was sponsored by all three partners DEKRA, ACHS and 
SODIMAC. The same message was delivered to the enabler and the starting team of observers in 
the 3rd month, after each was constituted. In the 3rd month, the enabler and the team were also 
asked to answer a short and voluntary personality and social preferences survey (explained below). 
In the 4th month, treatments 1 and 3 were explained to them (the latter only to the two stores that 
received it). Importantly, for all these communications instances, the three consultants used the 
same powerpoint slides carrying the exact same message. We emphasized the importance of 
following the guidelines and the scripted messages.  
                                                 
 
62 BAPP excludes supervisors, area/line managers, senior managers, etc. from observations. As indicated above, BAPP 
is “by the workers, for the workers”.  
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Treatments 
The three treatments were designed during the last quarter of 2016. Treatment 1 is the baseline and 
is applied to all four stores. Treatments 2 and 3 aimed to explore conditions that can boost (or 
hinder) the impact of treatment 1 and were applied to only two stores each. Table 24 displays 
which store received which treatment. Each treatment profile was randomly assigned to the stores 
(i.e., the assignment of the columns of Table 24). Treatments 1 and 2 are a within-store, while 
treatment 3 applies to the whole store. Below we describe the treatments, first describing the details 
of their design and their execution, and then explaining their logic and intended effect. 
Table 24. Distribution of treatments across sites 
 
Antofagasta 
Store 
Temuco Store Huechuraba Store La Reina Store 
T1: Group structure X X X X 
T2: Identity  X  X 
T3: Reputation   X X 
 
Treatment 1: “Group structure”. This baseline treatment is central to the experiment. With this 
treatment, in each of the four sites, we created a group structure for half of the observers in the 
starting team. This structure was designed as follows: suppose the starting team had n observers 
plus the enabler. Then half of the observers (n/2) were randomly chosen, and each of those chosen 
was assigned a share of 1/n of the total number of workers in the store as a “group” 63. In case of 
an odd number of observers, we selected the even number below the mid-range (max minus min 
divided by 2) (e.g., in a case of 9 observers, we only selected 4 at random). A selected observer 
was allowed to execute observations only among the workers assigned to him (“his group”). 
Equally, workers assigned to an observer were allowed to be observed only by their assigned 
observer. Workers were informed that they were part of a group but not about who the other 
                                                 
 
63 The enabler also executes observations. This rule allowed to have the same number of workers per-observer (which 
include the enabler) both in treatment and control. 
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members of the group were. The identity of the workers in a group was known only to its assigned 
observer. Thus, Treatment 1 generated small anonymous groups around each of one half of the 
observers. What about later added new observers? If a worker was enrolled from one of these 
groups, then he would also be bound to observe the workers only within his group. The consultants 
implementing the treatment were instructed not to tell the committee observer originally assigned 
to a group to act as a guide or leader for the new observers in its group (however, this might, and 
was allowed to, arise naturally). 
The remaining observers that were not selected, plus the enabler, were allowed to execute BAPP 
observations freely across all remaining workers that had not been assigned. Thus, in the control 
group, BAPP was implemented in its regular form, without any pre-defined structure on who could 
observe whom. Note that the enabler was allocated to the control group within the site. As the 
enabler had a different status and role, we decided not to include him in the randomization. 
However, enablers do execute many observations (typically more than the rest). Below, we provide 
details on how we dealt with this complication in the econometric analysis. 
How were the groups implemented? First, in the 4th month of implementation, when the starting 
team was being trained to execute observations (see section 3.2), the BAPP consultant 
communicated that, as part of the research, some randomly chosen observers would be focusing 
their observations on a subset of the workers of the site (also randomly chosen). The consultant 
used a lottery box with folded small pieces of paper, of which only half were marked as “selected 
for the treatment”. All the observers had to select one piece from the box, after which they had to 
open it and read it aloud. Then, we paired the selected observers with their respective groups (of 
workers to be observed). To do so, the consultant placed several lists on the table – one for each 
group – that contained the names of the workers included in the group. These lists were numbered 
and put on the table facing down. The selected observer had to pick one list, which would be 
his/her assigned group. These lists were prepared by the research team beforehand and sent to the 
consultant prior to his/her visit to the site. The workers were allocated to the lists randomly, 
stratifying by gender, age, tenure and task (we coded the workers’ tasks, e.g., “cashier”). To 
produce the lists, we used the site’s most recent worker rosters as provided by SODIMAC 
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(typically one or two months before the month of the assignment). As part of the communication 
protocol, the consultant motivated randomization by explaining that it assured that no one would 
be penalized by or benefit from having a special set of workers to observe (i.e., groups were not 
biased)64. In order to communicate to the workers in a group that they had a specific observer 
assigned to them, a set of letters was printed and handed out to the selected observers. The 
observers were instructed to introduce themselves and hand out the letters to all the workers in 
their group within a month or at the first observations (whichever came first). This letter is 
reproduced in Appendix 3.7.3. The message of the letter was the following: a brief introduction to 
BAPP; an introduction of the role and name of the assigned observer; a notice to only accept 
observations from this assigned observer; and an invitation that the worker him/herself could 
become an observer in the future. (In Treatment 2, we added extra elements to this letter.) This 
message of the letter also played a role in enforcing the compliance of the groups as the 
implementation progressed (Section 3.4.4 below addresses treatment take-up in detail). Each 
observers in the control group was also given a list; it contained all the workers that were not 
assigned to a group. The observers in the control group could observe workers only from this list.  
Stores experience a non-negligible rotation in their workforce (about 5% per month). This required 
frequent updates to the lists and letters. On average, we updated the lists every two months (see 
the details in Table 25). In these updates, the newly joining workers were randomly assigned to 
the groups or the control (again stratifying the assignment). The lists were updated accordingly 
and sent via the consultant to the store enabler, who distributed them to the observers in treatment. 
Also, the letters were printed and delivered to the new workers that were assigned to a group. 
The consultants monitored the execution of the treatments as they visited the sites over subsequent 
months. The consultants did this mainly by asking the enabler and selected committee observers 
                                                 
 
64 Also, the communication protocol of the treatments stated that if workers asked why this treatment was being 
generated, the consultant had a specific answer to provide (which occurred once), which indicated that DEKRA and 
ACHS wanted to study whether having small groups or a large one was better, and that a-priori there were good 
arguments for both: small provides high focus but low flexibility, but large provides low focus but high flexibility.  
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whether the groups and lists have been used (and reminding them if compliance was low). Overall, 
the compliance observed during these monitoring instances was positive. 
The group sizes are summarized as follows. A store had on average 10 observers in the committee 
and 250 workers. Thus, roughly 5 observers and 125 workers were randomly matched in groups 
of 25 workers. The remaining observers and workers experienced a standard implementation, 
without group structuring. Across four sites, we had about 20 observers in treatment and 20 
observers in control (before the addition of new observers), as well as 500 workers in treatment 
and 500 workers in control. Table 25 summarizes the groups and their size for each store (as well 
as additional stats regarding the implementation). Figure 19 and Figure 20 show the evolution of 
the number of observers per store and per treatment condition (excluding enabler). 
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Table 25. Implementation details of each store 
 Antofagasta Store Temuco Store Huechuraba Store La Reina Store 
Workers subject to 
BAPP observation 
233.5 333.6 257.7 268.3 
Number of observers 
in starting team 
(including the 
enabler)* 
10 10 12 11 
Number of active 
observers May-18 
(including the 
enabler) 
22 27 24 19 
Number of groups*  4 4 5 5 
Average number of 
observers per group ‡ 
3.2 2.8 2.5 2.6 
Average number of 
observers per group in 
May-18 ‡ 
4.7 2.7 3 3 
Average number of 
workers in groups 
28.0 41.9 24.7 25.9 
Number of workers in 
control 
121.5 166 134.2 138.8 
Month of 1st 
observation 
Jul-17 Jun-17 Oct-17 Aug-17 
Months of lists and 
letter update** 
Aug-17, Oct-17, 
Dec-17, Jan-18, 
Mar-18, Apr-18  
Aug-17, Oct-17, 
Dec-17, Jan-18, 
Mar-18, Apr-18  
Oct-17, Dec-17, 
Jan-18, Mar-18, 
Apr-18 
Aug-17, Oct-17, 
Dec-17, Jan-18, 
Mar-18, Apr-18,  
Month of entry and 
number of new 
observers enrolled 
Oct-17 (9 obs.), 
Feb-18 (8 obs.), 
May-18 (5 obs.) 
Oct-17 (9 obs.), 
Jan-18 (8 obs.), 
Feb-18 (9 obs.), 
Abr-18 (6 obs.) 
March-18 (7 
obs.), May-18 (8 
obs.) 
March-18 (6 
obs.), May (6 
obs.) 
Notes: (1) for the number of workers and observers we display are the averages all the lists that were handed out 
on the implementation and they include the observers in each group/control. (2)* After the starting team of 
observers was trained and assigned to treatment they had to go out and execute observations. However, some 
observers might not execute them and quit BAPP in the first or second month. This happened in three stores. In 
Antofagasta, Temuco and Huechuraba, one observer assigned to a group quitted (we probed whether it was the 
treatment that caused this, but this it wasn’t clear as other elements were present as well in their decision). After it 
was clear who wasn’t quitting, we corrected the lists as follows: if the observer that quitted was part of a group, 
their workers were randomly assigned to the other groups; if the worker was part of control, the control list 
wouldn’t be changed. We did this in order to avoid excessive changes in list and, given the enabler as a default in 
control (who doesn’t quit), to be conservative on the sizing of groups (i.e., not to favor treatment 1 with smaller 
groups). One example: Temuco. Originally we had 5 groups and control and thus 11 observers (including 
enabler). We had 33.4 workers per observer. However, we lost one observer assigned to a group. Thus, the new 
number of workers per observer in treatment changed to 33.4 * 5 / 4 = 41.9 (3) ** if the updated was in, for 
example October, that meant the workers in the store we used in the update were those present at the end of that 
month. We then sent the update around the 10th day of the next month, in the example 10th of November. (4) ‡ we 
compute the average without considering the months where the groups was constituted by only one member (i.e., 
the committee observer appointed to it). The average includes the committee observer. 
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Figure 19. Evolution of the number of observers in each store 
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Figure 20. Evolution of the number of observers in each condition 
 
Rationale of Treatment 1.  
In order to predict the impact of this treatment, we analyze how it changes the three social 
dilemmas from section 3.2.1: a public good game among workers in becoming observers, a public 
good game among observers in providing level and sustainment of effort, a prisoner’s dilemma 
among an observer and a worker in the event of an observation. In particular, we explore how the 
treatment can facilitate one mechanism that is regularly used to sustain cooperation in such 
dilemmas: direct reciprocity. 
We start with the second game. Treatment 1 limits the detrimental effects that an increasing 
number of observers places on the incentives to exert effort. Consummate effort among a group of 
observers could be sustained by direct reciprocity, that is, the threat of effort withdrawal by a 
partner (another observer). However, it is well known that reciprocity as a mechanism to sustain 
cooperation breaks down quickly as size grows (Boyd and Richerson, 1988). Absent formal 
targeted punishment (as BAPP is voluntary and therefore does not include “firing” or 
“disciplining” of low effort observers), reciprocity in public goods is limited to punishment by all 
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the other members via withdrawing effort. And this threat becomes less potent as the group grows 
(Boyd and Richerson, 1988). 
Creating groups in Treatment 1 changes the set of observers that plays the game, and thus the 
incentives. Specifically, direct reciprocity recovers potency, as threats of not exerting consummate 
effort now occur within the group. In a normal implementation, there are several tens of observers, 
while the number of observers within a group is just a handful (in the experiment, it’s 3 on 
average), and therefore direct reciprocity can still work.  
In the third game, Treatment 1 dramatically increases the extent to which a single worker interacts 
with a specific observer. Imagine a site of 200 workers and 20 observers (10 in the starting 
committee and 10 new), where each observer executes 5 observations a month, and suppose an 
observation selects a worker randomly each time. Then the likelihood that a worker repeats 
observations with a single observer in the next month is P(Being observed) * P(Same observer) = 
(5*20)/200 * 1/20 = 1/40 = 2.5%. In Treatment 1, in contrast, we have 5 treatment groups of 20 
workers each and 1 control group of 100 workers. We assume that the 10 new observers are equally 
distributed to treatment and control. The likelihood of repeating an interaction with one observer 
in the next month in the control group is equal to P(Being observed) * P(Same observer) = 
5*10/100 * 1/10 = 1/20 = 5%. In the treatment group, this likelihood becomes P(Being observed) 
* P(Same observer) = 2*5/20 * 1/2 = 1/4 = 25%. Thus, the likelihood of repeated interactions 
increases by a factor of 5 under treatment as opposed to control. This factor would further increase 
if observations per observer are higher under treatment (prediction for the 2nd game, see above), 
and a higher number of new observers enter treatment rather than control (as observing becomes 
more attractive, see below). This increase in frequency of interaction will boost the incentives for 
cooperation: the worker having a higher incentive to accept observations, be engaged and be 
willing to change his/her behaviour, and the observer having a higher incentive to provide frequent 
observations of high quality.  
We now turn to the first game, the rewards of which are influenced by our analysis concluding that 
the second and third game would increase the incentives to become an observer. This is particularly 
the case for the third game. Higher repeated interactions between the observer and the worker 
  
 
147 
 
 
might also lead the worker, as a reciprocal response to consummate effort by the observer, to be 
more willing to become an observer if asked. In game 2, the observer may be very sensitive to 
high cooperation among a few observers within the group, whereas without groups, the observer 
may be very sensitive to free-riding among the many (new) observers. Note that calculations might 
not be necessary here; it could just be the operation of our evolved capacity to prefer small groups 
when asked to cooperate (see Bowles, 2009.) 
Across the three games, Treatment 1 is likely to affect new observers more intensely than the 
observers of the initial committee. In section 3.3.8 we documented the role of private 
“reputational” benefits of becoming an observer in the benefits and costs experienced by different 
observers. Given that these benefits are much higher for the observers in the committee, we 
estimated that for these observers cooperation may well be dominant, that is, B/N > C (i.e., they 
might be below the critical threshold in the snowdrift game). In contrast, new observers would 
face incentives to defect, B/N < C. As the members of the initial committee are more likely to 
cooperate than the new observers, the new observers are likely to be much more influenced by the 
treatment. 
There is a second theoretical argument that also supports the expectation that the groups of the 
Treatment 1 will exhibit higher cooperation, without appealing to strategic behavior (i.e., 
cooperation is conditioned on past behavior). The idea of “spatial selection” proposes that even if 
players do not have contingent strategies but only one fixed behaviour (cooperation or defection), 
a population structure that generates assortment of cooperative types can make cooperators reap 
higher benefits than defectors. In well mixed populations (everyone has the same likelihood of 
playing with everyone else), cooperation without strategies cannot evolve. However, Nowak and 
May (1992) simulated n-agents playing a prisoner’s dilemma with their immediate neighbours (as 
in the squares of a chessboard) and showed that pure cooperation (playing against pure defection) 
is always sustained in a population (but oscillates): cooperation can prevail within local clusters of 
cooperators. Treatment 1 may have the same effect, particularly for game 1, where contingent 
strategies such as reciprocity are less clear in how they operate. In Treatment 1, the workers are 
limited to interacting with a reduced set of neighbours (their own group). This could increase the 
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level of cooperation by assortment of cooperatives types within a local group. (Spatial selection 
may possibly also operate in game 2, but here it is less clear that the theoretical requirements are 
met.65)  
Treatment 2: “Identity”. In the stores “La Reina” and “Temuco”, we modified the letters that were 
given to the workers in Treatment 1, by adding two elements. First, we added a simple name to 
each group: “Group 1”, “Group 2”, etc. Second, at the end of the letter, we added a list with the 
names of all the workers that were part of the group (and their area/task). We display the letters in 
Appendix 3.7.366. 
Rationale of Treatment 2.  
In this treatment we attempted to generate identification of observers and workers with the group, 
which in turn could increase the incentives to cooperate. The addition of a name follows the 
minimal group paradigm that has its roots in social psychology (Tajfel, 1970). This line of research 
assigns subjects in experiments to different groups based on arbitrary elements, showing that this 
generates more help to in-group members (Tajfel, 1982) to view them as more trustworthy and 
cooperative (e.g., Kramer, 1991), and to be more cooperative (Loch and Wu, 2008). In our case, 
this would correspond to a group name possibly motivating workers and observers to muster more 
cooperation across all three games.  
                                                 
 
65 Specifically, each observer now interacts with fellow observer of its group, instead with all on the site (particularly 
for new observers). We can calculate the condition that favours cooperation: if the benefit to cost ratio is higher than 
the average number of interactors in the group (or neighbours in the network) then cooperation can survive (Ohtsuki 
et al, 2006). Using the figures from section3.3.8, we can estimate that the benefit (B/N) to cost ratio (C) within a 
group is roughly 0.3, with an average number of interactors in the group of roughly 3. However, if the private 
reputational benefits increase from 2% to 4%, then the ratio can easily surpass 3 (the ratio increases exponentially 
with increases in reputation benefits). 
66 On the design stage, as can be seen in the preregistration document, treatment 2 also included participation of a 
portion of new observers in the joint committee monthly meetings and meetings of the observers within the groups. 
However, these treatments proved infeasible to be executed on the ground (mainly, due to time restrictions for new 
observers). On hindsight, this change was positive as we can now know better about a single mechanism, i.e., adding 
names, instead of a combination of mechanisms, i.e., names and meetings. 
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However, in the social psychology tradition subjects allocate resources without having to face a 
social dilemma (Bernhard et al, 2006). Recent research within behavioral economics suggests that 
the minimal group paradigm doesn’t necessarily hold when subjects face conflicting incentives 
between individual and group welfare (e.g., Buchan et al, 2006; Charness et al, 2007). Two studies 
show evidence that groups require a joint history: Bernhard et al (2006) use a lab-in-the-field third 
party punishment game (TPPG) in tribes in Papua New Guinea and show that altruistic punishment 
(a cooperative act) of norm violations is much higher if the victim of the violation belongs to the 
punisher’s group; Goette et al (2006) use lab-in-the-field prisoner’s dilemma and TPPG with 
subjects drawn from platoon members that were randomly assigned to platoons and had just a 3 
week history together: they find that cooperation increases towards with platoon membership, and 
that altruistic punishment is higher if the victim is a fellow platoon member. Consistent with these 
findings, it has been shown in the lab that identity from minimal groups has a positive effect on 
cooperation in social dilemmas only when there is common knowledge of group affiliation (Guala 
et al, 2013; Yamagishi and Mifune, 2008)67. Following these findings, we decided to add the names 
of the group members in order to generate common knowledge and allow for a history to 
spontaneously emerge as group members might relate to one another and recognize themselves a 
peers in their groups. Loch and Wu (2008) suggest that joint history can also be minimal: in a non-
cooperative supply chain setting, group names significantly increase cooperation if paired with as 
little as a short introduction.  
In consistency with these previous theoretical and empirical findings, this treatment should change 
the cooperative tendencies of observers and workers, and therefore, it should affect the cooperation 
decision in all three games discussed in section 3.2.1. 
However, there is a specific context at SODIMAC and within BAPP that might cause this treatment 
to generate a negative reaction in the workers. In the third game we described, workers have to 
cooperate with BAPP in being willing to receive observations (it is not infrequent that they refuse 
                                                 
 
67 In a more general note, this research relates to the work on the economics of identity by Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 
2005, and 2010). 
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or are disengaged); and if they receive one, they have to engage and strive to change their 
behaviour. A particular worry of workers within the company is the feeling of being “spied on” 
and “denounced” (“ratted out”) by BAPP observers. BAPP explicitly addresses such fears by 
emphasizing anonymity and by using the motto “no spying, no naming, no blaming”. Thus, 
providing the names of the group members may, in the mind of workers, compromise this motto 
(although though the lists do not lift the anonymity condition of observations) and cause a negative 
reaction. This issue came up at the design stage with DEKRA and ACHS68. 
Treatment 3: “Reputation”. In the stores “Huechuraba” and “La Reina”, we published on the site 
bulletin board the number of observations carried out by all the observers in the site. At the start 
of each month, the research team would access the data on observations and generate a report that 
included: the name of the observer, his /her starting date, the accumulated number of observations 
until the previous month, and the monthly average of observations. This list was ranked by the 
average number of observations per month from highest to lowest. This list was sent, via the 
consultant, to the enabler of the site who would print it and publish it on the bulletin board of the 
site. The enabler would send, via the consultant, photographic evidence of the publication of the 
report. In Appendix 3.7.4, we display the report and two sample photographs. 
Rationale of Treatment 3.  
This treatment builds on the idea of indirect reciprocity (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998 and 2005), 
which suggests that cooperation can evolve if the behavior displayed in a round of a cooperative 
dilemma (cooperation or defection) generates reputation (good or bad) that affects how other 
players behave toward this player in subsequent rounds: cooperate if reputation is good, and 
punishment (for example, withholding cooperation) if reputation is bad. This is a powerful 
mechanism, particularly when interactions are anonymous so that direct reciprocity cannot operate. 
                                                 
 
68 In SODIMAC, there was a strike that covered 30% to 40% of workers between November and December 2016. 
Labor relations within the company became quite tense after this strike. This may well have contributed to the feeling 
of being “spied on” or “ratted out” by treatment 2.  
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Lab experiments provide supporting evidence for this mechanism (Rand and Nowak, 2013), and 
recent work has shown a large impact in the field (Kraft-Todd et al, 2015).  
Indirect reputation is uniquely effective in scenarios where encounters are anonymous. 
Anonymous encounters are rare in organizations, and yet, reputation is widely observed in practice 
(e.g., gossip is frequent). Therefore, it is interesting to understand how indirect reciprocity might 
operate in a scenario of repeated interaction, where direct reciprocity is at play. This is exactly 
how our treatment operates: Treatment 3, just like Treatment 2, is an interaction effect for 
Treatment 1. That is, we study whether Treatment 1 is boosted (or not) by the presence of indirect 
reciprocity. (Given that Treatment 3 is at the store level, the only meaningful analysis is with the 
interaction with Treatment 1, which is a within store treatment). 
There is an absence of studies analyzing this interaction, and in general on the interplay between 
the mechanisms that sustain cooperation (Rand and Nowak, 2013) (see Van Veelen et al, 2012, for 
a notable exception). Roberts (2008) analyzes which of these strategies might dominate. When a 
player decides his/her next move contingent on past behavior of the other player, s/he can either 
use the “reputational” information (i.e., interaction with others) or the information coming from 
their mutual previous interactions. The main finding in Roberts (2008) is that direct reciprocity 
tends to dominate indirect reciprocity if the expectation of future interactions is high (personal 
information is prioritized). This finding suggests that Treatment 3 will not generate a strong 
interaction with Treatment 1, as it might be dominated by the improved direct reciprocity under 
Treatment 1.  
However, an important aspect to consider for evaluating this treatment is the fact that sites typically 
have a report that is displayed and shared on committee meeting where the historical number of 
observations is displayed. This would specially affect the behavior of committee members, and 
less the behavior of new members. This would imply, that the treatment 3 would simply make 
public the private enforcement mechanisms happening at stores informally (via peer pressure for 
example). Then the question changes: how is it that treatment 3 might change the incentives to 
exert this private enforcement? For example, one might think that public enforcement of treatment 
3 might substitute the private enforcement.  
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Given that the terrain of interactions between direct and indirect reciprocity is largely unchartered, 
we view this treatment as mainly exploratory, perhaps with the potential to provide evidence for 
new theoretical developments. 
Identifying the treatment effects 
While Treatment 1, our central treatment, is the only treatment in the “Antofagasta” store (Table 
10), it is present and contrasted with the control, as well as examined for how it is modified by 
being combined with Treatments 2 and 3, across the four sites. In Appendix 3.7.5, we show 
calculations in support of this. The identification of Treatment 1 across all sites is important for 
the statistical power of the experiment.  
Pre-experiment power calculations 
On observations. Assuming power of 80% and significance of 5%, and using data on previous 
BAPP implementations in the DEKRA dataset, we calculated the number of observers in the 
treatment plus control conditions in a balanced experiment in order to be able to detect different 
effect sizes. In Appendix 3.7.6, we present the resulting curve. In our experiment, we expected to 
have 50 to 60 observers (on average) which would allow us to detect an effect with a minimum 
size of 2 or 1.8 observations (equivalent to 90% and 80% of a standard deviation, respectively). If 
we find a significant result below that, power would be an issue in need of exploration. 
On accidents. Assuming power of 80% and significance of 5%, and using data on previous 
workplace accidents at the worker level from SODIMAC (we had access to that data for 2014), 
we calculated the number of workers in treatment plus control conditions in a balanced experiment 
in order to be able to detect different effect sizes in observations. In the appendix 3.7.6 we present 
the resulting curve. In our experiment, we expected to have 1000 workers which would allow us 
to detect an effect with a minimum size of roughly 20% of one standard deviation in accidents. 
Given that the occurrence of accidents is infrequent, 20% of the variance is equivalent to two and 
a half times the monthly mean of accidents in SODIMAC (~1.5 percentage points, considering all 
different type of accidents). Therefore, if one finds statistical significant results below this level, 
then power needs to be explored.  
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If one assumes gains from having panel data, then one could reduce the size of the detectable effect 
by approximately 30% to 50% depending on assumptions (Mckenzie, 2012). That is, the threshold 
would be 1.4 to 1 observations and ~1 percentage points in the monthly accident rate (a bit more 
than two means). 
End of the experiment 
At the outset of the experiment, it was agreed with ACHS and SODIMAC to execute the 
experiment until “mid 2018”. Stores or enablers were not informed about this approximate date. 
Consultants were informed but requested not to tell any party in the stores about it. Around 
February 2018, it was agreed with the senior manager sponsoring the experiment, to run it the 
experiment until June 2018. Often, it is hard to keep end dates secret, and they might slowly 
percolate to enablers and the store. Thus, in order to avoid a “last-period” drop in the collaboration 
of the sites (e.g., compliance with treatment), we decided to communicate to the consultants in 
early May that the experiment would end in June 2018, but we internally committed to execute the 
analysis of the experiment with the data only until end of May 201869.  
End of experiment interviews 
In the month after the end of the experiment, we executed three meetings on site with the enabler, 
a group of 3 observers and 3 workers in Treatment 1, and a group 3 observers and 3 workers from 
the control. We executed a structured interview format, avoiding leading questions. The objective 
of these meetings was to understand qualitatively the mechanisms that generated the results we 
found, and whether they align with our theoretical interpretation. We also executed similar format 
one-on-one interviews with the consultants executing the treatments. In these interviews, in 
addition to probing into mechanisms, we also assessed the integrity of the implementations of the 
treatment. 
                                                 
 
69 We actually experienced some signs of a drop in collaboration. For example, Treatment 3 took longer to get 
implemented on June-18, and the photo evidence came back more slowly. 
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Survey to observers 
We sent an online survey to the starting team of observers and to the subsequently enrolled 
observer. This survey was sent immediately after the observer entered BAPP. The survey was 
voluntary and confidential. The survey was sent by the research team of the University of 
Cambridge and it included a terse explanation about the research project (i.e., not revealing the 
topic nor the purpose of the research). The survey contained a Big Five personality, a Dictator 
Game (DG), Third Party Punishment Game (TPPG) and a list of its social network within the store.  
The DG and TPPG were played with fictitious money, indicating to the respondent to imagine they 
had an endowment. The purpose of this survey is threefold: 1) check the balance of the 
randomization, 2) study any heterogeneity of impact that might be driven by these traits, 3) study 
possible differences between the observers in the starting team and those enrolled subsequently. 
Ethics review board and Preregistration 
This project was revised and approved by the internal review board of the Cambridge Judge 
Business School. The approval date of the project was 12 of December 2016 and the approval 
number is #16-035. 
This project was preregistered in the American Economic Association's registry for randomized 
controlled trials. The ID of the registration is AEARCTR-0002350 and the registration was 
executed on July 25, 2017. 
3.4.3. Datasets 
We built two panel datasets to execute the analysis. The first is a dataset of observers for every 
month in the BAPP implementation from its start (which varied across the four stores) to May 
2018. We recorded the name of the observer, the number of observations, information encoded in 
these observations (number of coached observations, number of CBI behaviors observed/reported, 
number of risky/safe behaviors), whether he/she was a member of starting committee or a new 
observer, and the treatment(s) he was allocated to (or control). 
In the second dataset, we built a monthly panel of workers, and accidents, from January 2016 to 
May 2018 with data obtained from various sources. For each month, we have information about 
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each worker in each of the four participating stores (ID, age, tenure, gender, and job title) from 
SODIMAC’s personnel registers. Using our randomization of workers, we assigned to each worker 
a treatment or control condition after BAPP started in the respective site. From the other dataset, 
we assigned the status of active observer (executing observations or not) to each worker in each 
month. This allowed us to study the impact of treatments on the likelihood of becoming an 
observer. To study impact on accidents, ACHS provided information about all accidents at 
SODIMAC, each accident indexed by the time of the accident, the ID of the injured worker, the 
type of the accident, and the number of lost days due to the accident. The breakdown of accident 
type is the following: work accidents (with or without loss of time), commuting accidents 
(accidents that occurred between home and work), and quasi-accidents (incidents, typically minor 
that did not meet the conditions to be attended by ACHS; e.g., not a workplace incident or not a 
real/meaningful incident). Accidents were also labelled according to whether they were first time 
accidents or repeat accidents (e.g., the worker injured a foot on a given day, it was treated, but two 
weeks later the same injury came back without a new independent event). Using this information, 
we indicated in our data, for each worker and each month, if he/she had an accident. We only 
considered first time accidents, using repeat accidents only to accurately establish the total number 
of lost workdays that a specific accident had produced. 
3.4.4. Balance of covariates, self-selection of observers and take-up 
As stated in the last section, we randomly assigned half of the observers and workers of each store 
to either the control or Treatment 1 condition, through the stratification of their age, gender, tenure, 
and job title. These entail two randomizations: workers to groups or control (executed by 
researchers), and selection of observers in the committee (executed by the consultant on the 
ground).  
Table 16 demonstrates the balance of the first randomization of workers. We present the statistics 
of the covariates used to stratify the sample, to check for balance. Using a t-test, we find that there 
are no statistical differences between treatment and control groups for any of the four stores in the 
study, suggesting that the randomization was effectively executed. Table 27 demonstrates the 
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randomization of observers. Again, we do not find any statistically significant differences between 
control and treatment, indicating that the consultants also executed the randomization effectively70. 
                                                 
 
70 Here we have 24 and 15 observers in control and treatment, respectively whereas Table 25 shows 24 and 18. The 
reason for the difference is that in La Reina and Temuco, in the 4th month we lost 2 and 1 observers, respectively, 
that belonged to a group (two of them because of transfer to another city and two for personal motives). These 
observers were replaced by new observers in their groups (and in the case of La Reina, the enabler covered the group 
for a few months). If we add these 3 observers to the table, the results remain unchanged. 
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Table 26. Balance check of worker randomization, for each store in the study. 
  Antofagasta Store Temuco Store 
  Control Treatment Diff (p-value) Control Treatment Diff (p-value) 
N 153 153  110 109  
Average age 35.7 34  1.6   (0.35) 36.3 36.2  0.1   (0.91) 
Share of women 49% 48%  1%   (0.84) 32% 31%  1%   (0.90) 
Average tenure 4.9 4.7  0.2   (0.76) 8 7.7  0.3   (0.65) 
Distribution of job titles             
    Full-time seller 25% 30% -5%   (0.43) 35% 32%  3%   (0.63) 
    Part-time seller 27% 23%  4%   (0.46) 24% 28% -4%   (0.44) 
    Operator 14% 11%  3%   (0.56) 13% 8%  5%   (0.20) 
    Replenisher 9% 7%  2%   (0.64) 10% 9%  1%   (0.85) 
    Other 25% 28% -4%   (0.52) 18% 22% -4%   (0.40) 
  Huechuraba Store La Reina Store 
  Control Treatment Diff (p-value) Control Treatment Diff (p-value) 
N 122 123  126 126  
Average age 38.3 37.2  1.0   (0.53) 34.8 34.8  0.0   (0.98) 
Share of women 52% 54% -2%   (0.80) 43% 43%  0%   (0.96) 
Average tenure 5.9 5.7  1.8   (0.78) 6 5.7  0.2   (0.75) 
Distribution of job titles             
    Full-time seller 22% 23% -1%   (0.88) 26% 24%  2%   (0.74) 
    Part-time seller 33% 32%  2%   (0.79) 30% 33% -2%   (0.71) 
    Operator 12% 14% -2%   (0.58) 12% 11%  1%   (0.83) 
    Replenisher 10% 10%  1%   (0.83) 7% 10% -2%   (0.51) 
    Other 23% 21%  2%   (0.65) 24% 22%  2%   (0.74) 
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Table 27. Balance check of observer randomization 
  
Committee members - All Stores 
Committee members - All Stores  
(not considering enablers) 
  Control Treatment Diff (p-value) Control Treatment Diff (p-value) 
N 28 15  24 15  
Average age 40.5 44.1 -3.53   (0.29) 41.6 44.1  -2.48   (0.48) 
Share of women 54% 47%  7%   (0.67) 54% 47%  8%   (0.66) 
Average tenure 7.9 10.1 -2.2   (0.20) 8.0 10.1  -2.1   (0.25) 
Distribution of job titles             
    Full-time seller 46% 40% 6%   (0.69) 42% 40% 2%   (0.92) 
    Part-time seller 11% 7% 4%   (0.67) 13% 7% 6%   (0.57) 
    Operator 7% 13% -6%   (0.52) 8% 13% -5%   (0.63) 
    Replenisher 11% 7% 4%   (0.67) 8% 7%  2%   (0.85) 
    Other 25% 33% -8%   (0.57) 29% 33% -4%   (0.79) 
 
The workers that become an observer might not be the same as the rest of the workers. This could 
affect the generalizability of our study: the impact of BAPP might be simply because the workers 
that become observers are different, and not because BAPP has the capacity of generating a change 
in behaviour in the “average” worker. This could also be the case for our treatments: it might be 
that they only work on the type of worker that becomes an observer. To evaluate the extent of this 
problem, in the Table 28 we explore the difference in sex, age, tenure, and type of job which we 
had available with administrative data. In panel a) we find that observers are older and have a 
higher tenure than the rest of the workers of the site. However, from panel b) and c) we find that 
this difference is generated exclusively by the observers that are part of the committee. In panel b) 
we also learn that the committee has a higher share of women. The new observers are not different 
to the workers of the site. This pattern makes administrative sense as, in general, site managers 
and BAPP consultants might prefer more experienced workers to embark on a new project.  
The difference between committee observers and new observers does not seems to pan out in terms 
of personality traits, altruism and social network. In the panels a) and b) of Table 29, we used the 
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answers of the observers that replied to the survey we do not find any difference in terms in terms 
of the big 5 personality traits, of the amount given in the dictator game and the size of their social 
network. This suggest that the criteria for selection of committee members is experience, and not 
personality, behavioural or social traits. 
Table 28. Difference between observers and workers 
 Observers 
Mean 
(standard deviation) 
Workers 
Mean 
(standard deviation) 
t-test (p-value) 
{Wilcoxon Rank sum 
test} 
Panel a). All observers vs workers 
Share of women 0.415 (0.494) 0.404 (0.491) 0.804 
Age 37.61 (11.9) 33.74 (12.21) 0.001*** 
Tenure 6.64 (5.46) 5.17 (1.63) 0.011** 
Distribution of Job titles   {0.738} 
Number 118 1,343  
Panel b). Committee observers vs. workers 
Share of women 0.55 (0.50) 0.404 (0.491) 0.065* 
Age 44.39 (9.76) 33.74 (12.21) 0.000*** 
Tenure 10.28 (5.35) 5.17 (1.63) 0.000*** 
Distribution of Job 
titles 
  {0.971} 
Number 38 1,343  
Panel c). New observers vs. workers 
Share of women 0.35 (0.49) 0.404 (0.491) 0.343 
Age 34.38 (11.5) 33.74 (12.21) 0.644 
Tenure 4.91 (4.62) 5.17 (1.63) 0.701 
Distribution of Job 
titles 
  {0.699} 
Number 80 1,343  
Notes: *** p-value <0.01, *** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.1. We used all the workers that 
were employed while the experiment was being conducted. We lose three observers in 
committee given that we filtered by the type of workers that were eligible for BAPP 
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observations and to become new observers (not supervisor or manager). To make an apples to 
apples comparison we dropped the cases of committee members that were supervisors. The 
result do not change if we include these back. 
Table 29. Difference between committee members and new observers 
 Observers 
members of the 
committee 
Mean 
(standard 
deviation) 
New observers 
 
 
Mean 
(standard 
deviation) 
t-test (p-value) 
{Wilcoxon Rank sum test (p-
value)} 
Panel A: Differences in administrative data 
Share of women 0.55 (0.08) 0.35 (0.05) 0.039 ** 
Age 43.5 (1.63) 34.22 (1.24) 0.000 *** 
Tenure 9.98 (0.86) 5.02 (0.52) 0.000 *** 
Distribution of Job titles   {0.990} 
Number 40 81  
Panel B: Differences in the survey 
Big 5: Neuroticism 2.33 (0.07) 2.39 (0.12) 0.607 
Big 5: Openness 3.91 (0.07) 3.98 (0.12) 0.584 
Big 5: Extraversion 3.69 (0.07) 3.68 (0.14) 0.938 
Big 5: Agreeableness 3.94 (0.05) 4.01 (0.11) 0.426 
Big 5: Conscientiousness 4.23 (0.07) 4.10 (0.14) 0.369 
Dictator game 5.03 (0.55) 4.29 (0.52) 0.375 
Social network 6.9 (0.93) 4.70 (1.12) 0.149 
Number 30 17  
Notes: *** p-value <0.01, *** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.1. Big 5, Dictator game and Social network 
were collected using a qualtrics survey. Big 5 questions are measured using a 1 to 5 likert scale. For the 
dictator game, we asked employees to imagine they receive an endowment of 10,000 CLP, and asked them 
to decide how much to give to an stranger (0, 1,000, 2,000, … , 10,000). For the social network, we asked 
workers to state with how many co-workers in the site they have a social relation (i.e., acquaintance, friend). 
 
Our treatment is an Intention to Treat (ITT). The lists of workers that we distributed to observers 
(plus the letters to workers) might not be sufficient to secure compliance with the groups. As a 
  
 
161 
 
 
consequence, it is necessary to explore the degree to which observers complied with executing 
observations only in their groups. This would allow to estimate the “real” effect of the treatment, 
that is, its impact in case of full compliance. For this, we implemented a short survey to gather 
information about the take-up in each store. The survey was conducted on a tablet by the enabler 
in each store, and the goal was for each enabler to survey 60 workers from a random subsample of 
workers assigned to Treatment 1. We sent the tablets to the store once the accumulated contact 
rate reached 1, surveying workers between January 2018 and May 2018.  
Table 18 presents the results of the survey. Averaging across stores, 92% of those surveyed 
indicated knowing about the implementation of BAPP in their store, and of those knowing BAPP 
was being implemented, 92% knew they had assigned observers to observe them. Of those who 
knew they had assigned observers, 78% acknowledged having received the letter from their 
respective observer. The second part of the survey asked how many times they had been observed 
and how many of those observations were made by their observers, showing that on average 85% 
of the observations were realized by their assigned observer. This number was driven down by 
Huechuraba with a low compliance of 52%, which we confirmed in our interviews (this low 
compliance did not arise during the monitoring executed by the consultant).  For the remaining 
stores, the share of observations realized by assigned observers was over 91%. These numbers 
suggest that treatments were effectively implemented in stores, allowing the estimation of an ITT 
impact. This estimate will be a lower bound of the “actual” effect of the treatments.  
Table 30. Survey results for take-up check, for each store in the study. 
  
Antofagasta 
Store 
Temuco 
Store 
Huechuraba 
Store 
La Reina 
Store 
Total 
Total surveys 38 26 46 37 147 
Knows BAPP is implemented 
in store 
32 26 42 35 135 (92%) 
Knows he has assigned 
observers 
29 24 39 32 124 (92%) 
Received the letter 21 19 37 20 97 (78%) 
Mean of times observed* 2.5 (2.6) 2 (2.2) 1.8 (1.8) 1.8 (1.8) 2 (2) 
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Mean of times observed by 
observers* 
2.1 (2.1) 1.8 (1.9) 0.8 (0.8) 1.5 (1.6) 1.5 (1.6) 
Mean of share of obs. realized 
by observers* 
91% (89%) 92% (90%) 52% (52%) 93% (97%) 85% (83%) 
* Numbers in parenthesis restrict the count to surveyors who acknowledge having received the letter. 
 
3.4.5. Impact on observations 
To study the impact of the treatments on the number of observations per observer, we use the 
following model: 
SHEETSijt = b1 + b2 x TREAT1ij   + b4 x TREAT1ij x TREAT2ij + b5 x TREAT1ij x TREAT3ij  
                     + b6 x NEWijt + b6 x ENAijt + b7 x TENijt + b7 x TENijt x NEWij + vjt + uijt  (12) 
In this model we regress the number of observations by observer i in store j in the month t 
(“SHEETS”) on the treatment dummies. Treatment 2 and Treatment 3 enter as interaction effects 
on Treatment 1. We control by the number of months that the observer has been active (TEN) in 
order to capture the ramp up in observations that naturally occurs when observers enter BAPP. 
The binary control variable NEW captures whether the observer is not a part of the starting 
committee. Figure 17 showed that new observers conduct systematically fewer observations. We 
also control for the interaction between TEN and NEW, as the dynamics can be different according 
to Figure 17. We also control for store and month with dummies (vjt), which is needed because the 
stores with Treatments 2 and 3 started their BAPP implementations later and thus, given the ramp 
up in observations in the first two months, their exclusion would introduce a negative bias on these 
treatments. We also control for the enablers by identifying them with the dummy ENA. Enablers 
were instructed to execute observations in the control group, introducing downward bias in b2 
(enablers typically execute more observations than the rest of observers). To control for this, we 
decided to keep enabler in the sample while adding ENA; the alternative of excluding them from 
the analysis would generate sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). 
Given that Treatment 1 is predicted to generate a larger impact on new observers, we also extend 
the previous model in order to study this heterogeneity of impact: 
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SHEETSijt = b1 + b2 x TREAT1ij x NEWij + b3 x TREAT1ij x COMij  
              + b4 x TREAT1ij x TREAT2ij + b5 x TREAT1ij x TREAT3ij  + b6 x NEWij   
             + b7 x ENAijt + b8 x TENijt + b9 x TENijt x NEWij + vjt + uijt       (13) 
Model (13) splits the impact of Treatment 1 into two components, the impact on new observers 
and the impact on observers that are part of the committee (COM, which is equal to 1 minus NEW). 
Table 19 and Figure 21 displays the results. Column (1) indicates that Treatment 1 generates an 
increase of 0.97 observations, significant at 90%. This effect is equivalent to 20% and 34% of the 
mean and standard deviation of the dependent variable, respectively. Column (2) shows that this 
impact is driven by the impact of the treatment on the new observers. These observers conduct 
1.38 more observations per month, a result that is statistically significant at 95%. Observers that 
are members of the committee display 0.58 additional observations under Treatment 1 but this is 
not statistically significant. New observers that do not receive Treatment 1 execute 1.60 fewer 
observations than a committee member, an effect size that is very similar to the difference 
estimated for the Dekra dataset between the first and second quintiles of observers (depicted in 
Figure 17). This result indicates that Treatment 1 operated as intended: it reduced the breakdown 
of cooperative effort as the number of observers increased71. Column (3) breaks down the impact 
of Treatment 1 on the committee member assigned to a group on two elements, when they were 
alone in the group and when a new observer enters the group. We see an increase in the amount of 
observations from having a companion in the group, however, the difference is not statistically 
significant. Our exit observer interviewees indicated that repetition of contact played an important 
role in the groups, particularly on whom other observers are “kept track off”. Workers indicated 
                                                 
 
71
 The condition of being a new or a committee observer is not randomly generated. Thus, the right interpretation of 
our results of Treatment 1 on new observers is on those new workers that would be (self) selected to be observers 
under a group structure, which could be different than those (self) selected to become observers in the control. 
Indeed, comparing the two groups on the variables of Table 27 yielded two statistical differences: new observers are 
younger and have a lower tenure.   Table 11 
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that having the same person observing them repeatedly made them more “committed” to follow 
their advice. These qualitative findings are consistent with direct reciprocity. 
Adding Treatment 2 to Treatment 1 reduces the number of observations by roughly 1.5 per month, 
statistically significant at 95%. This means that the benefit that is obtained by creating groups and 
“structured growth” is eliminated if the names of the group members are revealed in the letter.  
We do not find any statistically significant impact of Treatment 3 on observations. Below (in the 
section on “peer monitoring”), we analyse this treatment deeper in order to probe whether this 
seeming non-result has a plausible interpretation. 
This result of Treatment 2 suggests, in the terminology of our theory discussion, that the distaste 
for the violation of anonymity was stronger than any identity effects that might have been 
generated by the Treatment 2, and this effect completely overwhelmed the impact of direct 
reciprocity. Our exit interviews strongly pointed at this interpretation: (partially) lifting the 
anonymity condition of BAPP generated a backlash from the workers. A strong argument being 
made was that the anonymity of observations is a cornerstone of BAPP. Providing the names of 
workers indeed jeopardized the BAPP promise of “no spying, naming, no blaming”. This 
resistance was then enacted by a lower willingness to collaborate with observers by either rejecting 
being observed (as they are allowed to) or if observed, frowning about it and not being engaged. 
In terms of the social dilemmas introduced above, the distaste for being “listed” translates into a 
higher cost of cooperating to workers in game 3, which increases their likelihood of defecting.  
This results is novel for the literature, where transparency (broadly defined) is in general advocated 
because it fosters identity building or indirect reciprocity, leading to cooperation. We believe that 
this outcome is natural when the cooperative act entails providing a “positive” benefit to the third 
party, that is, it carries a neutral or positive signal for the recipient. However, in our case the 
recipient is told to change an erroneous behaviour, one which he/she has probably been advised 
not to incur in the past. This can generate a negative signal on the recipient if his name is not 
anonymous. Simply put, being “pointed at” on a mistake generates a cost, even if the “pointing” 
comes when receiving help. The plausibility and generalizability of this idea is an avenue for future 
research. 
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Table 31. Impact of treatments on number of observations 
  Observations 
(1) 
Observations 
(2) 
Observations 
 (3) 
Treat 1  0.97*     (0.53) 
  
Treat 1 x Committee observer 
 
0.58     (0.66) 
 
Treat 1 x Committee observer alone 
  
0.23       (0.61) 
Treat 1 x Committee observer with group 
  
0.88       (0.89) 
Treat 1 x New observer 
 
1.38**   (0.57) 1.32*      (0.57) 
Treat 1 x Treat 2 -1.52**   (0.67) -1.56**  (0.68) -1.50**   (0.59) 
Treat 1 x Treat 3 -0.74      (0.61) -0.51     (0.64) -0.35      (0.68) 
Enabler 3.40**   (1.37) 3.28**   (1.34) 3.26**    (1.34) 
Tenure  0.12      (0.14) 0.12       (0.14) 0.10        (0.15) 
Tenure x New observer -0.04      (0.16) -0.04      (0.16) -0.02       (0.16) 
New -1.17      (0.88) -1.60*    (0.91) -1.64**    (0.91) 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 585 585 585 
R-square 38.95% 39.33% 39.54% 
Mean (Standard deviation) 5.02 (2.82) 5.02 (2.82) 5.02 (2.82) 
All regressions are estimated with OLS. Errors in parentheses: Robust and clustered at the observer level. * p<0.1,** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Figure 21. Impact of treatments on the number of observations 
 
Alternative explanations 
Instead of direct reciprocity, an alternative mechanism that might lie behind the positive impact of 
Treatment 1 is the “guide” or “leadership” role that committee observers provide to incoming new 
observers. Without treatment, there is not a clear 1 to 1 relationship between a committee observer 
and a new observer, so the latter is left to their “own devices”. Although our treatment protocol 
avoided tagging any role of “guide” and “leadership” to the committee observer under Treatment 
1 (and explicitly instructed the consultants not to emphasize it), these roles could have emerged 
spontaneously. To test this alternative explanation, we executed a two-stage model where in the 
first stage we obtain a proxy for the quality of the observers in the committee before the entry of 
new observers, and then we plug these estimates into our basic regression of observations in Table 
31. In the first stage, we executed a fixed effect model with the tenure controls and the store-month 
fixed effects and restricting the series of the committee observers under treatment 1 to the months 
before the entry of new observers into their group. Then, for the second stage, we created a variable 
“observer fixed effect” which was constructed as follows: i) for the each new observer in 
5.0
5.0
5.9
6.2
5.4
5.6
4.0
4.4
5.4
3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5
simple average
control (t1=0 | t3=0)
treatment 1 (t2=0 | t3=0)
trat 1 & committee (t2=0 | t3=0)
trat 1 & new (t2=0 | t3=0)
control + committee
control + new
treat 1 & treat 2 (t3=0)
treat 1 & treat 3 (t2=0)
Number of observations per observer
  
 
167 
 
 
Treatment 1 we assigned the fixed effect we estimated for the corresponding committee observer 
(i.e., the one assigned to the group of the new observer), ii) for the new entrants in the control 
group, we added the average of the fixed effects of the committee observers in control72, and iii) 
For the committee observers we added their own fixed effect estimated in the first stage. The 
results show including this control does not alter the conclusions obtained in Table 31, if anything 
the results become stronger for the new observers with an increase of 50% in the coefficient (as 
expected from the addition of fixed effect, the coefficient of committee observers is close to zero). 
In particular, we found that a higher fixed effect of the committee members increases the number 
of observations executed by new observers both in the control and in the Treatment 1, but that the 
impact is higher in the former. These results indicate that quality of committee members (or their 
“leadership”) has a role, but that this is not driving the impact we document for Treatment 1. 
Another alternative explanation for the impact of treatment 1 is the idea of “Diffusion of 
responsibility” (Latane and Darley, 1968). This idea indicates that the willingness to volunteer 
effort decreases with the size of the group. (This idea is closely related to the idea that free-riding 
temptations increases with the group size.) The treatment 1 reduces the size of the relevant group 
that is responsible for helping: now the few observers of a group in treatment 1 are “alone” in 
observing workers. This would make the observers more willing to provide effort. However, there 
are three reasons that suggests that this mechanism is not driving our results. First, diffusion of 
responsibility is not strategic, in the sense of behaviour contingent on other’s behaviour; but we 
do document strategic behaviour in our results (column 3 of table 29; table 31; interviews). Second, 
diffusion of responsibility will predict higher effort but lower entry of new observers; this is 
contradicted by our results in section 3.4.7 below. Third, we executed an additional analysis 
(available upon request) that splits the impact of treatment 1 according to the number of observes 
in the group: only the committee observer (1 observer), the committee observer plus one new 
observer (2 observers), the committee observer plus two new observers (3 observers), and the 
                                                 
 
72 The results did not vary if we used another statistics such as the median or percentiles 25 and 75, or if we estimated 
the fixed of committee observers in control restricting their series before any new observers enter into the control 
condition. 
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committee observer plus three or more new observers (4 or more observers). We find that the 
impact doesn’t decrease with the number of observers in the group. This contradicts the diffusion 
of responsibility explanation, which would predict a sharp decrease in effort. 
Regarding the negative impact of Treatment 2, an important alternative mechanism could lie in the 
behaviour of the consultants. Given that Treatment 2 is basically an addition to Treatment 1, it 
could be that the two consultants that executed it – one consultant in Temuco and one consultant 
in La Reina –executed Treatment 1 in such a way that led to a negative outcome, and this 
“consultant effect” is being picked up by Treatment 2. In simple, idiosyncratic implementation by 
consultant by drive the results. However, several arguments and tests indicate that this did not 
driving the results. We describe these in turn. 
First, the consultant in La Reina also executed BAPP in Huechuraba, a store that had Treatment 1 
but not Treatment 2. Thus, if the execution of consultants was the issue, we would find a negative 
impact of Treatment 1, because in 3 out of 4 stores it would have been implemented in a “negative” 
way. However, we don’t find this. 
Second, following the previous point, we executed two regressions, one restricting the sample to 
the consultant in La Reina and Huechuraba, and the other by excluding the Temuco store (these 
are available upon request). We found the same pattern in these regressions: Treatment 1 reduces 
accidents and Treatment 2 increases them. This suggests that the result of Treatment 2 is not caused 
by an idiosyncratic implementation of Treatment 1.  
Third, we executed a regression interacting Treatment 2 with the condition of being a new 
observer. If Treatment 2 is the effect of an idiosyncratic implementation of Treatment 1, we expect 
the negative effect of Treatment 2 to be smaller for new observers, as the Treatment 1 is 
particularly powerful on them and some of its effect should be maintained. In contrast, if the effect 
is coming from the workers (as it should if the effect is a worker backlash on “being listed”), there 
shouldn’t be any difference between committee or new observers in the negative coefficient of 
Treatment 2.  The latter is what we find: we fail to find a significant interaction effect between 
Treatment 2 and being a new observer (regression available upon request). 
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Fourth, below we present results that show that Treatment 2 has a negative impact on dependent 
variables that capture observed workers’ outcomes (i.e., risky behaviour, accidents, and the 
likelihood of becoming an observer) and a null impact on the dependent variable that affect 
exclusively observer behaviour, namely coaching. This is consistent with workers as the driving 
force behind the negative effect of Treatment 2, and therefore, closer to our proposed mechanism 
of a “workers’ backlash”. On the contrary, if the influence of Treatment 2 came from 
idiosyncrasies of the consultant (or enabler), the impact would also be felt in the observers’ 
coaching behaviours.  
Fifth, we explored the effect of time on with the impact of Treatment 2. We find that Treatment 2 
is particularly detrimental at the start of the BAPP implementation, generating approximately a 
backlash of two and half observations in the first couple of months. After that, the negative effect 
is gradually reduced so that by the end of the experiment it is small and close to zero. We also 
document an effect of time on Treatment 1, but of a smaller magnitude. These patterns are 
consistent with a backlash at the start of the Treatment 2, and then, as workers realize that the list 
of names was not ill-intended, they restore effort. These results indicate that the impact of 
Treatment 1 are cleanly felt at the end of the experiment, without a reversion effect from Treatment 
2. 
Clustering and power 
The impact of consultants, or any other store-specific variable that affects the implementation of 
the treatment, is not limited to a possible bias in the coefficient, it could also affect the precision 
of the estimates. Common shocks within a store can generate correlations in the standard errors, 
and if it is not accounted for, standard errors can be too small. To accommodate for this, we 
executed additional regressions clustering the standard errors by store. Given that we had only four 
clusters, we used the correction proposed by Cameron and Miller (2015). For T1 x NEW, we 
obtain a p-value of 0.165 in a one-sided test, and for T1 x COM, we obtain 0.065. Thus, we lose 
significance in one parameter but gain significance in the other.  
 Abadie, Athey, Imbens and Wooldridge (2017) indicate when clustering is required. Based on an 
experimental design criteria clustering by store wouldn’t be necessary: our Treatments 1 and 2 are 
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not correlated with the clusters as they are executed within stores. Therefore, inference executed 
at the observer or worker level wouldn’t require clustering. However, according to Abadie et al 
(2017) clustering by stores would be necessary on grounds of sampling design. This is so because 
we have clusters in the population (all the stores of SODIMAC or even all the sites of BAPP) that 
we don’t observe in the sample we have. In simple terms, to identify the findings within our sample 
clustering would be necessary, but to generalize beyond it, it would.  
As we have discussed earlier, if we find a statistical significance of below 1.8, it is necessary to 
explore the power of the estimates. The ex-post power of “Treat 1 x New observer” in column 2 
of Table 19 is 0.51 (assuming significance of 5%). For the interaction between Treatment 1 and 
Treatment 2, ex-post power is 0.6273. This means that in our sample, it is 51%/62% likely to detect 
the effect we observe (at 5%) if we assume that it is there to be found. Thus, power is not high (nor 
small), indicating that false negatives can happen not infrequently in a study as ours. Moreover, 
Ioannidis (2005) showed that insufficient power can also cause high rates of false positives, the 
identification of a statistically significant effect where there in reality is none. Ioannides (2005) 
recommends calculating the PPV statistics which reflects the likelihood that a statistically 
significant finding actually reflects a true effect. In our case, the PPV for “Treat 1 x New observer” 
equals [0.51*R/(0.51*R+0.016)], where 0.51 is the power, 0.016 the statistical significance, and 
R is the ratio of “true relationships” to “no relationships” in studies similar to this one (R can be 
very low in fully empirical and a-theoretical fields such as genome-disease association studies). If 
we assume R=0.25, then PPV is 89%. Arguably, R equal to 0.25 might be conservative, given the 
theory and the evidence from the DEKRA dataset that support our experiment. If R=0.5, then the 
PPV equals 94%. Compared to the values provided by Ioannidis (2005) our PPV is encouraging. 
Impact on coaching 
An additional cooperative behavior that observers can execute is “coaching” (see definition of the 
second game in section 3.2.1).  This refers to observations where an observer is accompanied by 
                                                 
 
73 We used an N of treatment equal to 16 (the average number of observers we had in “new x treatment 1”) and 44 for 
the N of the control group (i.e., the rest of the observers). Roughly, we had 60 observers on average in our experiment. 
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and gets advice from a more experienced observer, typically the enabler or committee members. 
We explored the impact of the treatments on the amount of coaching that the observers received. 
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 32, we replicate equations (12) and (13) but now with the number 
of coached observations as the dependent variable. We use a Poisson regression because this 
dependent variable behaves as a count variable (results are consistent if we use OLS). Column (1) 
shows that Treatment 1 increases the amount of coaching that the observers receive. Column (2) 
shows that new observers receive substantially more coaching, particularly if the new observer is 
under Treatment 1. If we assume tenure, t2 and t3 equal to zero, the impact of being a new observer 
without treatment is exp(1.02) = 2.77 additional coached observations, whereas the impact of 
Treatment 1 on new observers is exp(1.02+0.4) = 4.13 additional coached observations. In 
contrast, for the committee members, Treatment 1 generates only exp(0.44) = 1.55 additional 
observations. Figure 17 provides the expected number of coached observations setting the 
covariates at their mean. This figure clearly shows how the observers under Treatment 1, 
particularly the new ones, receive disproportionately more coaching than the rest. Overall, these 
results are consistent with direct reciprocity generating more consummate cooperation among 
observers of Treatment 1. 
Opposite to what we find for the number of observations, we don’t observe a negative impact of 
Treatment 2 on coaching. This is another piece of evidence that the mechanism behind the negative 
impact of Treatment 2 is related to workers’ reaction rather than to an idiosyncratic implementation 
of Treatment 1 in Temuco and La Reina.  Coaching is a phenomenon that doesn’t involve the 
workers, it is internal to observers. If the impact of Treatment 2 we observed in Table 17 is driven 
by a “workers’ reaction”, we should not find an effect when studying coaching. If, in contrast, 
consultants or enablers implemented Treatment 1 badly (generating an effect that would be 
captured by T1 x T2), then we should find an effect on coaching (because observers are readily 
influenced by the idiosyncratic implementation). 
Returning to the leadership question regarding the committee members, columns (3) and (4) 
illuminate whether coaching mediates the impact of Treatment 1 on the amount of observations: 
do new observers under Treatment 1 conduct more observations because of repeated interactions 
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with a small group of workers and observers, or because they get more help via coaching from the 
enabler or the assigned committee observer? The results suggest that coaching captures only a 
marginal share of the impact of Treatment 1 on observations. First, column (3) establishes a 
positive and strong impact of coaching on the number of observations, adding observer fixed 
effects to improve identification, as coaching is not randomized. In column (4) we replicate the 
second column of Table 31, but adding coached observations as a control. We see that the 
coefficient of “Treatment 1” drops from 0.58 to 0.41 and that the coefficient of “treatment 1 x new 
observer” drops from 1.32 to 1.22. These drops indicate that the driving mechanism behind 
Treatment 1 is not help received as coaching.  
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Table 32. Impact of treatments on coaching 
  
Coached 
observations 
(1) 
Coached 
observations 
(2) 
Observations  
 
(3) 
Observations  
  
(4) 
Treat 1  0.42**   (0.19)    
Treat 1 x Committee 
observer  
 0.44*** (0.22)  0.41   (0.64) 
Treat 1 x New observer  0.40** (0.21)  1.22**  (0.52) 
Treat 1 x Treat 2 -0.14    (0.22) -0.14    (0.22)  -1.52** (0.63) 
Treat 1 x Treat 3 -0.27    (0.20) -0.28    (0.21)  -0.43    (0.61) 
Enabler 0.49*** (0.16) 0.49*** (0.16)  2.87**   (1.19) 
Tenure  0.02     (0.05) 0.02     (0.05) 0.69*   (0.36) 0.11      (0.13) 
Tenure x New observer -0.38***  (0.09) -0.39***  (0.09) 0.25*   (0.14) 0.11      (0.15) 
New 1.00***   (0.38) 1.02***   (0.39)  -2.17**  (0.84) 
Coached observations   0.56*** (0.09) 0.59*** (0.11) 
Observer fixed effects No No Yes No 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 585 585 585 585 
R-square 21.69% 21.69% 65.70% 44.49% 
Mean 1.15 1.15 5.02 5.02 
(1) and (2) are Poisson regressions. (3) and (4) are OLS regressions. Errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at 
the observer level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,*** p<0.01.   
Results are robust to also including sheet as a control. We preferred not to add sheets as control since coached 
observations are an independent decision, and thus not fully nested in observations as flags or risks. For example, the 
mean of coached observations is 1.2, the 50th percentile is 1 and the 90th percentile is 3. Given that the mean of 
observations is 5 (and the 25th percentile is 3), for the majority of observers there are enough observations in order to 
execute coaching (and thus becoming an independent decision). 
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Figure 22. Impact of treatments on coaching 
 
The Effect of Treatment 3 and Peer Monitoring  
Thus far we have not found any impact of Treatment 3. In the assessment of behavior in the next 
section, we also fail to find a significant impact. This is surprising given that prior research is very 
supportive of the indirect reciprocity/reputation mechanism as a driver of cooperation. One 
possible explanation of this lack of support is that we don’t test a pure reputation effect, instead, 
we test an interaction effect between reputation (Treatment 3) and reciprocity (Treatment 1: 
repeated interactions between observers of group, and between observer and workers of the group). 
Theoretical work suggests that the interaction of mechanisms supporting cooperation is by no 
means obvious (Nowak and Rand, 2013). For example, direct reciprocity and network/spatial 
selection may interact either synergistically or antagonistically, depending on the levels of 
repetition and assortment (Van Veelen et al, 2013).  
A second possible explanation is that the real nature of treatment 3 wasn’t simply about generating 
a reputation-based enforcement where no enforcement was present. Instead, Treatment 3 occurred 
in a context where there was a reputation based mechanism among committee observers. As 
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discussed above, the number of observations executed by each observer was frequently displayed 
and discussed at the monthly committee meetings. Our discussions with enablers and observers 
over the course of the experiment suggested that these committee-level discussions already 
generated real peer pressure on those observers that did not execute their share. In this light, 
Treatment 3 might well have simply made public to the whole store what was already visible in 
private (in the committee), and thus Treatment 3 in effect failed to generate any additional peer 
pressure --- the peer pressure effect of committee discussions was not realized at the outset of the 
experiment and therefore not taken into account.   
In order to test this idea, we executed the regressions displayed in Table 33. The variable “Low 
ranked in the last month” captures whether the observer is below the median of the cumulative 
number of observations per observer up to the previous month74. 42% of the variance in this 
variable is within observer, which allowed to plug observer fixed effects into the regression in 
order to improve identification (low rank is not randomized). The model analyses how Treatment 
1 and Treatment 3 changed the way that “Low rank” operated in motivating observations. Column 
(1) indicates that a low rank in the previous month doesn’t generated a significant change in 
observations. However, this average effect hides plenty of heterogeneity. Column (2) shows that 
low rank does incentivize observers to increase observations but only in the case of no treatment 
1 and no treatment 3. Under Treatment 1, the positive of effect low rank disappears. We speculate 
that this is driven by the fact that Treatment 1 means that the observer is responsible for its own 
group of workers (in effect being “less comparable” to the other observers), and therefore, the 
threat of peer monitoring goes away. In general, peer punishment operates much better if there is 
a joint effort or a common pool where agents contribute. The same occurs with Treatment 3, it 
reduces the positive impact of low rank but with smaller magnitude and lower statistical 
significance.  This result is consistent with “private” enforcement (display of rank acted upon in 
the committee) and “public” enforcement (reputation effect of a public bulletin board display) 
being substitutes. For example, the public list might be (implicitly) interpreted by the committee 
                                                 
 
74 Results are consistent if we use the continuous ranking. We stick to the dummy variables as it is easier to interpret. 
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as a signal that the “list” now executes monitoring (for all to see), reducing the incentives of people 
in the committee to monitor and enforce effort levels. In our exit interviews confirmed that private 
enforcement was indeed a powerful force driving behaviour. However, evidence in favour of its 
interactions with Treatment 1 and Treatment 3 was present but not definitive. 
Column (3) explores the triple interaction between Treatment 1, Treatment 3 and low rank. Here 
we find that the negative effect of Treatment1 is partially reverted when Treatment 3 is present. 
This is compatible with the “substitutes” interpretation that we have just arrived at: the observer 
under T1 is “independent” or “not accountable to” (not comparable with) other observers in the 
committee, but with Treatment 3, s/he is accountable to his/her group of workers (to whom s/he 
gave a personal letter), which restores (some of the) accountability.  
Table 33. Impact of observation ranking and its interaction with treatment 1 and 3 
  
 
Observations 
(1) 
Observations 
(2) 
Observations 
(3) 
Low rank in previous month 0.56 (0.54) 2.11***  (0.78) 2.42***  (0.90) 
Treat 1 x Low rank in last month  -2.19**  (0.76) -2.73**  (1.18) # 
Treat 3 x Low rank in last month  -1.30†  (0.86) -1.89**  (0.94) 
Treat 1 x Treat 3 x   
Low rank in last month 
  1.34      (1.36) # 
Tenure  1.35* (0.79) 1.04  (0.75) 0.98      (0.73) 
Tenure x New observer -0.03 (0.20) -0.02  (0.20) -0.01     (0.20) 
Observer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 427 427 427 
R-square (adjusted) 63.98% (47.98%) 65.51% (49.69%)  65.51% (49.69%) 
 Errors in parentheses: Robust and clustered at the observer level. † p<0.15 / * p<0.1 / ** p<0.05 / *** p<0.01 / 
# p<0.05 in a joint t-test. The results are robust to adding lagged observations as a control (this controls for a 
possible “reversion-to-the-mean” effect). 
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Moreover, Table 34 demonstrates that these dynamics among low rank, Treatment 1 and 
Treatment 3 are much weaker or non-existent for new observers. We split all the coefficients by 
multiplying them with dummies for new and committee observers. We find that the impact of low 
rank on observations by new observers is half of the impact on committee observers. Only 
committee observers observe the ranking of observations in the monthly committee meeting. New 
observers are not in these meetings, so they receive less peer enforcement; they might still receive 
some direct monitoring, from peers in conversations and particularly from the enabler, which 
explains the significant but smaller coefficient we observe. In sum, lower exposure to private 
enforcement (or peer pressure) weakens the motivation impact of low rank, both in its direct and 
in its interaction effects.  
Although we cannot rule out all possible alternative interpretations of these results, the effect sizes 
are large and nuanced, suggesting that enforcement, whether it is private (via peer pressure) or 
public (via a reputation mechanism) is highly sensitive to the context, such as the social structure 
(Treatment 1) and information availability (Treatment 3). 
These results are robust to adding Treatment 2 and its interactions to the models of Table 22: we 
did not find any significant results. Just like the results on coaching, this lack of impact of 
Treatment 2 on the observers’ peer pressure and public reputation again supports the interpretation 
that Treatment 2’s impact (the negative effect of revealing names) is driven by the workers’ 
reactions. The results are also robust to adding lagged observations, which control for the 
persistence of effort or a “reversion-to-the-mean” dynamic. 
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Table 34. Impact of observation ranking and treatments for committee versus new observers 
  
 
 Observations 
(1) 
Committee observers x Low rank in previous month 2.21** (1.08) 
Treat 1 x Low rank in last month -2.82*** (0.96) 
Treat 3 x Low rank in last month -1.28 (1.13) 
Treat 1 x Treat 3 x   
Low rank in last month 
 
New observer x Low rank in previous month 1.38*** (0.42) 
Treat 1 x Low rank in last month -0.06 (0.62) 
Treat 3 x Low rank in last month -0.51 (0.63) 
Treat 1 x Treat 3 x   
Low rank in last month 
 
Tenure  Yes 
Tenure x New observer Yes 
Observer fixed effects Yes 
Store-month fixed effects Yes 
Observations 427 
 Errors in parentheses: Robust and clustered at the observer level. † p<0.15 / * p<0.1 / ** p<0.05 / *** 
p<0.01 / # p<0.05 in a joint t-test. The results are robust to adding lagged observations as a control. 
 
3.4.6. Impact on safety relevant worker behaviors  
The observer has to record on the observations sheet whether the behaviors in the CBI that she/he 
focused on were executed in a safe or a risky manner75. One or more risky behaviors provide the 
ground for providing feedback to the worker.  
                                                 
 
75 It could be argued that the number of CBI behaviours recorded by the observer (whether safe or risky) is a measure 
of observer effort on the execution of observations. We analysed the impact of the treatments on the total number of 
recorded CBI behaviours, conditional on the number of observations, but did not find any significant impact (see 
Appendix3.7.7).  
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Table 35 presents the impact of the treatment on the number of risky behaviors that were recorded 
by the observer. The models are the same as the ones in Table 31 with the addition of the number 
of observations and the total number of recorded CBI items. These control are necessary because 
risky behaviors are spread among all workers --- the more sheets an observer completes and the 
more items she/he focuses on, the more risky behaviors she/he would finds.  
Column (1) shows that the amount of risky behaviors is significantly lower for by workers in 
Treatment 1. The effect size of -0.99 behaviors is sizeable, representing a 28.5% decrease from the 
mean of 3.47 --- BAPP matters, in other words, observations do translate into a reduction of risky 
behaviors.. Columns (2) and (3) indicate that this impact is stable across new and committee 
observers. Again, Treatment 2 reverses the beneficial impact of Treatment 1.  Again, as above, 
this suggests that Treatment 2 has a negative impact not because it is badly implemented (as 
observations still translate into reduced risky behaviors), because of a negative worker reaction to 
revealing the names, in the form of refusing to engage76. Finally, Treatment 3 is again non 
significant. 
As an aside, it is interesting to note that the control variable “tenure” is related to a lower level of 
risky behaviors: this is a sign that observer experience does play a role in reducing risks. 
 
                                                 
 
76 However, it could also be argued that the lower observations documented for treatment 2 in Table 31are the driving 
force for finding an increase in risky behaviour (and thus it wouldn’t be the workers’ reaction driving the effect). 
However, the inclusion of observations as a control refutes this concern: the estimates of Table 35Table 35 is 
conditional on the impact of the treatments on the number of observations. 
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Table 35. Impact of treatments on worker behaviour 
  Risky behaviors 
(1) 
Risky behaviors 
(2) 
Risky behaviors 
(3) 
Treat 1  -0.99*  (0.52)   
Treat 1 x Committee observer   -1.09   (0.70)  
Treat 1 x Committee observer alone   -1.12*  (0.67) 
Treat 1 x Committee observer with group   -1.07   (0.89) 
Treat 1 x New observer  -0.89*   (0.53) -0.89*  (0.58) 
Treat 1 x Treat 2 1.15*    (0.68) 1.14*    (0.68) 1.14*    (0.68) 
Treat 1 x Treat 3 0.14     (0.70) 0.20     (0.75) 0.21     (0.72) 
Enabler 0.76     (0.71) 0.74     (0.73) 0.74     (0.73) 
Tenure  -0.08#   (0.13) -0.07#   (0.13) -0.08#   (0.15) 
Tenure x New observer -0.16#   (0.16) -0.15#   (0.16) -0.15#   (0.17) 
New 0.62     (1.06) 0.51     (1.10) 0.51     (1.12) 
CBI Items 0.02     (0.01) 0.02     (0.02) 0.02     (0.01) 
Observations 0.48*** (0.15) 0.48*** (0.15) 0.48*** (0.15) 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 585 585 585 
R-square 49.73% 49.75% 49.75% 
Mean (per observation) 3.47 (0.69) 3.47 (0.69) 3.47 (0.69) 
OLS. Errors in parentheses: Robust and clustered at the observer level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. # denotes 
p<0.1 in a joint t-test. 
 
3.4.7. Impact on the likelihood of becoming observer 
If the group interaction structure works as it appears so far, it might influence not only the number 
of observations that observers conduct, it might also increase the attractiveness for workers of 
becoming an observer. This is indeed what we demonstrate in this section.  
Figure 23 and Figure 24 examine this graphically and show that the effect is subtle at first glance. 
In the former, we present the evolution of the number of observers, separating in four groups 
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considering whether observers are from the treated group, and whether the observers are in the 
initial committee or whether they are new observers. In the later, we divide the new observers by 
the eligible workers, generating a “probability of being observer” for Treatment 1 and control. We 
see that as BAPP penetrates each store, we see an increase in new observers over time and that this 
increase is higher, albeit not much, in Treatment 1 compared to control. The committees slightly 
shrink over time because of natural rotation in observers.  This results, which are not controlling 
for a potential backlash of treatment 2, suggests that Treatment 1 is affecting positively the 
likelihood of becoming observer and therefore, speeding up the diffusion of cooperation. 
 
Figure 23. Evolution of the recruitment of observers in time 
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Figure 24. Evolution of the ratio of new observers to committee members in time. 
 
 
These figures are merely suggestive and are subject to confounds.  In order to statistically test the 
impact of the different treatments on the probability of becoming an observer, we run the following 
OLS model: 
OBSERVERijt = b1 + b2 x TRAT1ij + b3 x TRAT1ij x TRAT2ij + b4 x TRAT1ij x TRAT3ij + Xit + 
τtj + uijt   (14) 
In equation (14) we model the likelihood of becoming an observer for all workers, excluding those 
who are part of the committee. OBSERVERijt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a 
specific worker i in a stores j is an active observer in month t and zero otherwise. TRAT1ij is a 
dummy that takes the value of 1 if that worker is under Treatment 1 and zero otherwise. TRAT2ij 
and TRAT3 are defined in the same way, respectively. Xit is a vector of controls at the individual 
level for each period (age, tenure, gender and job title), while τtj are fixed effects at the store and 
the calendar-month level. 
Table 36 presents the estimates of the model. Columns (1) and (2) uses all the months of 
implementation as the sample. The first column indicates that there seems to be no effect of 
Treatment 1 on the likelihood of becoming an observer. However, the picture changes when we 
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disaggregate the treatments: Column (2) indicates that the null effect in column (1) is due to 
Treatments 1 and 2 having opposite effects of comparable sizes. Treatment 1 increases the 
likelihood of becoming and observer by 1.9 percentages points over the timeframe of our 
experiment, which is almost equivalent to the mean likelihood of 2.2 percent. In contrast, 
Treatment 2 decreases the likelihood by 2.1 percentages points, reversing the positive impact of 
Treatment 1.  Treatment 3  does not play a relevant role in the likelihood of becoming an observer. 
These results are consistent with the previous results on observations and risky behavior. By 
considering all the months of implementation, columns (1) and (2) include many early months 
where recruiting was non-existent or irrelevant, thus decreasing the power of the estimates. In 
column (3) we skip that problem by consider only the workers in May-18. The downside is that 
we don’t consider attrition of observer, which is captured in column (2). The results are consistent 
and statistically stronger: Treatment 1 increases the likelihood of becoming observer by 5 
percentages points (equal to the mean) while Treatment 2 reverts this, with a decrease of 7.2 
percentages points.  
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Table 36. Impact of the treatments on the probability of becoming an observer. 
    
P(observer) P(observer) 
P(observer) 
 by May-18 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Trat 1 0.003   (0.006) 0.019#   (0.013) 0.054**   (0.025) 
Trat 1 x Trat 2  -0.021*   (0.012) -0.072**   (0.028) 
Trat 1 x Trat 3  -0.009   (0.010) -0.006   (0.027) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Store fixed effects No No Yes 
Observations 10,879 10,879 1,072 
R-squared 0.02 0.027 0.011 
Mean 0.022 0.022 0.052 
OLS. Errors in parentheses: Robust and clustered at the worker level. # p<0.15, * p<0.1,** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
All regressions exclude committee members. Sample restricted to months and stores with BAPP already 
implemented. 
  
3.4.8. Estimating the economic effect: Impact on accidents 
In this section we verify that the overall impact of the BAPP methodology on accidents is 
influenced by our experiment, in other words, we verify that the experiment is economically 
meaningful.  
We first study the impact of BAPP as a whole, replicating the type of test executed in section 3.3.3. 
This allows us to confirm earlier findings, but more importantly, to weigh the impact of the 
experiment against the overall impact that BAPP has on the stores. In order to study the impact of 
the different treatments on the probability of having an accident, we run the following model:  
ACCIDENTijt = b1 + b2 x BAPPij + b3 x BAPPij x TIME_ELAPSEDij + b4 x OBSijt +  Xit + τt + γj 
+ uijt   (15) 
Accidents is a dummy that takes the value of one if the worker i in the store j experienced an 
accident in the month t, and zero otherwise. The variables BAPP takes the value of one in the 
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month where observations start, and zero before that. The variable TIME_ELAPSED is a count 
variable that takes zero before BAPP and then 1, 2, 3, etc. for each month elapsed in the BAPP 
implementation of a site. Coefficient b2 capture the impact on the level at time 0, while b3 captures 
whether the impact of BAPP builds up over time. X is the same vector of controls as above. We 
control for month and store fixed effects to control for the common trend in accidents and store 
unobservables (in this model we can’t add joint fixed effects as τtj) because it would be collinear 
with BAPP x TIME-ELAPSED). OBSijt is a dummy identifying that a worker is an observer after 
it becomes one: this variable captures the indirect impact of BAPP through the behaviour of 
observers (which might change beyond what is caused by being observed). In this sample, we 
include only the four sites of our experiment and a time period from January 2016 to May-2018. 
Thus, our test of BAPP’s impact is a simple first-difference test, whose identification hinges on 
invariant store and worker unobservables.77 In addition, we only consider workers that are subject 
of BAPP, that is, we exclude supervisors and managerial positions. 
Table 37 presents the results. We study six different measures of accidents registered by ACHS, 
total accidents which we analyse in panel a), and its breakdown into work accidents (panel b), 
commuting accidents (panel e), and quasi-accidents (panel f). We further break down work 
accidents into two sub-groups: without lost working days (panel c) and with lost working days 
(panel d). Final, in the case of lost days, we also study the length of leave (panel g). In the first two 
columns of panel a) we find that BAPP reduces accidents over time, a result that is statistically 
significant at 90%. During its first 12 months, BAPP is correlated with an average decrease of 1.1 
percentage points in the likelihood of any type of accident for that period [(0.0022 + 0.0016 x 
12)/2], which is equivalent to a decrease of 9.5% in the yearly rate of accident (of any type) [0.011 
/ (0.0094 x 12)] (at the 12th month is twice that). By exploring the other panels, we find that the 
impact of BAPP is concentrated on work accidents, with no impact on commuting or quasi 
                                                 
 
77 We left for further research the execution of more complex impact assessment methods such as i) matching the 
treatment stores with other similar untreated stores and execute a difference-in-differences (or a triple difference test 
using the supervisors and managerial workers as well), or ii) using the workers that are transferred to a new site after 
being treated by BAPP.  
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accidents. If we repeat the exercise of panel a) now for panel b) we find that BAPP is correlated 
with a reduction of 0.9 percentages points in work accidents in the first year, which is equivalent 
to 17.4% of the mean of work accidents for that period (at the 12th month is twice that). These 
results are of a similar in magnitude as the results presented in section 3.3.3 above for the DEKRA 
archival dataset. However, different from the DEKRA dataset, we can show that within work 
accidents, BAPP is only correlated with a decrease in accidents that do not cause lost worktime. 
This suggest that more severe accidents might have a different data generating process, less related 
to worker behaviour and more to inherent workplace conditions. This is consistent with panel g) 
where we find no impact on length of leave (conditional on the presence of accidents with lost 
time). We also do not find an impact on commuting accidents, which is re-assuring as BAPP 
provides specific advice on workplace behaviour. Regarding quasi-accidents, they are also 
expected to be independent of BAPP, as these incidents are mostly not workplace accidents (e.g., 
an injury from weekend sport), and those that are workplace related are deemed not meaningful 
by ACHS. 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 37, we explore the indirect effect of BAPP through observers. In 
column 4 we add worker fixed effects to the estimation. Although this improves the estimation of 
column 3 by controlling for time invariant worker unobservables, it generates an additional 
problem of attrition bias. Since the rotation rate in SODIMAC is high (approximately 5%), the 
estimates in column 4 use the information of the subset of workers that have information before 
and after BAPP, which could change the population of workers (notwithstanding the fact that the 
estimates of column 3 and 4 are consistent). The results across these two columns indicate that if 
a worker becomes an observer, s/he enjoys an additional benefit in terms of safety in accidents that 
cause lost time. These workers receive the baseline benefit of BAPP –which is concentrated in 
accident without lost time– but then are able to reduce the incidence of severe accidents as well 
(those with lost time). This pattern is consistent with the safety literature, which has accumulated 
plenty of evidence suggesting that the reduction of severe accidents requires heavier investments. 
The effect is considerable: while other workers experience a 0.2% likelihood of experiencing a 
severe accident in any given month, column 3 indicates that observers only experience a 0.06% 
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likelihood. This reduction of 0.14 percentage points is equivalent to 15% of the expected likelihood 
of having any type of accident (0.14 / 0.94). 
 
Table 37. Results of the impact of BAPP in accidents 
Panel a) 
Accidents Accidents Accidents Accidents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BAPP -0.0036 (0.0034) -0.0022 (0.0036) -0.0022 (0.0036) -0.0013 (0.0036) 
BAPP x Time 
elapsed 
 
-0.0016* (0.0008) -0.0016* (0.0008) -0.0008 (0.0008) 
Observer 
  
-0.0007   (0.0031) -0.003 (0.0039) 
Ind. level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worker FE No No No Yes 
Observations 30,193 30,193 30,193 30,193 
R-squared (Adj. R2) 0.0041 0.0042 0.0042 0.091 (0.024) 
Mean 0.0094 0.0094 0.0094 0.0094 
Panel b) 
Work accidents Work accidents Work accidents Work accidents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BAPP -0.0013 (0.0022) 0.0000   (0.0023) -0.0000   (0.0023) 0.0003 (0.0023) 
BAPP x Time 
elapsed 
 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0006) 
-0.0015*** 
(0.0006) -0.0006* (0.0004) 
Observer 
  
-0.0004 (0.002) -0.0024 (0.0027) 
Ind. level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worker FE No No No Yes 
Observations 30,193 30,193 30,193 30,193 
R-squared (Adj. R2) 0.0034 0.0037 0.004 0.095 (0.029) 
Mean 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 0.0043 
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Panel c) 
Work accidents 
without lost 
working days 
(1) 
Work accidents 
without lost 
working days 
(2) 
Work accidents 
without lost 
working days 
(3) 
Work accidents 
without lost 
working days 
(4) 
BAPP -0.0024 (0.0019) -0.0014 (0.0019) -0.0015 (0.0019) -0.0007 (0.0019) 
BAPP x Time 
elapsed 
 
-0.0011*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0011*** 
(0.0004) -0.0009*** (0.004) 
Observer 
  
0.0011 (0.0019) -0.0000 (0.0026) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worker FE No No No Yes 
Observations 30,193 30,193 30,193 30,193 
R-squared (Adj. R2) 0.0023 0.0025 0.0025 0.089 (0.022) 
Mean 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023 
Panel d) 
Work accidents 
with lost working 
days 
Work accidents 
with lost working 
days 
Work accidents 
with lost working 
days 
Work accidents 
with lost working 
days 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BAPP 0.0011 (0.0011) 0.0015 (0.0012) 0.0015 (0.0012) 0.0010 (0.0012) 
BAPP x Time 
elapsed 
 
-0.0004 (0.0003) -0.0004 (0.0003) 0.0002 (0.0003) 
Observer 
  
-0.0014*** 
(0.0004) -0.0024** (0.0011) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worker FE No No No Yes 
Observations 30,193 30,193 30,193 30,193 
R-squared (Adj. R2) 0.0018 0.0018 0.0019 0.097 (0.030) 
Mean 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 
Panel e) 
Commuting 
accidents 
Commuting 
accidents 
Commuting 
accidents 
Commuting 
accidents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
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BAPP 0.0003 (0.0018) 0.00013 (0.019) 0.0001 (0.0019) 0.0006 (0.0018) 
BAPP x Time 
elapsed 
 
0.0002 (0.0004) 0.0002 (0.0004) 0.0003 (0.0004) 
Observer 
  
0.0008   (0.0019) 0.0014 (0.0021) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worker FE No No No Yes 
Observations 30,193 30,193 30,193 30,193 
R-squared (Adj. R2) 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.085 (0.017) 
Mean 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 
Panel f) 
Quasi-accidents Quasi-accidents Quasi-accidents Quasi-accidents 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BAPP -0.0022 (0.0019) -0.0019 (0.0021) -0.0018 (0.0021) -0.0018 (0.0022) 
BAPP x Time 
elapsed  -0.0004 (0.0005) -0.0004 (0.0006) -0.0001 (0.0005) 
Observer   -0.0013 (0.0014) -0.0018 (0.0014) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worker FE No No No Yes 
Observations 30,193 30,193 30,193 30,193 
R-squared (Adj. R2) 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029 0.080 (0.011) 
Mean 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033 0.0033 
Panel g) 
Length of leave Length of leave Length of leave Length of leave 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
BAPP 0.040 (0.045) 0.039 (0.036) 0.040 (0.036) -0.016 (0.033) 
BAPP x Time 
elapsed 
 
0.001 (0.014) 0.001 (0.015) -0.008 (0.005) 
Observer 
  
-0.030 (0.027) 0.004 (0.034) 
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Accident with lost 
time 13.382*** (2.905) 13.382*** (2.905) 13.382*** (2.905) 13.347*** (2.903) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Store FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worker FE No No No Yes 
Observations 30,193 30,193 30,193 30,193 
R-squared 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.237 (0.181) 
Mean (days per 
accident) 0.049 (13.4) 0.049 (13.4) 0.049 (13.4) 0.049 (13.4) 
OLS in columns (1), (2) and (3), we estimate lineal probability models (results are consistent if we use LOGIT).  
Errors in parentheses: Robust and clustered at the worker level. * p<0.1,** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
Now we turn to the impact of our treatments on workplace accidents. We use the following model: 
ACCIDENTijt = b1 + b2 x TREAT1ij + b3 x TREAT1ij x TREAT2ij + b4 x TREAT1ij x TREAT3ij 
+ Xit + τtj + uijt   (16) 
As before, TREAT1ij is a dummy taking the value of 1 if that worker is under treatment 1, and 
zero otherwise. The same applies for TRAT2 and TRAT3. We do not have time indices for the 
Treatment variables because we estimate this model using the BAPP implementation period, where 
every worker is assigned to a particular treatment. The vector X is the same as above. Now we 
introduce a store-month fixed effects (τtj) for the same reason discussed in equation (12): 
Treatments 2 and 3 enter latter, potentially biasing the coefficients with uneven ramp-up of 
observations. 
Table 38 presents the results. The panels of the table mirror Table 37. The first column uses only 
Treatment 1 and the second column introduces the interactions with Treatments 2 and 3. Panels 
b), c) and d) show that again, disaggregation of the treatments is key --- Treatment 1 alone has a 
positive effect on accident reduction, which is reversed by the anonymity violation of Treatment 
2. Importantly, the impact is only on accidents without lost working days, exactly the dependent 
variable where BAPP has his main impact (see Table 37). From panel e) we learn that the effects 
also translate into commuting accidents: Treatment 1 is associated with a reduction (p-value 0.13) 
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while Treatment 2 reverts this effect. This result suggests that the group structure, properly 
implemented, can generate benefits beyond the primary domain of BAPP. Quasi-accidents are not 
affected by the treatments. Regarding Treatment 3, we find that it generates a significant boost of 
Treatment 1 in work accidents without lost working days. This result is unexpected as no previous 
test of Treatment 3 has yielded an impact on observations or worker behavior. In addition to 
chance, this result could be explained if Treatment 3 generated a higher quality of interaction in 
observations, something that we have not captured so far in our tests. All of these effects are 
reflected in panel a) of total accidents.  
Regarding the length of leave, we find that, conditional on the presence of lost time accidents, 
treatment 2 is associated with a reduction in the time (p-value 0.102).  
The impact in panel b) of a decrease of 0.3 percentages points for Treatment 1 is equivalent to a 
one third of the overall BAPP impact, or a 6% reduction in the yearly mean of work accidents. 
This is a sizable effect, indicating that the treatment can importantly enhance the impact of BAPP. 
However, our pre-experiment power calculation suggests that we should not have been able to 
detect this effect if power is set at 80% (the minimum effect to detect was closer to 0.7 percentage 
points, assuming repeated observations). Our ex-post power calculation indicates that it is around 
15%, which is low. The advantage in our case is that we already documented the underlying 
mechanisms (observations) at a fairly well powered level and with a high PPV (see section 3.4.5). 
In our case, when calculating the PPV suggested by Ioannidis (2005) we can use this fact and 
assume a larger R, which we set at 50%. Assuming this, we obtain a PPV of 65%, that is, we have 
a two in three chance that the statistically significant finding we uncover actually reflects a true 
effect.  
 
Table 38. Results of the impact of treatments in accidents 
Panel a) 
Accidents Accidents 
(1) (2) 
Trat 1 -0.0003 (0.0017) -0.0031 (0.0026) 
Trat 1 x Trat 2 
 
0.0072** (0.0033) 
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Trat 1 x Trat 3 
 
-0.0035 (0.0034) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 11,277 11,277 
R-squared 0.0071 0.0076 
Mean 0.0081 0.0081 
 Panel b) 
  
Work accidents Work accidents 
(1) (2) 
Trat 1 -0.0007 (0.0012) -0.0030** (0.0015) 
Trat 1 x Trat 2 
 
0.0047** (0.0022) 
Trat 1 x Trat 3 
 
-0.0013 (0.0024) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 11,277 11,277 
R-squared 0.0071 0.0075 
Mean 0.0037 0.0037 
Panel c) 
Work accidents without 
lost working days 
Work accidents without 
lost working days 
(1) (2) 
Trat 1 -0.0014* (0.0086) -0.0022*   (0.0012) 
Trat 1 x Trat 2 
 
0.0034**   (0.0016) 
Trat 1 x Trat 3 
 
-0.0030*   (0.0018) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 11,277 11,277 
R-squared 0.0044 0.0051 
Mean 0.0019 0.0019 
 Panel d) 
Work accidents with lost 
working days 
Work accidents with lost 
working days 
  (1) (2) 
Trat 1 0.0069 (0.0080) -0.0083   (0.0087) 
Trat 1 x Trat 2 
 
0.0013   (0.0015) 
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Trat 1 x Trat 3 
 
0.0016   (0.0017) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 11,277 11,277 
R-squared 0.0058 0.0059 
Mean 0.0018 0.0018 
Panel e) 
Commuting accidents Commuting accidents 
(1) (2) 
Trat 1 -0.0006 (0.0085) -0.0024 (0.0016) 
Trat 1 x Trat 2 
 
0.0031* (0.0017) 
Trat 1 x Trat 3 
 
-0.0001 (0.0016) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 11,277 11,277 
R-squared 0.0032 0.0035 
Mean 0.0019 0.0019 
Panel f) 
Quasi-accidents Quasi-accidents 
(1) (2) 
Trat 1 0.001 (0.001) 0.0022 (0.0018) 
Trat 1 x Trat 2 
 
-0.0006 (0.0019) 
Trat 1 x Trat 3 
 
-0.0028 (0.0018) 
Individual Controls Yes Yes 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 11,277 11,277 
R-squared 0.0052 0.0054 
Mean 0.0026 0.0026 
Panel g) 
Length of leave Length of leave 
(1) (2) 
Trat 1 -0.056 (0.0347) 0.0098 (0.0264) 
Trat 1 x Trat 2 
 
-0.103 (0.0678) 
Trat 1 x Trat 3 
 
-0.0107 (0.0549) 
Accident with lost time 12.978*** (4.438) 12.985*** (4.442) 
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Individual Controls Yes Yes 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 285 285 
R-squared 0.1819 0.1821 
Mean 0.045 (12.97) 0.045 (12.97) 
OLS. Errors in parentheses: Robust and clustered at the worker level. * p<0.1,** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. The results are robust to dropping individual level controls as an independent 
variable, and to separate fixed effects for store and month. 
 
3.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper studies cooperation in large groups, where individuals bear a cost in order to provide a 
benefit to co-workers and the group at large. Free-riding (or defecting while enjoying the benefits 
of others’ cooperative efforts) makes cooperation in large groups hard to build and sustain. We 
analyse an empirical setting that is uniquely suited to study cooperation in large groups: the host 
firms implement a safety methodology where a small group of workers was trained to advice co-
workers in terms of workplace safety, and then the initial group expanded by enrolling new 
workers as additional advice providers.  Our setting allowed us to study the evolution of 
cooperation (i.e., whether the number of cooperators increased over time), the intensity of the 
cooperative effort (as the cooperator group grew), and the challenges and limitations afflicting 
cooperation as it expanded, as well as potential solutions to the challenges.  
Fine grained archival data and experimental interventions in the field allows us to dissect the 
anatomy of cooperation in our setting. Using a large-scale dataset of previous implementations of 
the methodology, we first document that cooperation is beneficial: it is associated with a reduction 
in accidents and an improvement in workplace culture. However, we document that as the number 
of cooperators grows, the additional cooperators display lower and less sustained cooperative 
effort, decreasing the capacity of cooperation to diffuse and to positively impact outcomes in a 
site. Foreshadowing our experiment, we also document that if cooperators interact within specific 
areas of a site, that is, interactions are structured and do not occur in a (quasi-)random way, the 
impact of cooperation is boosted. 
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We then intervened experimentally in four company sites where the safety methodology was being 
implemented, applying three treatments. The first treatment structured the growth of cooperation 
around small groups. This was expected to boost the degree of repeated interactions and the 
capacity of direct reciprocity to sustain cooperation (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Axelrod and 
Hamilton, 1981). Accordingly, we found that this treatment enhanced cooperative effort (i.e., more 
advice was provided) and the diffusion of cooperation (i.e., more workers enrolled to provide 
advice), as well as reducing the incidence of risky behaviour and workplace accidents. Paired with 
the dataset findings, this result provides rare field evidence of cooperation breakdown as groups 
grow and of a mechanism that is able to mitigate this breakdown.  
In our second treatment, we added a name to the groups of treatment 1 as well as providing the 
group with a list of group members. This treatment was expected to enhance identification with a 
“minimal group” (Tajfel 1982) and thus support cooperation, on the other hand, the publication of 
names went against the privacy assurances that were part of the safety methodology, which might 
cause suspicion and hinder cooperation. The empirical observation clearly indicated that the 
negative privacy effect outweighed group identification: treatment 2 reverted the impact of 
treatment 1. Exit interviews, and supplementary tests, indicated the strength of negative feelings 
about violating a cornerstone of the safety methodology: “no spying, no naming, no blaming”. 
Workers displayed a strong distaste for being “listed” or “under surveillance,” generating a cost 
that weighed against cooperation. This finding suggests two insights. First, the benefits of group 
structure interact sensitively with the context. In this case, improved group identity was 
outweighed by valued anonymity. Second, when cooperation includes pointing at erroneous 
behaviour, and this carries a cost, anonymity might be necessary for cooperation to thrive. This 
goes against the usual prescription of providing information on identities so that reputation 
mechanisms can operate. 
In our third treatment, we explored how treatment 1 of direct reciprocity interacts with indirect 
reciprocity by posting public information on cooperative effort (Nowak and Sigmund, 1998 and 
2005). Theoretical literature has merely indicated that the interaction of cooperation mechanisms 
is tricky and highly sensitive to local parameters (Rand and Nowak, 2013; van Veelen et al, 2012; 
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Roberts, 2008). In our case, we found no statistical impact of treatment 3 on the effectiveness of 
treatment 1, pointing at independence among these mechanisms.  However, we realized during 
implementation that private peer enforcement of effort naturally occurs among cooperators: among 
the starting team, observers would frequently be informed about each other’s effort, generating 
peer pressure. We measured this private enforcement and found that it increased effort but that 
both treatments decreased its impact, probably due to following motives:  the group structure of 
treatment 1 disaggregates responsibility, reducing the legitimate reach of direct peer-to-peer 
enforcement; and the public nature of treatment 3 may have crowded out costly peer punishment 
(i.e., “it is better to let the impersonal ranking operate, instead of engaging in costly peer 
monitoring”).  
Our study is not without limitations. First, the archival dataset findings only use sites that were 
selected to implement the methodology we study. Although we showed that causality within the 
sample is likely, this might not generalize to any site, as the sites might have been chosen based 
on criteria that themselves influence safety behaviour. Second, power in our experiment is not 
high. Even if statistical significance and strong a-priori beliefs increase the likelihood of having 
detected a true effect, replication of our findings is required to be conclusive. Third, although we 
present a plausible interpretation for the negative impact of treatment 2, we cannot definitively 
rule out alternative explanations. Instead, we showed, using interviews and several tests, that our 
interpretation is likely. Finally, the findings around treatment 1 and 3 and their interaction with 
private enforcement are only suggestive and exploratory. All of these limitations represent good 
avenues for future research.  
Beyond the detailed field evidence of cooperation in large groups, our study contributes to the 
economics of organization (Gibbons, 2018) and strategic organization (Puranam, 2018). First, we 
illustrate the general idea of “interaction structure” as a mechanism that supports and sustains 
cooperation in large groups. When a large number of individuals interact, a structure is required in 
order to favour cooperation: who is paired with whom  and how they interact plays a crucial role 
in generating cooperation. Appropriate structures, plus a replicator dynamic, ensure that 
cooperation can spread over time and resist invasion from defecting individuals. Second, large 
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group cooperation is at the base of key phenomena of interest in these two fields. In organizational 
economics, there is a strong interest in understanding the root of persistent performance difference 
among seemingly similar enterprises (PPD among SSE) (Gibbons and Henderson, 2013). We 
believe that large group cooperation, understood through the lenses of “interaction structures” and 
replicator dynamics, can complement the advancements generated based on rational actor models 
of relational contracting. In strategic organization, understanding how organization affects 
capability formation is central (Argyres, 2011; Argyres et al, 2012). While collaboration is deemed 
crucial to that process, most attention has focused on the coordination of specialized effort (e.g., 
Puranam, 2018) and the integration of different knowledge pools (e.g., Grant, 1996) that underlies 
complementary assets (Argyres and Zenger, 2012). However, the notion of cooperation is almost 
entirely absent in the mainstream capabilities literature78. It may be the case that the theories of 
capabilities have assumed that cooperation is easily obtained within firms (for example, with 
incentives or other mechanisms) in order to focus on the details of knowledge integration (e.g., 
Grant, 1996), search (Rivkin, 2001) or learning (Argote and Miron-Spektor, 2011), much like 
organizational economics silenced capabilities in order to focus on cooperation incentives (see 
Gibbons, 2010 for a discussion). Within this discussion, we claim that large group cooperation is 
a fundamental and basic ingredient for group members to come together, to share ideas, knowledge 
and goals, and to coordinate in order to produce valuable goods and services that no individual 
could produce on his/her own. Our proposition is that ‘interaction structures facilitate cooperation 
in big groups, which facilitate capability formation, which in turn generates PPD among SSE’.   
We conclude by mentioning two managerial implications that we believe to be important. Calls to 
teamwork and collaboration are legion, present in almost any company that requires large groups 
to work together. Yet practitioners rely importantly on leaders with intuitive but inarticulate know-
how on how to foster collaboration. Our study points to the crucial importance of the interaction 
structure of workers in generating cooperation, and thus, to the role that formal organization of 
                                                 
 
78 For instance, a word search for “cooperation” in Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) yielded zero hits, while the word 
“knowledge” yielded 50 hits, a situation that replicates in other canonical papers in the capabilities literature. 
  
 
198 
 
 
companies, departments, and units can play in such a challenge. The second implication concerns 
change efforts that focus on critical mass approaches. When fostering cooperation, these 
approaches are limited as they don’t address the social dilemma conditions of large-scale 
cooperation.  
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3.7.2. Heterogeneity of impact of BAPP 
In order to explore the conditions that would maximize the impact of BAPP, we computed several 
variables at the site-month level that capture different choices in terms of how to 
structure/implement the BAPP methodology. Then, we studied the heterogeneity of impact using 
the following model: 
ACCit = b1 + b2 x BAPPit + b3 x TRENDit + b4 x (BAPPit x TRENDit) + b5 x BAPPit x Zit  
+ b6 x  ln(WORKERSit) + Ui  + ERRORit    (10) 
This model is the same as equation (1) with the addition of the interaction between BAPP and the 
variable Z, the moderator of the impact of BAPP. Given that Z captures a BAPP implementation 
variable it enter multiplies by the BAPP dummy. We also added to Z important variables of the 
implementation to act as control, such as participation and intensity. Below we describe the 
variables we used and the results we obtained (all the tables and figures for these results are 
available upon request).  
i. Tenure. We computed the tenure of observers in their role of observer. This is computed 
as the time elapsed between the first observation and the focal observation. Then we 
Density
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averaged these at the site-month level. We found evidence of a negative correlation of 
average observer tenure in the site with the reduction in accidents coming from BAPP. That 
is, long tenure in observers is detrimental to the impact of BAPP. However, just like 
participation, the average effect covered interesting underlying dynamics. We split tenure 
at the site on tenure for observers of different cohorts, and we found that tenure is 
detrimental for the first cohorts only, while it is beneficial on new additional observers. 
From our conversations with DEKRA, we learned that the observers that start early in the 
process, particularly those in the committee, tend to get demotivated of being the ones that 
contribute to large part of the cooperative effort in the site. They feel that other should 
contribute as well. On the contrary, for the newer cohorts, low tenure is simply a matter of 
low compromise towards cooperation. 
ii. Coaching. On average, 20% of the observations are executed with a fellow observer that 
acts as a coach, who provides feedback to the observer at the end. A larger share of the 
coaching is executed by the enabler of the site. We find that coaching generates an increase 
in the reduction of accidents generated by BAPP. Again this is not surprising: quality of 
observations should improve with coaching, and effort/intensity might be boosted in 
response to a helping/caring leader. 
iii. Training method. To train new observers, BAPP considers two methods. The typical 
method is that the enabler and the members of the starting team of observers are “trained 
to train” the new observers. This method is used 80% of the time. In the remaining cases, 
DEKRA is training all the observers that enter a specific implementation. We find that 
“training the trainers” is related to an improvement in the impact of BAPP. This suggest 
that it is useful to empower the starting team and to make them “own” their process by 
making them responsible for the successful training enrollment of new observers.  
iv. Use of the observation sheets. There are two areas of the sheets that the observer can fill 
partially or fully depending on the care and effort they display. The first is general 
information at the header of the information sheet regarding the time, the place, the 
presence of coaching, the number of workers being observed (only occasionally is more 
than one), shift and hours at work of the observed worker, among a few others. The second 
area of the sheet he has to fill is the area known as “flags”. When an observer has indicated 
that a particular behavior of the CBI was performed in a risky way, the observer, after 
providing feedback, has to fill out several fields describing the risky behavior as well as 
the quality/depth of the interaction with the observed worker. We computed the extent of 
use of these two areas of the sheet for each observation and then added this up at the site-
month level. We found that these two area correlated with an increase in the impact of 
BAPP: The quality and care in filling out the information in sheets is generating a boost on 
BAPP. This is not surprising: this information is aggregated and analyzed by the enabler 
and the site committee in order to evaluate progress, plan the next steps and set priorities 
(e.g., are we performing enough coaching? are the observations balanced across the areas 
of the site? is the reported quality of the interaction with observed workers good enough?).  
v. Focused observations. BAPP also includes the notion of focused observation, where the 
observers are instructed by the enabler (in conjunction with the committee) to observe 
specific tasks, specific times of the day, or specific areas of the site. The share of 
observations that have this condition is approximately 5%. The need to focus the 
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observations comes from observing patterns in the gathered data that show that risky 
behavior is happening mostly in specific areas, times and/or tasks79. We find that focused 
observations is related to an increase in the impact of BAPP. This suggest that is beneficial 
to analyze and put to use the information that is gathered by the observations sheets. 
vi. Number of behaviors tracked. The enabler and committee at the start of BAPP define a set 
of critical behavior for the site –the CBI. However, as the implementation elapses the data 
might point at behaviors that are missing that became obvious after observation. In general, 
this feedback is placed into the comments section of the observations sheet but it can also 
be given informally as well. When this happens, the enabler and the committee might 
decide to take action and update the CBI. We find that increases in the CBI is related to an 
improvement in the impact of BAPP. This suggest that the capacity of the enabler and 
committee to gather and consider the feedback coming informally or through the sheets is 
beneficial. 
From this exercise, plus a concise and interesting picture emerges regarding the type of BAPP 
implementation that is related to a higher reduction in accidents. First, on the organizational aspect 
of BAPP, we find that is useful to: 1) keep the group of observers small –at 10% of the site or 25 
workers– so to focus on intensity, 2) have high tenure and specialize observers, and 3) delegate 
training to workers and promote coaching so to boost the collaborative spirit in the group. Second, 
on the information aspect, we find that is useful to: 4) be thorough in gathering and coding the 
operational data, and 5) have a leader –the enabler and committee– that acts upon the patterns that 
can be extracted from the data.  
3.7.3. Letter handed out to workers 
 
Letter handed out under treatment 1 
Estimado Colaborador, 
En nuestra tienda estamos implementando la metodología BAPP cuyo propósito es ayudarnos a 
trabajar de forma segura, sin accidentes y enfermedades laborales.  
                                                 
 
79 It may also come from the occurrence of accidents. However, accidents are not frequent, and thus are a noisier 
source than leading/behavioral indicators such as risky behavior. 
  
 
208 
 
 
En esta metodología mi rol es ser tu “observador”. Esto significa que de forma frecuente, por 
ejemplo una vez al mes, observaré cómo ejecutas tu trabajo, tomaré nota de lo observado y te 
entregaré retroalimentación. Si estás haciendo alguna tarea o actividad de forma insegura, intentaré 
hacértelo ver y podremos discutir cómo mejorar; si estás haciendo las tareas de forma segura, 
reforzaremos en conjunto la importancia mantener ese comportamiento en el futuro.  
Todas las “observaciones” serán anónimas, tú nombre no quedará registrado en ninguna parte del 
proceso. Asimismo, yo seré tu único observador. Si algún otro observador se acerca por error a 
observarte, por favor indícale gentilmente que ya tienes un observador asignado.  
Yo estaré haciendo observaciones a ti y a [NUMERO] otros trabajadores de la tienda.  
Finalmente, es importante que sepas que TÚ también puedes ser un observador como yo. Si en el 
futuro decides serlo, yo te podré entrenar y podrás realizar observaciones a los mismos 
[NUMERO] trabajadores que yo observo. Podremos trabajar codo a codo, ayudando a nuestro 
compañeros a trabajar de forma segura! 
Si tienes cualquier duda o comentario, no dudes en contactarme. 
Cordialmente, 
 
[FIRMA DEL MIEMBRO DEL EQUIPO IMPLEMENTADOR] 
[NOMBRE DEL MIEMBRO DEL EQUIPO IMPLEMENTADOR] 
 
Letter handed out under treatment 2 (the areas highlighted in grey are added to  
Estimado Colaborador, 
En nuestra tienda estamos implementando la metodología BAPP cuyo propósito es ayudarnos a 
trabajar de forma segura, sin accidentes y enfermedades laborales.  
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En esta metodología mi rol es ser tu “observador”. Esto significa que de forma frecuente, por 
ejemplo una vez al mes, observaré cómo ejecutas tu trabajo, tomaré nota de lo observado y te 
entregaré retroalimentación. Si estás haciendo alguna tarea o actividad de forma insegura, intentaré 
hacértelo ver y podremos discutir cómo mejorar; si estás haciendo las tareas de forma segura, 
reforzaremos en conjunto la importancia mantener ese comportamiento en el futuro.  
Todas las “observaciones” serán anónimas, tú nombre no quedará registrado en ninguna parte del 
proceso. Asimismo, yo seré tu único observador. Si algún otro observador se acerca por error a 
observarte, por favor indícale gentilmente que ya tienes un observador asignado.  
Yo estaré haciendo observaciones a ti y a [NUMERO] otros trabajadores de la tienda. Más abajo 
encontrarás un listado con los trabajadores que forman parte este grupo. Hemos bautizado a este 
grupo con el nombre “[GRUPO NUMERO XX]”. 
Finalmente, es importante que sepas que TÚ también puedes ser un observador como yo. Si en el 
futuro decides serlo, yo te podré entrenar y podrás realizar observaciones a los mismos 
[NUMERO] trabajadores que yo observo (es decir, a los trabajadores del listado de abajo). 
Podremos trabajar codo a codo, ayudando a nuestro compañeros a trabajar de forma segura! 
Si tienes cualquier duda o comentario, no dudes en contactarme. 
Cordialmente, 
 
[FIRMA DEL MIEMBRO DEL EQUIPO IMPLEMENTADOR] 
[NOMBRE DEL MIEMBRO DEL EQUIPO IMPLEMENTADOR] 
Observador asignado al “[GRUPO NUMERO XX]” 
 
Integrantes del “[NOMBRE DEL GRUPO]” 
 NOMBRE COMPLETO CARGO 
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1 xxx xxx 
2 xxx xxx 
3 xxx xxx 
4 xxx xxx 
5 xxx xxx 
6 xxx xxx 
7 xxx xxx 
8 xxx xxx 
9 xxx xxx 
10 xxx xxx 
… … … 
… … … 
… … … 
 
 
 
3.7.4. Report used in treatment 3 
 
Report 
            
Listado observadores y observaciones BAPP 
En nuestra tienda estamos implementando, con ayuda de la ACHS, una metodología de prevención 
de accidentes laborales llamada BAPP. En esta metodología, el rol de los “observadores” es muy 
importante.  
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Los observadores son compañeros de trabajo que destinan parte de su tiempo a observar como 
ejecutamos nuestras tareas laborales y a darnos retroalimentación acerca de cómo hacerlas de 
forma segura. Abajo se despliega un listado con sus nombres, y la cantidad y la calidad de las 
observaciones que ellos han realizado.  
Te invitamos a apoyar a los observadores en su labor! Recuerda también que tú puedes ser un 
observador. Contáctanos en caso que quieras ser parte de este equipo. 
Nombre 
observador BAPP 
Fecha de inicio 
como observador 
Número total de 
trabajadores 
observados 
Promedio mensual 
de trabajadores 
observados  
Prueba probando    
Prueba probó    
….    
….    
Etc.    
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Picture of published report in “La Reina” store 
 
Picture of published report in “Huechuraba” store 
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3.7.5. Identifying the treatment effects 
 
Consider T1, T2, and T3 as treatments, and A, T, H, L as the differential impact that the treatments 
have above the control group within a site (where T2 and T3 really capture the incremental 
generated on T1). The treatments effect can be identified using the following system of equations: 
T1                       = A      (1)    “Antofagasta” 
T1  +  T2            = T       (2)   “Temuco” 
T1             + T3  = H      (3)    “Huechuraba” 
T1  +  T2  + T3  = L       (4)    “La Reina” 
 
Adding (1) and (2), we get the following system, 
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2T1  +  T2            = A + T       (2’) 
  T1             + T3  = H      (3) 
  T1  +  T2  + T3  = L       (4) 
The solution is: 
T1 = (A + H – L + T) / 2   ;    T2 = L – H     ;    T3 = (H – A + L – T) / 2 
 
If we add (1) to (3), we get, 
  T1  +  T2            = T           (2) 
  2T1           + T3  = H + A     (3’) 
  T1  +  T2  + T3  = L             (4) 
The solution is: 
T1 = (A + H – L + T) / 2   ;    T2 = (L + T – A – H ) / 2    ;    T3 = L – T 
 
The average of the previous solutions is: 
 T1 = (A – [L – (T + H)] ) / 2   ;     T2 = (3L – 3H + T - A) / 4    ;    T3 = (3L – 3T + H – A) / 4 
 
From these solutions it is easy to see that the information from all sites is used to identify the 
treatment effects. 
 
Other solutions are restrictive. For example, if we add (1) to (4), we get, 
  T1  +  T2            = T             (2) 
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  T1             + T3  = H             (3) 
  2T1  +  T2  + T3  = L + A     (4’) 
The solution is: 
T1 = L + A - H ;    T2 = H – L + T - A ;  T3 = 2H – A – L   , provided that H + L = A + L 
 
 
3.7.6. Power calculations 
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3.7.7. Impact of treatment on number of CBI items recorded 
 
  CBI Items 
(1) 
CBI Items 
(2) 
CBI Items 
(3) 
Treat 1  -1.51   (1.80) 
  
Treat 1 x Committee observer 
 
-1.67   (2.69) 
 
Treat 1 x Committee observer alone 
  
-1.28   (2.20) 
Treat 1 x Committee observer with group 
  
-2.01   (3.79) 
Treat 1 x New observer 
 
-1.34   (2.08) -1.28  (2.12) 
Treat 1 x Treat 2 -2.94    (2.67) -2.96    (2.70) -3.02    (2.75) 
Treat 1 x Treat 3 -0.50    (3.02) -0.41    (3.29) -0.58    (3.30) 
Enabler 1.23     (3.29) 1.19     (3.25) 1.20     (3.27) 
Tenure  1.07**  (0.48) 1.07**   (0.48) 1.09**   (0.46) 
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Tenure x New observer -0.19    (0.54) -0.19    (0.55) -0.21    (0.54) 
New 4.23     (2.96) 4.28     (2.96) 4.16     (3.49) 
Sheets 5.86*** (0.31) 5.86*** (0.31) 5.86*** (0.31) 
Store-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 585 585 585 
R-square 84.0% 84.0% 84.0% 
Mean (mean per observation) 30.66 (6.11) 30.66 (6.11) 30.66 (6.11) 
OLS. Errors in parentheses: Robust and clustered at the observer level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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4. Concluding remarks 
In this dissertation, I have applied ideas developed in evolutionary sciences to address two 
questions: what is the origin of firms? and, how can firms accomplish large scale cooperation? The 
answers that I propose are obtained using a mixture of formal models, regression analyses and 
field experiments: Firms evolved because they facilitate the conditions that lead to cumulative 
culture; firms can favor cooperation by exploring which interaction structures favor cooperators 
over defectors in their specific setting.   
In the remaining of these remarks, I will briefly describe three (early stage) projects that, in a joint 
effort with collaborators, plan to take the cultural evolution agenda further.  
The first project attempts to introduce cultural evolution to management. Several evolutionary 
approaches exist management (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Aldrich, 1999; Hannan and Freeman, 
1997; Levinthal, 1997). In this project we detail how cultural evolution can provide novel and 
valuable contributions to management:  
i) it provides an overarching framework that can integrate and organize the cacophony of 
(highly insular and disconnected) research branches in our field --in a similar way how 
evolution integrated the different biological sciences (e.g., paleontogy, genetics, ecology, 
developmental physiology, cytology) under a common framework,  
ii) it allows to rigorously study the evolutionary origin of features widely present in economies, 
industries and companies (section 2 of this dissertation is an example),  
iii) it introduces micro-evolutionary models, mainly based in evolutionary game theory and 
replicator dynamics, which provide a powerful tool to explain macro-phenomena using micro-
founded mechanics --something that has eluded extant approaches; moreover, these models 
allows to engineer change in culture --something that is currently left to leaders or simplistic 
critical mass approaches (section 3 of this dissertation is an example).  
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The second project is the continuation of section 2. It uses verbal theory, a NK model and evidence 
to explain the evolution of the modern firms such as corporations and limited liabilities companies. 
The key idea is that modern firms are an excellent mechanism to accelerate the evolution of group-
level traits, defined as complex traits generated by synergistic collaboration between specialized 
individuals (e.g., complex technologies, processes, practices, strategies). Since the imitation of 
complex group traits easily breaks down across firms (Rivkin, 2000), group selection, and 
therefore group properties, becomes crucial. We discuss how some key and historically non-
obvious properties of modern firms affected the selection, variation and inheritance forces and 
estimate a twenty-fold increase the speed of the evolutionary process.  
The third project is about distilling insights from the large literature on cultural micro-evolutionary 
models and then generate practical guidance for cultural change. These are insights on the 
likelihood that an inherited culture is adaptive, and in case it is not, insights on how to effective 
drive change using the mechanisms of social learning biases, conformity, interaction structures 
(for cooperation), norm psychology (for coordination), and complementarity (to avoid clashes with 
managerial/operational practices). The target audience is both academics and practitioners. 
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